Bernard v. Eaststroudsburg Univ.

FRANTZ BERNARD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EASTSTROUDSBURG UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.

3:09-CV-00525

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

February 24, 2016

(JUDGE MARIANI)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

A jury trial was held in the above-captioned case in October, 2014, which concluded in a verdict in favor of Defendant Isaac Sanders and against Plaintiffs Frantz Bernard, Timotheus Homas, and Anthony Ross. Now before the Court is "Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial or Amending a Judgment". (Doc. 220). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the plaintiffs' motion in its entirety.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because the factual background of this case is thoroughly familiar to all parties and has been discussed at length by this Court before (see generally, Mem. Op. Granting Summ. J. to University Defs., Doc. 140; Mem. Op. Granting in Part and Denying in Part Summ. J. to I. Sanders, Doc. 142), a detailed discussion of the facts of the case is unnecessary here. Briefly, for purposes relevant to the present motion, on February 13, 2009, Plaintiffs, Frantz Bernard, Timotheus Homas, Anthony Ross, William Brown, Jerry Salter, and Dejean Murray commenced this action, alleging violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., as well as violations by Defendants, East Stroudsburg University, Robert J. Dillman, Kenneth Borland and Victoria L. Sanders (hereinafter "ESU Defendants" or "University Defendants") and Isaac W. Sanders, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Further, the Plaintiffs alleged violations by Defendants Dillman, Borland, and V. Sanders under 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

In October, 2010, District Court Judge James Munley granted the motions to dismiss of Defendants with respect to the claims of Plaintiffs Brown, Murray, and Salter, who were dismissed from the action because their claims were untimely. (Doc. 48). In April, 2014, this Court granted the University Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 141) and granted in part and denied in part Defendant I. Sanders' motion for summary judgment, leaving the remaining Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim for trial (Doc. 143). On May 12, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to "Alter or Amend the Judgment Entered in Favor of Defendants East Stroudsburg University, Robert Dillman, and Victoria Sanders" with respect to Count I (Title IX) and Count II (42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Doc. 145), which the Court interpreted as a motion for reconsideration and denied. (Docs. 162, 163).

A jury trial was held from October 27, 2014 through October 31, 2014. After deliberation, the jury found in favor of Defendant I. Sanders. After the entry of judgment,Plaintiffs timely led the instant Rule 59 motion pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 220).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A losing party may move for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59.

"The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues - and to any party . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). The Court may grant a new trial "purely on a question of law;" or to correct a previous ruling "on a matter that initially rested within the discretion of the court, e.g. evidentiary rulings or prejudicial statements made by counsel" or "because [the Court] believes the jury's decision is against the weight of the evidence" among other grounds. Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1289-1290 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted). While the Court has wide discretion to order a new trial to correct rulings that initially rested in its discretion, it has relatively narrow discretion to overturn a verdict on the grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Id. This is because

where no undesirable or pernicious element has occurred or been introduced into the trial and the trial judge nonetheless grants a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the trial judge in negating the jury's verdict has, to some extent at least, substituted his judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury. Such an action effects a denigration of the jury system and to the extent that new trials are granted the judge takes over, if he does not usurp, the prime function of the jury as the trier of the facts.

Lind v. Scheniey Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir. 1960).

Accordingly, the district court ought to grant a new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence only where a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were to stand. Where the subject matter of the litigation is simple and within a layman's understanding, the district court is given less freedom to scrutinize the jury's verdict than in a case that deals with complex factual determinations . . . .

Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1352 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted).

The Court may also alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), otherwise known as a motion for reconsideration. See Keifer v. Reinhart Foodservices, LLC, 563 F.App'x 112, 114 (3d Cir. 2014). A motion to alter or amend "must rely on one of three major grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence not available previously; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.'' North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also, Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, when a jury errs as a matter of law, a Court may rectify this error through a Rule 59(e) motion. Keifer, 563 F.App'x. at 115; see also, United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003) ("A motion under Rule 59(e) is a 'device to relitigate the original issue' decided by the district court, and used to allege legal error") (quoting Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158-159 (3d Cir. 1988)). However, "motions for reconsideration should not be used to put forward arguments which the movant . . . could have made but neglected to make beforejudgment." United States v. Jasin, 292 F.Supp.2d 670, 677 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Reich v. Compton, 834 F.Supp.2d 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1993) rev'd in part and aff'd in part on other grounds, 57 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1995)). Nor should they "be used as a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant." Donegan v. Livingston, 877 F.Supp.2d 212, 226 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F.Supp.2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002)). Because federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments, motions for reconsideration should only be granted sparingly. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F.Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (citing Rottmund v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 813 F.Supp. 1104, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1992)).

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs' motion raises at least 17 issues, including five alleged pre-trial errors, ten alleged errors relating to the trial, and broad assertions that "[t]he jury verdict was in violation of the legal standards on which the District Court instructed the jury" and that "[t]he jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence." (See generally, Doc. 220).

A. The Motions to Dismiss

Plaintiffs first argue that "the complaint of W. Brown must be reinstated on all counts." (Doc. 232, at 17). In particular, Plaintiffs argue that the action must be reinstated with respect to Brown because the continuing violation theory precluded dismissal as to thisformer Plaintiff. Plaintiffs do not challenge the Court's dismissals of Dejean Murray or Jerry Salter. (Id. at 16 n.6).

Preliminarily, in Plaintiffs' brief in opposition to the University Defendants' motion to dismiss, they advanced only a continuing violation theory with respect to their claims under §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. (See Doc. 16, at 5-6). With respect to their Title IX claim, Plaintiffs acknowledged that "the last graduation or employment dates of these three Plaintiffs [Dejean Murray, William Brown, and Jerry Salter] control the statute of limitations under Title IX." (Id. at 6). Brown graduated from ESU on May 13, 2006 and resigned from his position in the ESU Advancement Office on July 27, 2006. (Doc. 28, ¶ 116). Thus, in light of Plaintiffs' acknowledgement that Brown's graduation or employment dates were the controlling dates with respect to the Title IX claim, Brown's Title IX claim which was first raised in February, 2009, was properly dismissed and Plaintiffs cannot now assert that the Court erred in its determination with respect to this claim.¹

With respect to Brown's claims pursuant to §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, Plaintiffs argue that Judge Munley misapplied the requisite factors that must be established to prevail on a "continuing violation theory." (Doc. 232, at 15).² Judge Munley, relying on a three-factor test set forth in Cowell v. Palmer Township, 263 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001) to determinewhether Plaintiff Brown could assert the equitable exception of the continuing violations doctrine, found that Brown met the first two factors, subject matter and frequency, but failed to adequately allege the third factor, degree of permanence. (Doc. 48, at 8-10). However, in 2013, the Third Circuit held that "it is clear that there is no longer a permanency requirement under the continuing violation doctrine." Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, as Plaintiffs' Reply brief in support of the present motion finally makes clear, Plaintiffs'...