Berry v. Woodland Hills Sch. Dist.

LORI BERRY, as parent and legal guardian of Allen Berry,and ALLEN BERRY, Plaintiffs,

v. WOODLAND HILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT,Principal DANIEL STEPHENS, WAYNE ANDERSON,Churchill Borough Police Officer STEPHEN SHAULIS,DYNASTY SECURITY, INC., a Pennsylvania corporation,and BRAD JOHNSON, a security officer for Dynasty Security, Inc., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11-cv-1343

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dated: July 19, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CONTI, District Judge.

Pending before the court are motions to dismiss filed by defendants Stephen Shaulis ("Shaulis") (ECF No. 112), and Daniel Stephens ("Stephens") and Woodland Hills School District ("Woodland Hills") (ECF No. 108), as well as a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint with respect to Woodland Hills, (ECF No. 103), filed by plaintiffs Lori Berry ("plaintiff-mother") and Allen Berry ("plaintiff-son" and together with plaintiff-mother, "plaintiffs"). At a motion hearing on June 26, 2013, the court granted the two motions to dismiss and denied the motion to file a third amended complaint; this memorandum opinion and order explains the court's basis for those decisions.

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff-mother, individually and as the legal guardian of plaintiff-son, initially filed a nine-count complaint against defendants. (ECF No. 1.) Following a hearing on a motion todismiss held on August 10, 2012, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. (ECF No. 69.) On October 31, 2012, a second amended complaint was filed. (ECF No. 75.) The court dismissed certain claims asserted against Woodland Hills and Stephens in the second amended complaint during a hearing on January 29, 2013. Plaintiffs now seek to file a third amended complaint, which the court permitted in part at a hearing held on April 12, 2013. The remaining claims in this case are asserted against Dynasty Security, Inc. ("Dynasty") and its employee Brad Johnson ("Johnson"), Shaulis, and Wayne Anderson ("Anderson"). Pursuant to the court's order at the April 12, 2013 hearing, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to assert claims against Woodland Hills and Stephens in a third amended complaint. (ECF No. 103.) On May 3, 2013, plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint (ECF No. 102) containing the following counts:

(1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim (alleging a violation of 14th Amendment substantive due process) against Anderson (Count 1);

(2) a § 1983 claim (alleging a violation of 14th Amendment substantive due process for state created-danger) against Stephens and Woodland Hills (Count 2);

(3) a state malicious prosecution and willful misconduct claim against Shaulis, Stephens and Anderson (Count 3);

(4) a state battery claim against Anderson (Count 4);

(5) a state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Anderson (Count 5); and

(6) a state claim for negligence or gross negligence against Dynasty and Johnson (Count 6).

Anderson answered the third amended complaint on May 17, 2013. (ECF No. 114.) A motion to dismiss filed by Dynasty and Johnson was denied at the motion hearing on June 26, 2013.

II. Factual Background Set Forth in the Complaint Viewed as True for Purposes of the Motion to Dismiss

The third amended complaint alleges that plaintiff-son was a ninth-grade student attending Woodland Hills High School ("Woodland Hills H.S.") when he was involved in a physical altercation with Anderson, who is employed by Woodland Hills as a wrestling coach and behavioral specialist. (ECF No. 102 ¶¶ 10-21.) Plaintiffs allege Anderson pushed plaintiff-son's head into a desk in a classroom and when plaintiff-son left the classroom continued to assault him while in the hallway, violently throwing him to the floor and shoving him down the hall to the principal's office. (Id. ¶¶ 17-21.) Attached to the complaint is security camera footage of the altercation in the hallway (but not in the classroom), which the court has reviewed. Anderson took plaintiff-son to the principal's office, where Anderson allegedly provided false and fabricated statements to Woodland Hills officials. (Id. ¶ 22.)

During the altercation, plaintiff-son sent plaintiff-mother a text message, and she came to the high school. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff-mother and Stephens allegedly reviewed videotape surveillance of the altercation, which according to the complaint provided clear evidence that Anderson assaulted plaintiff-son violently without provocation or resistance. (Id. ¶¶ 25-30.)

Plaintiffs allege that Stephens contacted Shaulis by radio and advised him that a staff member had been assaulted. (Id. ¶ 31.) Shaulis allegedly reviewed the surveillance video of the incident and a report prepared by Anderson indicating that plaintiff-son assaulted Anderson. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.) Plaintiffs allege that Shaulis undertook no additional inquiry or investigation of the alleged assault and prepared a criminal complaint charging plaintiff-son with aggravated assault against a school official and disorderly conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.) Plaintiff-son was suspended from school, a juvenile petition was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, andproceedings were instituted against him. (Id. ¶¶ 36-38.) Plaintiffs allege that the charges against plaintiff-son were withdrawn after the assistant district attorney viewed the security video. (Id. ¶ 39.)

Anderson told Woodland Hills' superintendent, Dr. Calinger, that his assaultive behavior against plaintiff-son resulted from Stephens advising him "to be more physical with the students." (Id. ¶ 47.) Plaintiffs allege that Stephens, as principal, is a final policymaker and that this instruction to Anderson was equivalent to issuing an official policy. (Id. ¶ 48.) Plaintiffs assert that Stephens' duty is to provide a safe environment for the students at Woodland Hills H.S. and that Anderson's assault was a foreseeable outcome from Stephens' instruction to be more physical. (Id. ¶¶ 56-61.)

III. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, when considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. "A claim has facialplausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'"

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (internal citations omitted).

Two working principles underlie Twombly. Id. at 678-79. First, with respect to mere conclusory statements, a court need not accept as true all the allegations contained in a complaint. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.) Second, to survive a motion to dismiss, a claim must state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007)). "But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief."' Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). A court considering a motion to dismiss may begin by identifying pleadings that are not entitled to the assumption of truth because they are mere conclusions. Id. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id.

"In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).

IV. Discussion

A. Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs seek leave to file a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the third amended complaint against Woodland Hills and Stephens, for a violation of plaintiff-son's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights under the state-created danger doctrine. (ECF No. 102 at 8.) Woodland Hills and Stephens challenge the motion on the ground that Count 2 fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure...