Bester v. State

188 So.3d 526

Charles BESTER

v.STATE of Mississippi.

No. 2013–CT–00058–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

April 14, 2016.

Charles Bester, appellant, pro se.

Office of the Attorney General by Scott Stuart, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LAMAR, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Charles Bester pleaded guilty to forcible rape, and the trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment. Bester petitioned for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing that the forcible-rape statute allows only a jury to impose a life sentence, and absent a recommendation from a jury, a trial judge is powerless to impose such a sentence. The trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected this argument and denied Bester's PCR motion. We agree with both courts and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. The following facts are adopted from the Court of Appeals' decision:

During the January 1992 Jones County term, a grand jury indicted Bester in cause number 7791 on two counts: Count I was the forcible rape of [name deleted] in violation of Mississippi Code annotated section 97–3–65 (Rev.1985); Count II was the Robbery of [name deleted] in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97–3–73 (1972).

On August 31, 1992, and pursuant to a plea agreement, Bester pled guilty to both counts. According to the sentencing order filed the same day, the circuit court accepted Bester's pleas as "entered freely, voluntarily, and intelligently." The sentencing order also states: "The circuit court is further advised by Bester, Bester's counsel, and the State's attorneys that plea negotiations have been conducted and that the recommendation of the State is mutually acceptable to all parties." The circuit court accepted the State's recommendation that Bester be sentenced to life in the custody of the MDOC for the charge of rape and to seven years in the custody of the MDOC for the charge of robbery, with both sentences to run concurrently to each other. It was so ordered.

On September 14, 2012, Bester filed a "motion to correct an illegal sentence,"¹ alleging that a life sentence for the crime of forcible rape must only be imposed by a jury. And because a jury did not impose his life sentence, he claimed he was "laboring under a sentence, of which the circuit judge had no authority to impose. Thus making his current sentence of life ... an illegal sentence." Additionally, Bester claimed that because his sentence is illegal, he has presented an exception to the time-bar. Analyzing Bester's motion as a PCR motion, the circuit court summarily dismissed the motion as time-barred, and found "the merits of Bester's PCR motion entitled him to no relief and no hearing...."

Bester v. State, 188 So.3d 576, 577, 2014 WL 3720550, at *1 (Miss.Ct.App.2014) (alterations omitted).

¶ 3. The Court of Appeals rejected both of Bester's arguments and affirmed the trial court's judgment. We granted Bester's petition for certiorari. After reviewing Bester's pro se arguments, we invited the Appellate Practice Section of the Mississippi Bar to designate one or more of its members to brief several additional issues on Bester's behalf, as pro bono amici curiae. We have carefully reviewed the supplemental briefs filed by Bester, the State and the amici curiae, and we now affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 4. "When reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a petition for post-conviction relief, this Court will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous." Twillie v. State, 892 So.2d 187, 189 (Miss.2004) (citation omitted). But we review questions of law de novo. Id.

DISCUSSION

¶ 5. The sole issue before us is whether the trial judge had the authority to sentence Bester to life imprisonment, absent a recommendation from the jury. We hold that he did.

¶ 6. Bester pleaded guilty and was sentenced under Mississippi Code Section 97–3–65(2)² which states, in pertinent part:

[U]pon conviction, [the defendant] shall be imprisoned for life in the State Penitentiary if the jury by its verdict so prescribes; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty at life imprisonment the court shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for any term³ as the court, in its discretion, may determine.

(Emphasis added.) The statute's plain language authorizes a trial judge to sentence a defendant to imprisonment "for any term as the court, in its discretion, may determine." Miss.Code Ann. § 97–3–65(4)(a) (Rev.2014) (emphasis added). "Any term" includes life imprisonment. "Our law has long provided that the imposition of sentence following a criminal conviction is a matter within the discretion of the Circuit Court, subject only to statutory and constitutional limitations. " Jackson v. State, 551 So.2d 132, 149 (Miss.1989) (emphasis added). Bester's sentence violates neither. And "[s]o long as these are not offended, we rarely interfere." Id. As such, Bester's sentence is not illegal.

¶ 7. Bester argues, and we acknowledge, that this Court previously has interpreted this statute to prohibit a trial judge from sentencing a defendant to life imprisonment without a jury recommendation.⁴ We also are cognizant of the principle of stare decisis: "[e]ven though this Court's previous interpretation of a statute was (in the current Court's view) erroneous, we must continue to apply the incorrect interpretation." Bell v. State, 160 So.3d 188, 195 (Miss.2015).

¶ 8. But "stare decisis is not an inexorable command." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). And this Court has declined to continue applying an incorrect interpretation when we find that it is " ‘pernicious,’ ‘impractical,’ or ‘mischievous in ... effect, and resulting in detriment to the public.’ " Id. (citations omitted). " ‘Pernicious' is defined as ‘having a harmful effect, especially in a gradual or subtle way.’ " Hye v. State, 162 So.3d 750, 765 n. 6 (Miss.2015) (Kitchens, J., dissenting). We think it pernicious, i.e., harmful, for this Court to continue to exceed its constitutional authority by judicially amending Section 97–3–65(4)(a) and limiting a judge's sentencing authority as established by the Legislature.

¶ 9. Sentencing is solely within the Legislature's purview, and for a conviction of forcible rape, the Legislature has chosen to give a trial judge the authority to sentence a defendant to any term he or she deems appropriate, if a jury fails to fix the term at life. And in other contexts when the Legislature has chosen to restrict a trial judge's sentencing options to a term of years, it has clearly and specifically done so. For example, the kidnapping statute contains almost identical language regarding the jury's "fixing" of the penalty and states that one convicted of kidnapping

upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for life in the custody of the Department of Corrections if the punishment is so fixed by the jury in its verdict. If the jury fails to agree on fixing the penalty at imprisonment for life, the court shall fix the penalty at not less than one (1) year nor more than thirty (30) years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

Miss.Code Ann. § 97–3–53 (Rev.2014) (emphasis added). These minimum and maximum sentencing guidelines are noticeably absent from Section 97–3–65(4)(a).

¶ 10. In short, we simply cannot continue to ignore the plain language of Section 97–3–65(4)(a). The Legislature chose not to limit a trial judge's sentencing options, and today we return to a faithful application of Section 97–3–65(4)(a)'s plain language. We do so because of our "constitutional mandate to faithfully apply the provisions of constitutionally enacted legislation." Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Easterling, 928 So.2d 815, 820 (Miss.2006). To the extent that Luckett v. State, Friday v. State,

and Lee v. State hold otherwise, they are hereby expressly overruled.

¶ 11. As a final note, because Bester's sentence is not illegal, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Bester's motion is barred as a successive writ and is time-barred as well. Bester, 188 So.3d at 579, 2014 WL 3720550, at *4. See also Rowland v. State, 98 So.3d 1032, 1035–36 (Miss.2012).

CONCLUSION

¶ 12. The trial judge had statutory authority to sentence Bester to life imprisonment, absent a recommendation from the jury. We therefore affirm the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' denial of his PCR motion.

¶ 13. AFFIRMED.

DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., COLEMAN AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR. KITCHENS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, C.J., AND KING, J. KING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, C.J., AND KITCHENS, J. MAXWELL, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

KITCHENS, Justice, dissenting:

¶ 14. I fully concur with the well-reasoned dissent authored by Justice King. Nevertheless, the gravity of the majority's decision today constrains me to write, inasmuch as Charles Bester was sentenced to, and is serving, an illegal sentence that the trial court lacked the authority to impose upon him. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

¶ 15. Mississippi Code Section 97–3–65(4)(a) (Rev.2014) provides that:

Every person who shall have forcible sexual intercourse with any person ... upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for life in the State Penitentiary if the jury by its verdict so prescribes; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty at life imprisonment, the court shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for any term as the court, in its discretion, may determine.

Miss.Code Ann. § 97–3–65(4)(a) (Rev.2014) (emphasis added).

¶ 16. Today's majority, which purportedly returns this Court's jurisprudence to a "plain language" interpretation of Section 97–3–65(4)(a), omits from consideration the clauses which qualify the trial court's discretion to fix the penalty "for any term." Here, no jury prescribed a sentence of life imprisonment for Bester. In truth, no jury prescribed, or failed...