Bennett v. Mem'l Hosp. at Gulfport

1

JAMES T. BENNETT PLAINTIFF v. MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AT GULFPORT through its President & CEO Kent G. Nicaud; MYRON S. McCOO, JD Vice President, HR; SHONA REEVES, HR Manager; AMBERELY BOSTWICK, HR Business Partner; TONY ALVES, MSHRM, Director of HR; ANTON COOPER, Director of Security; NORMAN POPE, LT Supervisor of Security; and LESTER BENNETT, Former Security Manager DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-270-TBM-RPM

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Southern Division

August 2, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TAYLOR B. McNEEL, JUDGE.

James Bennett was a security officer at Memorial Hospital at Gulfport until his firing in 2022. He represents himself pro se and has filed suit against the Hospital and its staffers primarily under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Those defendants have moved to dismiss all his claims. They argue his employment discrimination claims were not properly filed his due process claims are baseless, and any state-law claims are similarly meritless.

After considering the Motion, this Court agrees with the Defendants, for the most part. Bennett cannot recover on the majority of his claims, but the Defendants have not carried their burden on several portions of their motion. Therefore this Court will grant their motion in part and deny their motion in part.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

James Bennett was hired as a Security Officer by the Hospital^[1] on February 5, 2007. [6-3], p. 1.^[2] Roughly fourteen years later, in December 2021, he applied for a promotion to Sergeant. [63], p. 1. Bennett was then fired in May 2022.

Following the firing, Bennett filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on June 29, 2022. [6-3], p. 1. He alleged to the Commission that he “was not promoted because of my age (61) and race (Black).” [6-3], p. 1. He did not mention any other discriminatory actions, including his firing. [6-3], p. 1.

Bennett received his notice of right to sue from the Commission in July 2022 and filed this suit on October 3, 2022. In his complaint, Bennett alleged that the Hospital and its staffers wrongfully terminated him due to his race, denied him due process, retaliated against him, harassed him, created a hostile work environment, failed to investigate the alleged allegations against him, and failed to promote him. [1], p. 6.

The Defendants have now moved to dismiss. Proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), they argue that Bennett has not stated a claim because his discrimination claims are procedurally barred, his due process claims are baseless, and he has failed to adequately plead any state-law claims he has raised.

II. ANALYSIS

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). That plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to plead facts allowing a court to infer reasonably that a defendant is liable. Id. (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). Courts accept any well-pleaded allegations as true and view them in the light most favoring the plaintiff. Id. (quoting Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012)).

Bennett's complaint targets the Hospital and its staff for a wide range of conduct as noted above. His claims broadly fall into four buckets: (1) Title VII-discrimination claims against Hospital staff; (2) Title VII-discrimination claims against the Hospital; (3) due process claims against the Hospital and its staff; and (4) various state-law claims.

A. A Title VII Overview

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act bars racial discrimination in the workplace. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The statute itself is enforced through an administrative system. First, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies. Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 893 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2018). This means an employee must file a charge of discrimination with the Commission laying out any discriminatory actions. Id. That charge must be filed with the Commission within 180 days of the discriminatory act.^[3] Ikossi-Anastasiou v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 579 F.3d 546, 549-50 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980). Then, the Commission investigates and attempts to obtain voluntary compliance from the employer. No employment-discrimination issue can be sued on until the Commission can investigate that issue, determine the veracity of the complaint, and try to obtain voluntary compliance first. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 467 (5th Cir. 1970); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Finally, if the alleged problem is not addressed to the employee's liking, the Commission can authorize the employee to sue his employer and achieve compliance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

Few litigants have direct evidence of discrimination. Therefore, most Title VII claimants offer circumstantial evidence. To evaluate that evidence, courts normally apply the McDonnell Douglas framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

B. Bennett's Title VII Claims

To begin, the Hospital staffers are not proper defendants here. “Individuals are not liable under Title VII in either their individual or official capacities.” Ackel v. Nat'l Comm'cns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 382 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2002)). Therefore, the motion is granted as to Bennett's Title VII claims against Hospital staff.

Turning to Bennett's claims against the Hospital, the motion does not address the merits of Bennett's Title VII claims against the Hospital. Instead, it asserts that Bennett's claims do not meet Title VII's two threshold requirements related to exhaustion and timeliness.

1. Administrative Exhaustion

The Hospital asserts that many of Bennett's discrimination claims were not brought before the Commission. To determine whether he exhausted a claim, this Court must liberally construe his discrimination charge and determine its scope. Jennings v. Towers Watson, 11 F.4th 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Patton Jacobs Eng'g Grp., Inc., 874 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2017)). Bennett's charge of discrimination, in its entirety, reads

I was hired February 5, 2007, as a Security Officer. In December 2021, I applied for promotion to the position of Sergeant. I was interviewed, but not selected, in January 2022 in favor of a younger White employee. I was not promoted because of my age (61) and race (Black). I was discriminated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.^[4]

[6-3], p. 1.

Even construed liberally, that charge only alleges a failure to promote. Nowhere does Bennett mention wrongful termination, retaliation, harassment, creation of a hostile work environment, or failure to investigate allegations against him. See Wiggins v. Golden Corral Corp., 802 Fed.Appx. 812, 814 (5th Cir. 2020) (“But the charge does not assert any claim based on failure to promote. Rather it asserts that other workers received more favorable schedules, that they wre given food while on the clock, and that [the general manager] treated black employees in a ‘tyrantlike manner.' . . . Nowhere in the charge did Wiggins claim that he was not promoted because of his race.”); Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 791-92 (5th Cir. 2006) (“On its face, Pacheco's administrative charge alleges none of the elements of disparate impact. Instead, it is facially a disparate-treatment claims[.] . . . As the district court below noted, this complaint ‘clearly supports claims for unfair and intentional discrimination, but does not even suggest claims under a disparate impact theory.'”). Of all Bennett's workplace-discrimination claims-wrongful termination, retaliation, harassment, creation of a hostile work environment, failure to investigate the allegations, failure to promote-only the failure to promote claim was exhausted. Therefore, the other workplace-discrimination claims shall be dismissed as unexhausted.

2. Timeliness

The Hospital next asserts the remaining claim-failure to promote-was not timely brought before the Commission. Again, Bennett had 180 days from the date of the discriminatory act to file his charge. Ikossi-Anastasiou, 579 F.3d at 549. So, when did the Hospital not promote Bennett?

The Supreme Court has said that “[t]he proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.” Del. State Coll., 449 U.S. at 258. Generally, that means that the 180-day clock begins running when an allegedly discriminatory decision was made and the plaintiff “was notified.” Id; Ikossi-Anastasiou, 579 F.3d at 550 (“Thus the discriminatory act (if any) was communicated to Ikossi in August, and the January letter confirming denial of her request was not a new act of discrimination.”).

Bennett represented to the Commission that the non-promotion happened sometime in January 2022. [6-3], p. 1. But the Hospital has attached to its motion a December 16, 2021, email- sent to Bennett and others-announcing the promotion ceremony for Robert Plym for the job Bennett sought. According to the Hospital, that email, at the latest, put Bennett on notice he was not being promoted. However, that email was attached to the Defendants' motion to dismiss, and this Court has already determined it is outside the limited purview applicable to a motion to dismiss. See supra footnote 2.

Again Bennett claims he was not...