Benton v. City of Atlanta

JOSEPH F. BENTON, III, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ATLANTA, YVONNE RICHARD MENDOZA, AND COWSER YANCY, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14-CV-02799-WSD-LTW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

July 11, 2016

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case is presently before the Court on Defendants City of Atlanta ("Atlanta"), Richard Mendoza ("Mendoza"), and Yvonne Cowser Yancy's ("Yancy") Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 29). For the reasons outlined below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. (Doc. 29).

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed his form Pro Se Employment Discrimination Complaint (the "Complaint") in this action on August 29, 2014, and the Complaint was entered September 17, 2014. (Docs. 1, 3). In Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff alleged generally that Defendants Atlanta, Mendoza, and Yancy (together, "Defendants") discriminated against him on the basis of his sex and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 12-13). Plaintiff also alleged the following sparse facts. On January 31, 2012, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered from discriminatory harassment and retaliation, and that his employment was subsequently terminated. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 12). Plaintiff asserts that on that date, in the public parking area of a work site, a co-worker, John Summerour ("Summerour"), "dropped his pants and made [a] sexual remark." (Compl. ¶ 14). Plaintiff alleges that he reported Summerour's conduct to supervisors and managers, but that they took no action. (Id.). Because of the alleged inaction, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Charge"), alleging sexual harassment. (Id.). In that Charge, Plaintiff alleged that the conduct above amounted to a sexually hostile work environment. (Compl., p. 15). Plaintiff also asserted that after reporting the incident, he was placed on administrative leave on February 1, 2012, pending an investigation; and then suspended without pay for five days later, after being accused of "recording [a] sexually hostile work environment," which Plaintiff claims he did not do. (Id.). Plaintiff appears to allege that his paid leave, suspension, and discharge were all retaliatory. (Id., see also Compl., p. 12). Plaintiff seeks the reinstatement of his employment, back pay, $2,500,000, and litigation costs and fees. (Compl., Request for Relief).

Plaintiff provided some minor clarification of the events in the Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan filed June 12, 2015. (Doc. 18). In it, Plaintiff explains thatin addition to reporting the incident to his supervisor and manager, he emailed other department heads. (Id., p. 2). Plaintiff met with two individuals on February 3, 2012, at Atlanta City Hall, who provided a preliminary statement to Plaintiff in relation to the investigation and placed him on leave. (Id., pp. 2-3). Plaintiff again met with Atlanta employees on February 7, 2012, when he was told he was suspended for video taping the incident. (Id., p. 3). Plaintiff asserts that he was never allowed to give a formal statement or speak with an investigator about the incident, and no resolution was ever made regarding his complaint. (Id.).

Because Plaintiff was proceeding pro se, on May 12, 2015, prior to the entry of the Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan, the Court entered a Notice to Pro Se Plaintiff, advising Plaintiff of his litigation responsibilities. (Doc. 17). In particular, Plaintiff was "ADVISED that he must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the Local Rules of this Court." (Id., p. 1 (emphasis in original)). Further, and importantly, Plaintiff was also:

ADVISED that, under Local Rule "7, PLEADINGS ALLOWED; FORM OF MOTIONS," if the deadline for a response to a motion passes without a response being filed, the motion is deemed unopposed. Furthermore, if Defendant files a motion for summary judgment, under Local Rule 56.1, Plaintiff's failure to controvert the statement of material facts provided by Defendant will be taken as an admission of those facts not controverted in Plaintiff's response.

(Id., p. 2 (emphasis in original) (citing LRs 7.1B, 56.1B(2) NDGa.)). Finally, Plaintiff was "REQUIRED to keep the Court advised of his current address at all times during the pendency of the lawsuit." (Id.).

Plaintiff participated in discovery, often raising issues by motion or otherwise with the Court. (See Docs. 21-23). In a joint motion requesting a discovery extension, Plaintiff and Defendants agreed that Plaintiff's deposition would be taken and that Defendant Atlanta offered to host any deposition requested by Plaintiff. (Doc. 24). Based upon their joint consent, the Court ordered that the deadline for filing dispositive motions was February 29, 2016, and that any responses in opposition would be due by March 31, 2016. (Docs. 25, 26).

In its Guidelines for Summary Judgment Practice, the Court carefully laid out instructions for Plaintiff to respond to any motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 26). First, the Court reiterated the above deadlines, noting that Plaintiff would have to respond no later than March 31, 2016, to any such motion filed by Defendants. (Id., p. 6). Next, the Court emphasized that:

[Plaintiff] shall file a response to the moving party's "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts." In the response, the [Plaintiff] shall respond to each numbered fact by number, admitting or denying the fact, and providing citations to the record to support any denial as well as an explaining the reason for the denial of the fact. The Court will deem as admitted those facts in the [Defendants'] statement that the [Plaintiff] party does not controvert with citations to the record in its response to that statement.

(Id. (citing L.R. 56.1(B)(2) NDGa.)). Finally, Plaintiff was warned that the "[f]ailure to comply with this order, may result in the imposition of sanctions, including the dismissal of this action." (Doc. 26, p. 8).

On February 29, 2016, Defendants filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment, along with a concise Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and othersupporting materials. (Docs. 28, 29). Plaintiff was promptly notified of the Motion by the Court Clerk, and warned "that within 21 days from the date said motion was served upon you, you must file all materials, including any affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and any other relevant materials, which you wish to be considered in opposition to the motion for summary judgment." (Doc. 30 (citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)(1)(B); Moore v. State of Fla., 703 F.2d 516, 519 (11th Cir. 1983)). The notice provided to Plaintiff continued, "unless otherwise stated by the trial court, the Court will take said motion for summary judgment under advisement immediately upon the close of the aforesaid 21 day period." (Doc. 30 (citing Moore, 703 F.2d at 519; Donaldson v. Clark, 786 F.2d 1570, 1575 (11th Cir. 1986); Griffith v.Wainright, 722 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985)). Finally, Plaintiff was instructed that:

The entry of summary judgment by the trial court is a final judgment on the claim or claims decided. Whenever the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue and the party moving for summary judgment has demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and must designate, by affidavit or other materials, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

(Doc. 30 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)(1)(B); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.317, 324 (1986); Finn v. Gunter, 722 F.2d 711, 713 (11th Cir. 1984)). Despite the instruction and warnings, in the past several months, Plaintiff has never filed a response to Defendant's Motion.

II. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants now contend that summary judgement should be granted on all of Plaintiff's claims. (Doc. 29). First, Defendants argue summary judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Mendoza and Yancy because individuals are not subject to liability under Title VII. Next, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim fails because (1) Plaintiff has not established a sufficiently severe or pervasive hostile work environment, and (2) because Atlanta took immediate action to remedy Plaintiff's concerns about the workplace. Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII because Plaintiff has not offered any evidence that (1) he opposed a practice he reasonably believed was made unlawful under Title VII, and (2) cannot establish that his engagement or participation in an activity protected by Title VII was the reason for any adverse employment action.

Although Plaintiff participated in discovery, filed multiple affirmative motions regarding discovery, and was made aware several times of his obligation in relation to summary judgment, Plaintiff failed to file a response in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. As a result, Plaintiff has not addressed or disputed the facts set forth in Defendants' Statement of Material Facts to Which There is No Genuine Issue to be Tried ("Defendants' Statement of Material Facts," or "DSMF," Doc. 29-1), and has not responded to any of the legal arguments presented by Defendants in support of their Motion. Local Rule 56.1B(2) requires a plaintiff - including one proceeding pro se - to submit a response to a defendant's statement of undisputed facts that includes,among other things, "responses corresponding to each of the movant's numbered, undisputed facts." Unfortunately for Plaintiff, under the Local Rules, his failure to respond has significant consequences -...