Bienvenu v. Defendant

382 So.3d 38

2023-01194 (La. 3/22/24)

Douglas BIENVENU, et al.

v.DEFENDANT 1 and Defendant 2 #87184

John Doe, et al.

v.Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 #87515 (Parish of St. Martin)

No. 2023-CC-01194

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 22, 2024

West Codenotes

Held Unconstitutional

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.9

Prior Version’s Limitation Recognized

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:5628

On Supervisory Writ to the 16th Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Martin

Gilbert Hennigan Dozier, for Applicant-Defendant

Jeffrey Martin Landry, John Joseph Elmer, Jr., New Orleans, Thear Jules Lemoine, New Orleans, Kevin Reeve Duck, Lafayette, LA, C. Michael Pfister, Jr., Metairie, LA, Andre M. Boudreaux, New Orleans, LA, Robert Irwin Siegel, New Orleans, LA, Gregory Engelsman, Alexandria, LA, David Jeddie Smith; Jr., Wilson Lewis Maloz, III, Metairie, LA, Cle’ Simon, for Respondent.

GENOVESE, J.

₁We granted this application pursuant to our supervisory jurisdiction to consider whether La. R.S. 9:2800.9, which revives certain prescribed child sex abuse claims for a limited three-year period, conflicts with the due process protections set forth in Article I, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we are constrained to find the statutory enactment is contrary to the due process protections enshrined in our constitution and must yield to that supreme law.

Accordingly, we reverse in part, and vacate in part, finding the trial court erred in overruling the exception of prescription to the extent it found the statutory enactment to be constitutional. However, given that the trial court deferred ruling on the issue of whether prescription was interrupted and/or suspended, particularly with reference to the doctrine of contra non valentem, we remand.

₂FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For purposes of the issue before us, the facts are largely undisputed. In September of 2018, Douglas Bienvenu, and several other plaintiffs (collectively, "plaintiffs"), filed suit against The Society of Roman Catholic Church, Diocese of Lafayette, and St. Martin De Tours Catholic Church ("defendants"). Essentially, plaintiffs alleged they were sexually molested by a Roman Catholic priest at various times between 1971 and 1979. At the time of the alleged abuse, plaintiffs ranged in ages from eight to fourteen.

Defendants responded by filing several exceptions, including a peremptory exception of prescription, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were subject to the general one-year liberative prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1).

While the suit was pending, the legislature amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 through 2021 La. Acts No. 322 ("Act 322"). As amended, the statute provides, in pertinent part:

A. (1) An action against a person for sexual abuse of a minor, or for physical abuse of a minor resulting in permanent impairment or permanent physical injury or scarring[,] does not prescribe.

(2) An action against a person convicted of a crime against the child does not prescribe and may be filed at any time following conviction. "Crime against the child" has the same meaning as provided in Children’s Code Article 603.

The effective date of Act 322 was June 14, 2021. However, Section 2 of the Act provides:

Section 2. For a period of three years following the effective date of this Act, any party whose action under R.S. 9:2800.9 was barred by liberative prescription prior to the effective date of this Act shall be permitted to file an action under R.S. 9:2800.9 against a party whose alleged actions are the subject of R.S. 9:2800.9. It is the intent of the legislature to revive for a period of three years any claim against a party, authorized by R.S. 9:2800.9, that prescribed prior to the effective date of this Act.

₃Following the 2021 amendment, defendants filed, a supplemental exception of prescription. Defendants asserted that La. R.S. 9:2800.9, as amended by the revival provisions, was not applicable, nor was it constitutional.

Approximately one year later, the legislature again amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 through 2022 La. Acts. No. 386, § 2 ("Act 386"), which became effective on June 10, 2022. The 2022 act specifically indicated it was the intent of the legislature to revive any cause of action related to the sexual abuse of a minor that previously prescribed under any Louisiana prescriptive period. It provides:

Section 2. Any person whose cause of action related to sexual abuse of a minor was barred by liberative prescription shall be permitted to file an action under R.S. 9:2800.9 on or before June 14, 2024. It is the express intent of the legislature to revive until June 14, 2024, any cause of action related to sexual abuse of a minor that previously prescribed under any Louisiana prescriptive period, [emphasis added].

Plaintiffs opposed defendants’ exception of prescription, citing Act 322 as interpreted by Act 386. Furthermore, plaintiffs argued the statute, as amended, was constitutional.¹

After a hearing,² the trial court overruled defendants’ exception of prescription. In oral reasons for judgment, the trial court found that the legislature clearly expressed an intent to apply the statute retroactively to revive prescribed claims, narrowly tailoring the relief allowed to child abuse cases.³

₄Pefendants sought supervisory review of the trial court’s judgment. The court of appeal denied writs in a split decision, with one judge dissenting.⁴

[1] Upon defendants’ application, we issued a writ of review, directing the parties to provide briefing and argument. Bienvenu v. Defendant 1, 23-01194 (La. 12/5/23), 373 So.3d 709. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the retroactivity provisions of Act 322, as interpreted by Act 386, are constitutional.⁵

DISCUSSION

General Principles of Retroactivity

We begin our inquiry with Article 6 of the Civil Code, which sets forth the general rules for determining prospective and retroactive application of laws:

In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary.

In Manuel v. Louisiana Sheriff’s Risk Mgmt. Fund, 95-0406, p. 4 (La. 11/27/95), 664 So.2d 81, 84, we recognized the limitation of retroactivity is a basic principle of most legal systems, explaining:

The principle that laws are to have a prospective and not retroactive effect is a basic principle of most legal systems. Planiol notes that France, from which Louisiana inherited its Civil Code, adopted this principle because:

There would be no security for private persons if their rights, their fortunes, their personal status, the effects of ₅their acts and of their contracts, could be questioned or modified or suppressed at any moment because the law-maker had changed his mind.

1 M. Planiol, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, § 240 (La.St. L. Inst. Trans. 1959).

In Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.2d 1058, 1063 (La. 1992), we explained that La. Civ. Code art. 6 requires that we engage in a two-fold inquiry. First, we must ascertain whether, in the enactment, the legislature expressed its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application. If the legislature did not, we must classify the enactment as substantive, procedural or interpretive. Id.

[2] This basic inquiry is easily satisfied in the instant case. Act 386 specifically provides, "[i]t is the express intent of the legislature to revive until June 14, 2024, any cause of action related to sexual abuse of a minor that previously prescribed under any Louisiana prescriptive period." This language clearly demonstrates the legislature intended to give retroactive application to the law by reviving previously prescribed claims. Because plaintiffs’ action was pending, i.e., "subject to judicial scrutiny,"⁶ on the effective date of Act 386, we conclude that plaintiffs’ claims are among those that the legislature intended to give retroactive effect, under amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9, until June 14, 2024.

Constitutional Limitations oh Retroactivity

Despite pur finding of clear legislative intent to impose a retroactive application, our inquiry is not at an end. Rather, we must consider the constitutional implications of retroactivity. In Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 00-1132 (La. 4/3/01), 785 So.2d 1, 10, we explained:

[B]ecause the principle has constitutional implications under the Due Process and Contract Clauses of both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions, even where the legislature has expressed its intent to give a law retroactive effect, that law may not be applied ₆retroactively if it would impair contractual obligations or disturb vested rights. See Keith v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar., 96-2075, pp. [sic] (La.5/9/97), 694 So.2d 180, 183; Rousselle v. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd., 93-1916 p. 11 (La. 2/28/94), 633 So.2d 1235, 1244; Segura v. Frank, 93 1271 pp. 8-9 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 714, 721; St. Paul Fire & Marine [v. Smith], 609 So.2d [809] at 816 n. 11 [(La. 1992)]; Lott v. Haley, 370 So.2d 521, 523 (La.1979). See also 2 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, § 10 (3d ed. 1991) ("Retroactive application of new legislation is constitutionally permissible only if it does not result in impairment of the obligation of contracts or in divestiture of vested rights."). [emphasis added].

Given these constitutional limitations, the issue presented by this case turns on whether the revival provisions operate to disturb defendants’ vested rights. Defendants argue that the revival provisions are unconstitutional under Art. I, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution, which provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law." [emphasis added]. In particular, they assert that accrued prescription extinguishes civil obligations; therefore, their right to plead accrued prescription is a vested property right that cannot be divested by the...