Bey v. MUSC Health Univ. Med. Ctr.

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Shawn Richards Bey, Plaintiff, v. MUSC Health University Medical Center; Octavia Nicole Washington; and the North Charleston Police Department, Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-03990-RMG-MGB

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division

August 1, 2024

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Shawn Richards Bey (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action challenging the administration of certain medical treatment on his minor daughter (A.R.B.) at the Medical University of South Carolina (“MUSC”). (Dkt. No 1.) In bringing this lawsuit, Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 4) and a Motion for an Emergency Injunction (Dkt. No. 5). Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed and Plaintiff's motions for injunctive relief be denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff claims that in April 2024, the family pediatrician diagnosed his daughter with mumps after examining a swollen lump under her chin. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 1.) When the lump continued to grow, Plaintiff sought a second opinion and took his daughter to Roper St. Francis Hospital, where medical personnel collected bloodwork. (Id. at 2.) Upon receiving the results from the laboratory on May 6, 2024, Roper St. Francis Hospital called A.R.B.'s biological mother, Defendant Octavia Nicole Washington, and told her that A.R.B. needed to go to MUSC's Shawn Jenkins Children's Hospital. (Id.) Once at MUSC, Plaintiff and Defendant Washington learned that A.R.B.'s bloodwork indicated leukemia. (Id.) A doctor apparently informed Defendant Washington, without Plaintiff present that A.R.B. needed to begin chemotherapy as soon as possible which would require surgically implanting a stent in her chest within the next two days. (Id.)

Plaintiff suggests that because he and Defendant Washington were no longer in a relationship, they “were not on the best of terms” at the time of the diagnosis, and when he “expressed objection to the proposed procedure,” Defendant Washington “became combative and disagreeable, refusing to listen to what [he] was trying to explain to her about [their] duty of prudence and due care to protect [A.R.B.'s] health and well-being.” (Id. at 1-2.) Instead, Defendant Washington “irresponsibly” agreed to the doctor's recommendations without “ask[ing] for any type of clarification” or “giving time for genuine consideration.” (Id. at 2-3.) Although Plaintiff told the doctor and Defendant Washington that he “did not consent to any chemotherapy procedures being performed”-arguing that “the results of chemotherapy often times cause serious and irreparable damage to one's immune system”-the doctor “claimed that they had the authority to move forward with the procedure against [his] will.” (Id. at 3.) Defendant Washington then “signed a consent form for the medical procedures/surgery/chemotherapy to be performed.” (Id.)

On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff sent an email to the “lead physician . . . giving her due notice to cease and desist any actions to move forward with any medical procedure[,] specifically the chemotherapy that was scheduled.” (Id. at 4.) The notice claimed to invoke Plaintiff's purported “[n]ational, religious, and medical right to not accept and proceed with any medical procedure without full free-willed and informed consent,” asserting that he and Defendant Washington “[did] not have any court order in place at all, so there [was] no legal nor lawful basis that would allow her to make sole decisions for [their] child.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 15-16.) To the contrary, the Complaint seems to allege that Plaintiff had “created a trust” with Defendant Washington pursuant to the “national ecclesiastical trust indenture law” of the Moorish American Nation, establishing that he, as the father, was “the decisionmaker and authority” with respect to the “protection and welfare” of A.R.B., who was “held as property” in that trust. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 1, 3, 5.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Washington and the medical team “were intent on performing [the] procedure against [his] will” and apparently moved forward with the surgery and chemotherapy despite his “notice to cease and desist.” (Id. at 4.) MUSC's Patient and Family Liaison later sent Plaintiff a letter explaining that,

Under S.C. law, surgeries on minors need only be consented to by one (1) parent. If medically necessary and vital to the minor patient's life and health, then can be undertaken with the documented agreement of 2 physicians that the operation is essential to preserve the minor patient's life and health. [A.R.B.'s] mother consented to the operation.... You do not . . . have sole decision-making authority (unless the Family Court has removed such rights from mom).

(Dkt. No. 1-1 at 25.)

Plaintiff contends that since May 8, 2024, his daughter's “health has rapidly declined from the implementation of [the] chemotherapy treatment,” and the “procedure is stealing life from [her] every day.” (Id. at 5-6.) He also claims that after A.R.B. was released from the hospital, Defendant Washington “had North Charleston policemen come to [his] home and forcibly remove [his daughter] from [his] guardianship without lawful authority,” such that she is now in the exclusive care of Defendant Washington. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Washington “is an imminent threat and danger to [A.R.B.'s] safety,” as she “has no knowledge of chemotherapy and its risk vs. rewards ratio, neither does she know whether or not the diagnosis was accurate” in the first instance. (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff contends that by allowing the ongoing chemotherapy treatments without his consent, Defendant Washington “is abusing the trust,” as she agreed to “[obey] the national and religious law protections of the trust,” which include “the ancient tradition of Islamism [that] the body of man and child [be held] sacred and . . . not be cut into unless proven absolutely necessary with the full free-willed consent of the Father.” (Id. at 6-7.) Similarly, Plaintiff claims that MUSC “violated [his] national and religious beneficial right and equitable asset law after [he] gave them due notice of the fact that them moving forward with their procedure without his consent violated [his] national and religious beneficial rights and law.” (Id. at 5.) Based on the above, Plaintiff demands that the “medical procedures and [Defendant Washington's] breach of trust be stopped immediately with a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief to cease the procedures, remove the stint [sic] from [A.R.B.'s] chest immediately and return the trust res [A.R.B.] to [his] custody so that [he] may do what's best for [his] property/child and nurse her back to health without the well-known harmful and many times irreversible and deadly effects of (prolonged) radiation in a little girl's body.” (Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff's “Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Emergency Injunctive Relief” (Dkt. No. 4) seeks similar relief, asking “to stay Defendants [MUSC] and [Washington] from continuing the harmful radiation treatment being currently forced onto [A.R.B.] . . . and the City of North Charleston Police Department from denying [him] possession of [A.R.B.] as they have recently done under color of authority.” (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff reiterates that A.R.B. is “held as private property in a private international ecclesiastical trust . . . subject to the ecclesiastical trust indenture law,” which states that “the father [is] the decision maker and authority.” (Id. at 2-3.) Thus, by “[performing] a radiation surgery and therapy procedures on trust res [A.R.B.] against [Plaintiff's] express will intent purpose,” Defendants have engaged in “breach of trust, coercion, trespassing and fraud” and violated Plaintiff's “equitable asset national and religious right.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff's Motion for an Emergency Injunction^[1](Dkt. No. 5) further attempts to enforce these purported rights, demanding “acknowledgement and performance” of his alleged agreement with Defendant Washington based on his status as a “private and true American national of inherited birthright . . . with proprietary rights under the organic American constitution trust indenture via the Treaty of Peace and Friendship ”^[2] (Id.)

LEGAL STANDARD

The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Accordingly, a claim based on a “meritless legal theory” or “baseless” factual contentions may be dismissed sua sponte at any time under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25, 327-28 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.

As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as...