Bergemann v. State of R.I.

958 F.Supp. 61

Scott BERGEMANN; Michael Fougere; Kevin Garlic; Richard Jackson; James O'Hearn; Jean-Paul Forcier; Daniel White; Edward Cabral; Thomas Abbott; Kurt Blanchard; Maurice Caouette; Donald Andrews; Myron Maria; Mark Saunders; Michael Dipietro; Clifford Gardner; Howard Leonard; Frank Papa; Jeffery Belmonte; David Clegg; Peter Wood; Francis Floor; Dean Lees; Anthony Rosa; Anne Holst; Albert

Mowry; Theodore Stevens; Peter Bissell; Raymond Lamont; John Gingerella; Frances Ethier; Joseph Poccia; Wilfred Bourdon; Wendy Knowlton; Michael Longtin; and Michael Morrissey v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; Nancy Mayer, General Treasurer; and Department of Environmental Management.

CA 95-579ML.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

March 5, 1997.

Ira L. Schreiber, Stephen M. Isherwood, Cranston, RI, for Plaintiffs.

Alan M. Shoer, Special Assistant Attorney General, Providence, RI, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LISI, District Judge.

This matter is before the court pursuant to the plaintiffs' timely objection to a Report and Recommendation issued by United States Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lovegreen on October 11, 1996. The defendants argued that this court lacked jurisdiction to decide plaintiffs' Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") claims. Magistrate Judge Lovegreen, properly treating the defendants' motion as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, agreed. For the reasons set forth below, this court accepts the Report and Recommendation.

Discussion

At the outset, it is incumbent upon this court to determine the correct standard of its review. A district court shall conduct a plenary review of those portions of a report and recommendation addressing dispositive pretrial matters to which specific written objection has been made. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). This court proceeds accordingly.

Generally, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from suit by all persons in federal court. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304, 110 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 109 L.Ed.2d 264 (1990). As with any rule of general application, however, there exist a number of exceptions. Most relevant to this case is the precept that, under certain circumstances, Congress can abrogate the immunity conferred upon the states by the Eleventh Amendment. See id.

In order to accomplish this goal, Congress must: (1) unequivocally express its intent to abrogate the immunity; and, (2) do so in the context of a valid exercise of its power. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1123, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court charted a new course in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, holding that Congress cannot use its Article I powers to accomplish this goal. See id. at ___ -___, 116 S.Ct. at 1131-32.

The dictates of the Seminole Tribe decision are squarely at issue in this case. The FLSA contains an unmistakably clear statement of Congressional intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (providing that a FLSA recovery action can be maintained against an employer in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction). It is equally clear, however, that Congress sought to exercise this power pursuant to its authority to regulate interstate commerce, as provided in Article I. See 29 U.S.C. § 202(b).

The question that confronts this court, then, is whether the prohibition announced in Seminole Tribe should extend to any attempts by Congress to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity through the exercise of its authority to regulate interstate commerce. The plaintiffs argue against such an interpretation. They contend that the holding in Seminole Tribe applies only to Congressional attempts to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment via the Indian Commerce Clause.

The plaintiffs' narrow interpretation is contrary, however, to both the language used by the Court in Seminole Tribe, as well as the uniform interpretations offered by the numerous courts that have addressed the impact of that case. Indeed, both support Magistrate Judge Lovegreen's conclusion that Congress cannot abrogate the Eleventh Amendment through the exercise of its commerce clause powers as it attempted to do in the FLSA. See, e.g., Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203 (6th Cir.1996), modified, 107 F.3d 358 (1997), Taylor v. Virginia, 951 F.Supp. 591 (E.D.Va.1996); Rehberg v. Department of Public Safety, 946 F.Supp. 741 (S.D.Iowa 1996); Chauvin v. Louisiana, 937 F.Supp. 567 (E.D.La.1996); Mills v. Maine, Civ. No. 92-410-P-H, 1996 WL 400510 (D.Me.1996); Adams v. Kansas, 934 F.Supp. 371 (D.Kan.1996); Raper v. Iowa, 940 F.Supp. 1421 (S.D.Iowa 1996).

In Wilson-Jones, the Sixth Circuit wrestled with the precise issue presented here. There, the court held that, after Seminole Tribe, the "power of Congress to abrogate by express statement a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity is no longer unlimited." Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d at 207. It noted that "[t]he regulation of interstate commerce alone cannot justify a waiver, because Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, which is part of Congress's Article I powers, is limited...." Id. As such, the court concluded that "[i]n light of [Seminole Tribe], ... the part of the FLSA that purports to give federal courts jurisdiction over an action against a state for violation of the FLSA's minimum wage and maximum hour provisions is unconstitutional and, therefore, the district court was without jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' case." Id. at 206; but see Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833 (6th Cir.1997) (abrogation provision of Equal Pay Act derivative of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore a valid exercise of Congressional power).

For the foregoing reasons, this court accepts Magistrate Judge Lovegreen's recommendations with respect to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction of this court. As such, this court cannot proceed to address the myriad substantive claims raised by the plaintiffs in their objection to the Report and Recommendation. It is "hornbook law" that a court cannot act in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, no matter how persuasive the argument or compelling the cause. United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 767 (1st Cir.1994).

Conclusion

This court adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Lovegreen on October 11, 1996. The above-titled action is therefore dismissed without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

LOVEGREEN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA" or the "Act"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219, for defendants' alleged failure to satisfy certain overtime and wage provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiffs are a group of similarly situated current and former state Environmental Management workers employed by defendants (the "state" or "Rhode Island"). Plaintiffs invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court on the basis of the federal question regarding certain FLSA violations for which plaintiffs seek damages and disgorgement of unpaid earnings. In addition to pendent state law claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, violation of due process, and breach of prior judgment, the complaint asserts a due process violation under the United States Constitution; each of the non-FLSA claims seeks damages.

Pending before me is Rhode Island's motion which, in form, seeks summary judgment but in substance, argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute. Rhode Island's argument for dismissal is based upon the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. At the core, Rhode Island contends that, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), Congress did not act pursuant to a valid source of constitutional authority when it sought to abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity under the FLSA. Plaintiffs, however, urge a narrower reading of Seminole Tribe. I will treat Rhode Island's motion as one to dismiss.¹

This matter has been referred to me for preliminary review, findings, and recommended disposition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Local Rule of Court 32(c). A hearing was held on September 24, 1996. After listening to the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda submitted, I recommend that defendants' motion be granted without prejudice to the plaintiffs from pursuing their claims in an appropriate forum.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), the inquiry of the Court is whether or not the challenged pleading sets forth allegations sufficient to demonstrate that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction in the case. In making this determination, the pleadings are to be taken as true and construed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Should the pleader allege facts from which jurisdiction may be inferred, the motion must be denied. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson, 586 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952, 99 S.Ct. 2182, 60 L.Ed.2d 1058 (1979). If there are genuine issues of material fact at issue, a decision must be made on the factual questions before the motion is decided. Commodities Export Co. v. United States Customs Serv., 888 F.2d 431, 436 (6th Cir.1989). However, if "the facts are relatively simple [and] substantially uncontroverted," as in the instant case, the court may rule on a 12(b)(1) motion without pausing to make findings on disputed questions of fact. Id., at 436-37.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity.

The defendant State of Rhode Island asserts its...