Berlin v. Meijias

AARON BERLIN, and FEIGE ZARETSKY, Plaintiffs, v. LINDA K. MEIJIAS, individually and in her official capacity,ELLEN W. MAURER, GOLDMAN & MAURER, LLP,JUDGE EDWARD A. MARON, individually and in his official capacity,JUDGE SHARON M.J. GIANELLY, in her official capacity,John Doe 1-10, and Jane Does 1-10, Defendants.

15-CV-5308 (JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

September 30, 2017

For Online Publication Only

ORDER

AZRACK, United States District Judge:

Pro se plaintiffs Aaron Berlin and Feige Zaretsky ("Feige") filed the instant suit asserting violations of federal and state law allegedly arising out of actions taken by the defendant in state court proceedings. These state court proceedings and a related proceeding in Bankruptcy Court were previously discussed in a March 30, 2017 decision by this Court that rejected Feige's appeal of an order issued by the Bankruptcy Court. (See Zaretsky v. Zaretsky, 15-CV-6600, March 30, 2017 Amended Order ("March 2017 Order"), ECF No. 9.) Defendants have all moved to dismiss this action on various grounds. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants those motions and dismisses the complaint.

Additionally, the Court imposes a filing injunction on plaintiffs as set forth below and ORDERS plaintiffs to SHOW CAUSE, in writing, by October 31, 2017 why this Court should not extend the filing injunction to preclude plaintiffs from filing in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York any further complaint or initial pleading against any person or entity without the Court's prior written permission. Plaintiffs shall respond to this ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE in writing. Failure to respond to this ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by October 31, 2017 will result in an injunction precluding plaintiffs from filing in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York any further complaint or other initial pleading against any person or entity without the Court's prior written permission.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the Court's March 2017 Order and the procedural history of the underlying state court action and bankruptcy proceeding.

To briefly rehash: On June 16, 2014, Feige filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. On June 27, Feige filed a notice of removal that removed a pending state court action to the bankruptcy court, which then treated the state court action as an adversary proceeding. On August 4, 2014, Harold Zaretsky ("Harold"), the plaintiff in the state court action, filed a motion to remand the suit back to state court. On September 4, 2014, the Bankruptcy Court granted a motion to dismiss Feige's Chapter 13 proceeding. On September 8, 2014, the Bankruptcy Court issued a docket entry stating that the removed action was "MARKED OFF; MAIN CASE DISMISSED."

On November 28, 2014, Feige filed a motion with this Court to withdraw the reference to the Bankruptcy Court. On February 12, 2015, Harold filed a motion to remand in the Bankruptcy Court, arguing, inter alia, the Bankruptcy Court's September 8, 2014 docket entry had already remanded the adversary proceeding back to state court. This Court denied Feige's motion to withdraw the reference on August 6, 2015. On October 28, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court ruled on Harold's motion and

Ordered, that the "marking off" of the Adversary Proceeding on September 8, 2014, based upon dismissal of the Debtor's chapter 13 case, constituted a remand of the Adversary Proceeding to the New York State Supreme Court as of September 8, 2014, and that no additional action was required to effectuate a remand.

Feige appealed that decision to this Court. In the March 2017 Order, this Court: (1) concluded that Feige had waived most of the arguments that she attempted to raise on appeal; and (2) affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's October 28, 2015 order, stating that "[t]he Bankruptcy Court's September 8, 2014 'marking off' of the instant adversary proceeding constituted a remand and no additional action was required to effectuate a remand." (March 2017 Order at 6.)

Plaintiffs' instant suit concerns actions that occurred in state court between the filing of the Notice of Removal on June 27, 2014 and September 10, 2015. During that time, the federal proceedings outlined above were occurring in the Bankruptcy Court and before this Court.

In the instant suit, plaintiffs name as defendants two state court judges, Justice Edward A. Maron and Justice Sharon M.J. Gianelli, who were involved in these state court proceeding, as well as a state court employee, Linda Mejias, who appears to be a law clerk for Judge Maron (collectively, the "Judicial Defendants"). Plaintiffs also name as defendants Goldman & Maurer, LLP, the law firm that represented Harold in state court, as well as Ellen W. Maurer, Harold's attorney in the state court action (collectively, the "Attorney Defendants").

Plaintiffs allege that the defendants conspired to ignore the removal of the state court action and allowed the action to proceed in state court despite the fact it had been removed.¹ Specifically, plaintiffs allege that, on July 1, 2014, after both the Attorney Defendants and the state courtreceived a copy of Zaretsky's notice of removal,

MAURER . . . together with Defendant LINDA MEIJIAS did maliciously conspire with willful intent to cause harm under color of law against the Plaintiff Feige Zaretsky, via conducting [an] ex-parte conversation, with Defendant ELLEN MAURER stating inter alia that the Plaintiff is deaf and learning disabled, and without legal counsel, and that her federal actions are just a joke and will be ignored that the removal of the Proceeding by Plaintiff Feige Zaretsky will be fully ignored, and they then continued to further discuss matters relating to the removed Proceeding.

(Compl. ¶ 33.) The complaint does not allege that any additional events occurred in state court until September 17, 2014 when the state court issued an order granting certain relief requested by Harold. (Compl. ¶ 35.) This occurred after the Bankruptcy Court "Marked Off" the adversary proceeding on September 8, 2014.

The complaint also alleges that the Judicial Defendants and the Attorney Defendants continued to conspire against the plaintiffs and took various other actions between September 17, 2014 and September 10, 2015. During this time, the Attorney Defendants filed motions and the state court judges issued orders. (Compl. ¶¶ 36-52.) The crux of plaintiffs' complaint is that, through this conspiracy, the defendants allowed the action to proceed in state court during this time even though the adversary proceeding had allegedly not yet been remanded back to state court. (Id.) Plaintiffs take the position, as they did in Feige's bankruptcy appeal, that the Bankruptcy Court's September 8, 2014 entry did not constitute a remand.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that defendants violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988. Plaintiffs also allege, under state law, abuse of process, injurious falsehood, civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. To remedy these alleged violations, plaintiffs seek: (1) "declaratory relief declaring the proceedings in the state court relevant to this action a nullity and that Plaintiffs herein were being deprived of" their rights; (2) "injunctive reliefbarring defendants from proceeding in the removed action"; and (3) monetary damages. (Compl.¶¶ 19-21, id. at 15.)

All of the defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint and have asked that the Court impose a filing injunction against plaintiffs. The Attorney Defendants also request costs for their motion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible only "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Mere labels and legal conclusions will not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006).

When faced with a pro se complaint, the Court must "construe [the] complaint liberally and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests." Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

On a motion to dismiss, the Court may take judicial notice of public records, such as state court proceedings. Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Canada), Ltd. v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2004).

B. The Judicial Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

The Judicial Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that: (1) they are entitled to absolute and qualified immunity; (2) plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief is moot and barred by § 1983; and (3) there is no basis for plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief.

Absolute immunity protects a judge from damage suits "unless he 'acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.'" McKeown v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 377 F. App'x 121, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d 930, 933 (2d Cir.1997)).

The two state court judges are entitled to absolute immunity concerning the allegedly improper actions that they took after the case was removed. Cf. Antelman v. Lewis, 480 F. Supp. 180, 184 (D. Mass. 1979) (dismissing § 1983 suit against state court judge and explaining that "any action taken by a ...