Benton v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.

1

DEBORAH BENTON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jerry Benton, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant.

Civil Action Nos. 21-cv-1575 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

March 28, 2022

Re Document No. 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Deborah Benton brought this action in the D.C. Superior Court against Defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) to recover retirement benefits allegedly owed to her as a beneficiary of her deceased husband's retirement plan (“the Plan”). WMATA removed and filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 56. For the reasons discussed below, WMATA's motion to dismiss is granted on all claims.

II. BACKGROUND^[1]

Plaintiff's husband, Jerry Benton, now deceased, worked for WMATA as a bus driver from around April 1982 to June 2011. See Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6, ECF No. 7 at 13. As a WMATA employee and member of the Local 689 Amalgamated Transit Union, Mr. Benton was eligible for retirement benefits governed by The Transit Employee's Retirement Plan. Id.; see John Decl. Ex. 1 (“Plan”), ECF No. 6-2 at 3-49.^[2] During his employment, Mr. Benton elected to receive benefits monthly from the date of his retirement until the date of his death, at which time his benefits would pass to his spouse, Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 7 at 13. Plaintiff alleges she is owed her husband's benefits, now amounting to over $580, 000, and that WMATA has refused to pay them. Id. at 13-14. Plaintiff also alleges WMATA has “refused to provide any reasonable offer to resolve [her husband's] claim.” Id. at 14.

Plaintiff brought this action against WMATA in the D.C. Superior Court on December 28, 2020. Id. at 12. Plaintiff alleges theories of breach of contract, bad faith, and punitive damages. Id. On June 9, 2021, WMATA removed to this Court. Notice of Removal at 1, ECF No. 1. On June 11, 2021, WMATA filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment on all claims, arguing 1) WMATA possesses sovereign immunity from claims for punitive damages; 2) WMATA is not a proper party under the Plan; and 3) WMATA merely sponsors the Plan and is therefore not liable. Def.'s Mem. of L. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Mem.”) at 1, ECF No. 6-1. Plaintiff filed an opposition on June 30, 2021. Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss or Summ. J. (“Opp'n”), ECF No. 8. On July 6, 2021, WMATA filed a reply. Def.'s Reply Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. and/or Summ. J. (“Reply”), ECF No. 9.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim” in order to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim without deciding the merits of that claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A court considering such a motion presumes that the complaint's factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000).

In other words, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This means that a plaintiff's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555-56 (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, ” are therefore insufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, see id., nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In suits against governments and their instrumentalities, “[i]f sovereign immunity has not been waived, a claim is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Clayton v. District of Columbia, 931 F.Supp.2d 192, 200 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.”)). Courts “may not find a waiver unless Congress' intent is ‘unequivocally expressed' in the relevant statute.” Hubbard v. Adm'r, EPA, 982 F.2d 531, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)).

B. Summary Judgment

A party is entitled to summary judgment only if it “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that it “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Material facts are those that could affect the outcome of the litigation, and genuine disputes about material facts exist when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A court assessing a summary judgment motion must avoid credibility determinations and draw all inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Id. at 255. But conclusory assertions without any evidentiary support do not establish a genuine issue for trial. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

IV. ANALYSIS

WMATA makes three arguments in support of its motion to dismiss: 1) WMATA possesses sovereign immunity from claims for punitive damages; 2) WMATA is not a proper party under the plain language of the Plan; and 3) WMATA merely sponsors the Plan and is therefore not liable for payment of benefits. For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees that WMATA is immune from punitive damages and that WMATA cannot be sued to enforce the Plan. But it is unnecessary to decide whether WMATA's status as a plan sponsor also limits WMATA's liability because the line of cases cited for that position are inapplicable to government retirement plans such as this. Finally, while the Court does not find that WMATA is immune from bad faith claims under the Plan, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support this claim.

A. Jurisdiction to Award Punitive Damages

WMATA argues this Court lacks jurisdiction to award punitive damages because WMATA's sovereign immunity bars such claims. Mem. at 5. Plaintiff does not contest this argument, but instead argues that if the Court lacks jurisdiction it must remand the case. Opp'n at 7.

It is well-settled law in the District that WMATA is immune from punitive damages. “Article II . . . of the WMATA Compact provides that WMATA is a governmental unit and instrumentality of the Compact signatories (Virginia, Maryland and the District).”^[3] Lucero-Nelson v. WMATA, 1 F.Supp.2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing Teart v. WMATA, 686 F.Supp. 12, 13 (D.D.C. 1988)). “Congress and the individual signatories have conferred the same Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity that each individual signatory enjoys.” Id.; accord WMATA v. Barksdale-Showell, 965 A.2d 16, 20 (D.C. 2009) (“The Compact confers upon the Transit Authority the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the signatories.”); see also Cutchin v. District of Columbia, 174 F.Supp.3d 427, 431 (D.D.C. 2016); Wainwright v. WMATA, 958 F.Supp. 6, 9 (D.D.C. 1997) (“[T]here can be no serious doubt that WMATA is a governmental agency, and given the structure of WMATA, punishing it would simply mean punishing its innocent riders or the citizens of the signatory governments which pay taxes to support Metro.”).

For government instrumentalities like WMATA, “[sovereign] immunity applies except where expressly waived by statute[, ] . . . [b]ut ‘there is no express waiver of immunity for punitive damages in the WMATA Compact and we will not imply one, given the settled state of District of Columbia law.'” Lucero-Nelson, 1 F.Supp.2d at 10-11 (cleaned up); see also Id. (collecting cases). The current version of the WMATA Compact waives immunity for contracts and certain torts, but there is no express mention of punitive damages. See D.C. Code § 9-1107.01, Art. XVI, No. 81.

As the foregoing authorities illustrate, WMATA is not subject to punitive damages. The question remains whether this Court must still remand. The Court sees no reason to do so.

It is true that “[w]hen a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it must remand the case to the proper forum.” Gebretsadike v. Travelers Home and Marine Ins. Co., 103 F.Supp.3d 78, 82 (citing Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris, Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c))). It is also true that “[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional.” In re Al Fayed, 91 F.Supp.2d 137, 138 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). However, the two jurisdictional issues are not to be conflated; “[s]overeign immunity is . . . a threshold issue that can be addressed separately from subject-matter jurisdiction, and can be addressed ‘even where subject matter jurisdiction is uncertain.'” Id. (quoting Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.D.C 1999)); see also Kemper v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 285 F.Supp.3d 145, 148 (D.D.C. 2018) (dismissing claim barred by sovereign immunity); Galvan, 199 F.3d at 463 (...