Bennett v. The Boeing Co.

1

Jonathan Bennett, Plaintiff, v. The Boeing Company, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:20-01143-RMG-MGB

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division

October 25, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff filed this action alleging race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This matter is now before the Court upon Defendant's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt No. 70.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 70) be granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a black male. (Dkt. No. 74 at 3.) He began working for Defendant as an aircraft painter in May of 2013. (Dkt. No. 70 at 2; Dkt. No. 74 at 3.) Defendant has two paint departments the Component Paint Department and the Decorative Paint Department. (Dkt. No. 70 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 74 at 3.) Plaintiff began his career in the Component Paint Department but later moved into the Decorative Paint Department. (Dkt. No. 70 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 74 at 3.) According to Defendant, the Component Paint Department experienced a staff shortage at some point in 2017. (Dkt. No. 70 at 3-4.)

Because of this staff shortage, Defendant implemented a “Component Recovery Plan” which “loaned” painters in the Decorative Paint Department to the Component Paint Department to assist with a backlog of work. (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff claims that he began experiencing harassment and discrimination when Eric Infinger became his immediate supervisor in the Decorative Paint Department. (Dkt. No. 74 at 3.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that “Infinger blatantly showed racial favoritism towards Caucasian employees to the direct detriment of African American workers” by loaning Plaintiff and other African American workers to the Component Paint Department to perform less-desirable work such as sanding, sweeping, taking out trash, and cleaning up after Caucasian co-workers. (Dkt. No 40 at 2; Dkt. No. 74 at 3-4.) Plaintiff further claims that Mr. Infinger made racist comments to Plaintiff, talked down to Plaintiff, and micromanaged Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 40 at 3-4; Dkt. No. 74 at 5.) Plaintiff asserts that he reported Mr. Infinger's actions to Defendant's Human Resources Department and its upper-level management, but that nothing was done. (Dkt. No. 40 at 2; Dkt. No. 74 at 5.)

Plaintiff also contends that two of his Caucasian co-workers, David Lakes and David Dugger, commented that they did not have to wear safety glasses, but that Plaintiff had to wear them “because he is black.” (Dkt. No. 40 at 2; Dkt. No. 74 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Lakes became his “new Lead in the paint shop” following this incident. (Dkt. No. 40 at 2-3.)

Plaintiff claims that he reported the incident with Mr. Lakes and Mr. Dugger to Defendant's Human Resources Department, an investigation ensued, and the Human Resources Department concluded that Plaintiff's complaint was unsubstantiated. (Dkt. No. 40 at 2; Dkt. No. 74 at 5.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant did not adequately address this complaint, nor his complaints about Mr. Infinger. (Dkt. No. 40 at 2; Dkt. No. 74 at 5-6.) He further contends that “Defendant retaliated against [him] by practicing a continuing pattern of animus, harassment, and denial of opportunities and relocations” after he “informed Defendant of the racial harassment and mistreatment that [he] [] was exposed to.” (Dkt. No. 40 at 7.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's unfair treatment is motivated by race-based discrimination. (See generally Dkt. No. 40; Dkt. No. 74.) He claims that Defendant's actions have caused him to “suffer[] tremendously in terms of his mental, physical, and emotional heath, as well as suffering other ongoing actual and compensatory damages.” (Dkt. No. 40 at 3.) Thus, he filed the instant civil action. (See generally Dkt. No. 40.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, along with three co-Plaintiffs (Donta Alston, Kevin Austin, and Joel Washington), filed an initial complaint against Defendant on September 24, 2019. (Dkt. No. 1.) The initial complaint alleged race discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, and promissory estoppel.^[1] (Dkt. No. 2.) On March 24, 2020, this Court ordered that the claims be severed into four separate actions, noting that each Plaintiff should file an amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on May 5, 2020. (Dkt. No. 6.) After requesting and receiving leave from the Court, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on September 11, 2020, eliminating his promissory estoppel claim. (Dkt. No. 40.)

On September 25, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 41.) On January 14, 2021, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 57.) In doing so, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. (Id.) Accordingly, only Plaintiff's claims for race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 remain.

Now before the Court is Defendant's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, which was filed on April 19, 2021. (Dkt. No. 70.) After requesting and receiving an extension of time, Plaintiff filed his response in opposition to Defendant's motion on June 1, 2021. (Dkt. No. 74.) Defendant replied to Plaintiff's response on June 14, 2021. (Dkt. No. 77.) As such, the motion before the Court has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

“As the moving party, Defendant[] [is] required to identify those portions of the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which [it] believe[s] demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact.” Perez v. Arnold Transportation, No. 3:15-cv-3162-TLW, 2018 WL 2301850, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2018) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “As the nonmoving party, Plaintiff[] must then produce specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 317). “Plaintiff[] may not rest on mere allegations or denials; [she] must produce ‘significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.'” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In other words, “the nonmoving party must go beyond the facts alleged in the pleadings and instead rely upon affidavits, depositions, or other evidence to show a genuine issue for trial.” Crawford v. Newport News Indus. Corp., No. 4:14-cv-130, 2018 WL 4561671, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 2, 2018) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 317), adopted in part, 2018 WL 2943445 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2018), appeal dismissed sub nom. Kershaw v. Newport News Indus. Corp., 2018 WL 8058614 (4th Cir. Oct. 25, 2018).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the Court must “draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Sandlands C & D LLC v. Cty. of Horry, 737 F.3d 45, 54 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013)). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

DISCUSSION

Defendant asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims. (Dkt No. 70 at 14-27; Dkt. No. 77 at 14-15 .) By contrast, Plaintiff contends that genuine issues of material fact exist as to each of these claims and that summary judgment is therefore inappropriate. (Dkt. No. 74 at 7-17.) For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims fail as a matter of law and recommends that the Court grant Defendant's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Race Discrimination^[2]

Section 1981 states that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C § 1981. Plainti...