El-Bey v. Lambdin

NOBLE EL-BEY, in propria person, and TANIA WILLIAMS, in propria person, Plaintiffs, v. LEANNA LAMBDIN, CASANDRA TESIK, MELANIE E. GAVISK, APRIL JENKINS, LARA NAFAIGER, STATE OF COLORADO, and EL PASO COUNTY Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-cv-00682-DDD-MDB

United States District Court, D. Colorado

February 23, 2023

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Maritza Dominguez Braswell United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court on the “El Paso County Defendant's [sic] Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim of Action Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted and for Lack of Jurisdiction.” ([“Motion”], Doc No. 9.) Plaintiffs have responded in opposition to the Motion, and Defendants have replied. ([“Response”], Doc. No. 12; [“Reply”], Doc. No. 17.) The Motion has been referred to the undersigned, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.1, for a recommendation regarding disposition. (Doc. No. 10; see Doc. No 13.) The Court has reviewed the briefs, the case file, and the applicable law. For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion (Doc. No. 9) be GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.

SUMMARY FOR PRO SE PLAINTIFF

The Court is recommending that certain of your claims be dismissed. Specifically, the Court is recommending that: (1) your claims against the State of Colorado, and (2) your official capacity claims for money damages against individuals who are considered “state officials” (April Jenkins, Leanna Lambdin, Lara Y. Nafziger, and Cassandra Tesik) be dismissed, because the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars claims against states, state entities, and state officials operating in their official capacity. Additionally, the Court is recommending that any claims for declaratory and injunctive relief that are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment be dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine, which limits a federal court's ability to take action when that action could interfere with state court proceedings. Finally, the Court is recommending that any money damages claims not barred by the Eleventh Amendment be allowed to proceed, but only after resolution of the underlying state court proceedings. To that end, the Court is recommending that this case be administratively closed for now, and reopened only upon a showing of good cause and after the underlying state court proceedings have concluded. This is only a summary of the Court's Recommendation to the presiding judge. The complete Recommendation is set forth below, including information about your right to object to this Recommendation within a set period of time.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises out of a 2022 dependency and neglect [“D&N”] action, which was commenced in Colorado state court by the El Paso County Department of Human Services [“El Paso DHS”] against Plaintiffs Noble El-Bey and Tania Williams, concerning custody of Plaintiffs' minor child. (See generally Doc. No. 9-1.) In their Complaint, Plaintiffs take issue with various aspects of the D&N action, including the investigation by El Paso DHS that led to the filing of the case, as well as certain aspects of the state court proceeding itself. (Doc. No. 1 at 5-8.)

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants April Jenkins, Leanna Lambdin, and Casandra Tesik, who are all El Paso DHS social workers, “conspired to deprive” Plaintiffs of their “god given right to travel and freedom of movemet [sic],” by “filing a false report” and “removing” Plaintiffs' “blood right child” without “a proper warrant.” (Id. at 6.) In addition, Plaintiffs allege that those same El Paso DHS social workers violated their “equal rights under the privacy laws of the United States Government,” and “discriminated” against them based on their race and national origin, “by placing hotel staff where [Plaintiffs were] dwelling . . . without [Plaintiffs'] consent.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Lara Y. Nafziger, the state court magistrate judge presiding over the D&N action, “admitted in open court” that she lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs and the subject matter; that Defendant Tesik “in open court committed fraud and perjury in the first degree;” and that Defendant Melanie E. Gravisk, the El Paso County Assistant Attorney prosecuting the case, “witnessed” these events and “failed to secure [Plaintiffs'] constitutional rights.” (Id. at 6-7, 10.)

Based on these allegations, on March 18, 2022, Plaintiffs commenced this federal civil rights action pro se,^[1]pursuant to “Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 195, Treaty of Peace and Friendship June 28 1786, Article 6 of the United States Constitution, [and] Title 18 [U.S.C. §§] 241-242.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiffs assert two claims for relief: (1) “Deprivation of rights, Lack of personam jurisdiction, Lack of subject matter jurisdiction[;]” and (2) “Racial Discrimination, National Origins.” (Id. at 6-8.) In their Complaint, Plaintiffs demand declaratory and injunctive relief barring Defendants-State of Colorado, El Paso County, April Jenkins, Melanie E. Gavisk, Leanna Lambdin, Lara Y. Nafziger, and Cassandra Tesik-“from permanently encroaching and violating [their] human rights, God [g]iven [r]ights, [r]ight[s] to travel, [f]reedom of [m]ovement, and [r]eligious [f]reedoms.” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiffs also demand “a monetary sum for $100,000,000.00 in damages.” (Id.)

Defendants Jenkins, Gavisk, Lambdin, Tesik, and El Paso County now move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against them, in their entirety, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the Eleventh Amendment. (Doc. No. 9 at 1, 5-8.) In the alternative, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the Complaint “contains vague and conclusory allegations that are not tied to any specific right.” (Id. at 4, 8-9.)

ANALYSIS

Defendants move for dismissal, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief. Because the Court finds that jurisdiction is either lacking or should not be exercised, as outlined below, the Court need not address Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

I. Legal Standard under Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) empowers a court to dismiss a complaint for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is not a judgment on the merits of a plaintiff's case. Rather, it calls for a determination that the court lacks authority to adjudicate the matter, attacking the existence of jurisdiction rather than the allegations of the complaint. See Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise jurisdiction when specifically authorized to do so). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting it. Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). A court lacking jurisdiction “must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Id. at 909. The dismissal is without prejudice. Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006).

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss “must be determined from the allegations of fact in the complaint, without regard to mere conclusionary allegations of jurisdiction.” Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1971). When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, however, a court may consider matters outside the pleadings without transforming the motion into one for summary judgment. Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995). If a party challenges the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends, a court may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's “factual allegations . . . [and it] has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and [may even hold] a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1).” Id.

II. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Court first addresses Defendants' arguments concerning Eleventh Amendment immunity. See D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (“We address jurisdictional issues in any order we find convenient.”); see also Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (“[T]here is no mandatory sequencing of jurisdictional issues[.]”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. It has been interpreted to bar any action brought against a state in federal court, including suits initiated by a state's own citizens. Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1552 (10th Cir. 1995). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to states and state entities deemed “arms of the state,” as well as to state officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages. Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)); see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (holding suits against state officials sued in their official capacities should be treated as suits against the state). The “sole...