Bhongir v. Mantha

374 P.3d 33

2016 UT App 99

Chandra Prakash BHONGIR, Appellant

v.Vidisha MANTHA, Appellee.

No. 20140707–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

May 12, 2016.

Jerry Salcido and Spencer J. Salcido, for Appellant.

Steven C. Russell, for Appellee.

Senior Judge PAMELA T. GREENWOOD authored this Opinion, in which Judges J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and KATE A. TOOMEY concurred.¹

Opinion

GREENWOOD, Senior Judge:

¶ 1 Chandra Prakash Bhongir (Husband) appeals the district court's grant of Vidisha Mantha's (Wife) motion to set aside the parties' supplemental divorce decree, the court's subsequent entry of temporary orders and a modified decree of divorce, and its denial of Husband's motion to set aside the temporary orders. We affirm but remand on the limited issue of the reasonableness of the attorney fees the district court ordered Husband to pay.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Husband and Wife were married in India in February 2011. Husband was living in Utah and, in March, Wife moved to Utah to be with him. By July the marriage “was troubled” and Wife returned to India. In January of the following year, Wife returned to Utah and lived at the YWCA. On May 4, 2012, Husband filed for divorce. Throughout their brief marriage, the two lived together for a total of only five months.

¶ 3 The district court executed a supplemental divorce decree (the Decree) in April 2013, which incorporated the parties' stipulated settlement agreement. The Decree contained the statement, “Each party is fully capable of supporting themselves, and therefore, neither party shall be awarded spousal support.”

¶ 4 Wife soon filed a motion to set aside the Decree under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that she was not able to support herself and that the contrary indication in the Decree was a mistake. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).² The district court granted the motion, finding that “there was a mistake in signing the stipulation as the parties signed something that was not true relating to [Wife] having no need of alimony” and that “there was no meeting of the minds when the stipulation was signed.” The district court eventually entered temporary orders, which were incorporated into another supplemental divorce decree (the Supplemental Decree), requiring Husband to pay Wife alimony of $1,000 per month for five months—the length of time the parties had lived together while married. The court also required Husband to pay a portion of Wife's attorney fees.

¶ 5 Husband moved—and the district court declined—to set aside the temporary orders on the ground of fraud, arguing Wife had perjured herself regarding having a work visa. This appeal followed.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 Husband raises four issues for our review. First, he asserts that it was error for the district court to set aside the Decree on the ground of mistake. Second, he argues that the district court erroneously denied his rule 60(b) motion to set aside the temporary orders on the basis of fraud. Third, he contends that the award of alimony in the Supplemental Decree should be set aside. And fourth, he claims that the award of attorney fees and costs was erroneous. We review each of these issues for abuse of discretion. See Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998) (a district court's rulings on motions made pursuant to rule 60(b) are reviewed for abuse of discretion); Dobson v. Dobson, 2012 UT App 373, ¶ 7, 294 P.3d 591 (alimony awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion); Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 10, 176 P.3d 476 (attorney fees awarded in a divorce proceeding “are within the [district] court's sound discretion” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 “In a divorce proceeding, the trial court may make such orders concerning property distribution and alimony as are equitable. The trial court has broad latitude in such matters, and orders distributing property and setting alimony will not be lightly disturbed.” Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted). After considering each of the issues raised on appeal, we conclude that the district court acted within this broad latitude, and we therefore decline to disturb its orders with the sole exception of the order of attorney fees. We vacate the court's ruling on attorney fees and remand for further proceedings.

I. The District Court's Grant of Wife's Rule 60(b) Motion

¶ 8 The district court did not abuse its discretion when it set aside the Decree on the grounds of mistake. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a district court “may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for ... mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).

¶ 9 Within ninety days after the entry of the Decree, Wife filed a motion pursuant to rule 60(b), asking the district court to set aside the Decree because, among other reasons, her “gross monthly income is zero.” She contended that her lack of income rendered the Decree's provision that “[e]ach party is fully capable of supporting themselves ... clearly wrong.”³ The district court agreed, finding that “there was a mistake in signing the stipulation as the parties signed something that was not true relating to [Wife] having no need of alimony.”

¶ 10 Husband now complains that Wife impermissibly used rule 60(b) to correct a legal error. In his view, the district court's finding “that the statement is a mistake, based upon the fact that [Wife] is not able to support herself, is a legal conclusion.” We disagree.

¶ 11 The court did not set aside the Decree solely because of a legal error. Instead, it set aside the Decree because the Decree contained a factual mistake, and that factual mistake affected the court's legal conclusion that neither party should be required to pay alimony. This is exactly how rule 60(b) is intended to operate. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) ; see also Goode v. Goode, 89 Ohio App.3d 405, 624 N.E.2d 788, 791–92, 795–96 (1993) (where spousal support award was based on stipulation containing mutual mistake as to the wife's income, the trial court erred by denying the husband's motion for relief under rule 60(b) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure ).

¶ 12 On appeal, Husband does not challenge the district court's factual finding that Wife could not support herself during the time for which alimony was awarded. See infra ¶ 19. He instead rests his argument on the proposition that Wife should have been precluded from using rule 60(b) to redress this mistake. But by its very language, the rule operates to correct mistakes. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). And here, the Decree's alimony determination was premised on the fact that Wife could support herself. That was not actually the case. The simplest way to describe this situation is to say that the Decree contained a mistake, and thus this correction fits within the confines of rule 60(b). Further, given the “liberal standard for application of Rule 60(b) in divorce cases,” Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980), we cannot conclude that the district court acted in error. See id. (indicating that “a court should modify a prior decree when the interests of equity and fair dealing ... so require”).

¶ 13 Wife used the appropriate remedy when she requested relief from judgment under rule 60(b), which provides for relief from final judgments when a mistake has been made. We therefore determine the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting Wife's motion to set aside the Decree. See Begum v. Begum, 2015 UT App 67, ¶ 17, 347 P.3d 25 (“The district court has ‘broad discretion’ in ruling on rule 60(b) motions ‘because most are equitable in nature, saturated with facts, and call upon judges to apply fundamental principles of fairness that do not easily lend themselves to appellate review.’ ” (citation omitted)).

II. The District Court's Denial of Husband's Rule 60(b) Motion

¶ 14 Husband contends that the district court should have granted his rule 60(b) motion to set aside the temporary orders because Wife had made fraudulent statements to the court. As we did with the district court's decision to grant Wife's motion, “[w]e review a district court's denial of a rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion.” Lindsay v. Walker, 2015 UT App 184, ¶ 14, 356 P.3d 195 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 15 After granting Wife's rule 60(b) motion and setting aside the Decree, the district court held a hearing to determine whether Wife should receive alimony. Wife misrepresented to the court that she was not able to work in the United States when, in fact, she possessed a work visa.⁴ The district court initially found that Wife “was not employed at the time of the hearing although she stated she was ‘preparing’ to apply for a work visa.” It then ordered that Husband pay Wife “spousal support for the duration of the time that they lived together in the marriage, i.e., five months” and determined that Husband was capable of providing $1,000 per month for the five months. It also awarded Wife her attorney fees for work done through December 4, 2013.⁵

¶ 16 Husband's motion pursuant to rule 60(b) alleged that Wife had committed fraud. The district court agreed that Wife “did commit fraud by lying under oath to the Court” but determined that “the fraudulent testimony was not related to the reasons why the Court awarded [Wife] alimony and attorney fees.” The district court accordingly denied Husband's motion. But the court also concluded that Wife “is in contempt of Court for her perjury and should be sanctioned for her actions.” Accordingly, in the Supplemental Decree—which incorporated the temporary orders—the district court sanctioned Wife by imposing a thirty-day suspended jail term and a $1,000 fine, of which it suspended $750.

¶ 17 Husband is correct that rule 60(b) “provides for relief from a judgment where fraud has been...