Biesecker v. Pa Attorneys Gen.

ANGELA BIESECKER, Plaintiff, v. PA ATTORNEYS GENERAL; PA MEDICAL FRAUD UNIT; PA DEPARTMENT HUMAN SERVICES; CEREBRALPALSY OF CHESTER COUNTY; BERKS COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER; CHRISTIAN SONDERGAARD;ELIZABETH MADIGAN; and BERKS COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT, PRESIDENT JUDGE PARISI, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-649

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

May 28, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Smith, J.

The pro se plaintiff has sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff asserts that her due process rights were violated during state court criminal proceedings where she was convicted of Medicaid Fraud. She also asserts that she was subjected to a malicious prosecution.

Although the court will grant the plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must dismiss the complaint because she has failed to state a claim for relief against any named defendant.

I. ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 10, 2021, the pro se plaintiff, Angela Biesecker ("Biesecker"), filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (the "IFP Application") and a complaint. Doc. Nos. 1, 2. In the complaint, Biesecker names as defendants the Pennsylvania Attorney General, the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services ("DHS"), the Pennsylvania Medical Fraud Unit ("MFU"), Cerebral Palsy of Chester County, the Berks County Public Defender, Christian Sondergaard (a Berks County Assistant District Attorney), Elizabeth Madigan (an Assistant Pennsylvania Attorney General), and President Judge Parisi of the Berks County Court of Common Pleas. See id. at ECF pp. 2-4.

As for the allegations in the complaint, it is noticeably short on facts. Nonetheless, it appears that at some point, Biesecker became a caregiver for her son, Evan, under the Medicaid Home and Community Based Services Waiver program authorized by section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act. See Doc. No. 2-1 at ECF p. 6, ¶ 10, p. 35, ¶ 82.¹ Apparently, the DHS and the State Medicaid Agency Bureau of Program Integrity discovered some irregularity in her provision of care (or requests for payments) and turned her in to the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office because of alleged Medicaid Fraud. See id. at ECF p. 34, ¶ 75; Compl. at ECF p. 5. Biesecker claims that the DHS and Bureau of Program Integrity "neglected all statutory requirements of [section] 1915(c) of the [Social Security] Act," when they turned her in to the Attorney General's Office. Compl. at ECF p. 5. In this regard, it appears that Biesecker asserts that she was denied a fair hearing and appeal under the administrative process when she did not receive notice, remediation, or a fair hearing. See Doc. No. 2-1 at ECF p. 34, ¶ 75, p. 35, ¶ 82, p. 37, ¶ 88; see also id. at pp. 28-29, ¶ 57 (framing issue in case as "whether Angela Biesecker was denied Remediation, Corrective Action and the Right for Administrative Procedures of 1915(C) OBRA Waiver. Unless the OBRA Waiver explicitly forbids provision of Corrective Action the answer must be 'yes'").

After Biesecker's case made it to the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office, the Attorney General and the Medicaid Fraud Unit charged and prosecuted her for Medicaid Fraud under the Social Security Act. Compl. at ECF p. 5. They prosecuted her in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, which Biesecker claims was the wrong jurisdiction. Id. She was found guilty of Medicaid Fraud and, thereafter, her son was indefinitely excluded from receiving Medicaid benefits. Id. at 5-6; Doc. No. 2-1 at ECF p. 31, ¶ 63, p. 34, ¶ 76, p. 39.

Biesecker asserts that during the criminal proceedings, she was deprived of her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Id. at ECF p. 5. She also alleges that the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office "den[ied] and neglect[ed] . . . [her] civil rights." Id. at ECF p. 6. She claims that she was maliciously prosecuted. Id. She also states that she "was wrongly convicted" and wants "to be exonerated" and have her "record cleared." Doc. No. 2-1 at ECF p. 39. She "ask[s] the Court to compel PA DHS and the PA OAG to exonerate and remove [her] from indefinite exclusion." Compl. at ECF p. 6.

In addition to the foregoing, the court notes that Biesecker appealed from her conviction and sentence of five years' probation to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed her judgment of sentence in April 2017. See Commonwealth v. Biesecker, 161 A.3d 321 (Pa. Super. 2017).² The publicly available docket entries for the underlying criminal case show that Biesecker thereafter unsuccessfully sought post-conviction collateral relief in the Court of Common Pleas. See Docket, Commonwealth v. Biesecker, No. CP-06-CR-3502-2013 (Berks Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.), available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-06-CR-0003502-2013&dnh=hTc3EFFByl1YVgXWpywFkg%3D%3D ("Docket"). She appealed from the denial of post-conviction collateral relief to the Superior Court, which affirmed the decision.Id. Biesecker then filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which denied the petition on May 27, 2020. Id. Although the docket reflects that proceedings relating to her probation are ongoing in the Court of Common Pleas, her Medicaid Fraud conviction remains intact. Id.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The IFP Application

Regarding applications to proceed in forma pauperis,

any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). This statute

"is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Specifically, Congress enacted the statute to ensure that administrative court costs and filing fees, both of which must be paid by everyone else who files a lawsuit, would not prevent indigent persons from pursuing meaningful litigation. Deutsch[ v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995)]. Toward this end, § 1915(a) allows a litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court in [sic] forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit stating, among other things, that he is unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827.

Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App'x 130, 131-32 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (footnote omitted).

The litigant seeking to proceed in forma pauperis must establish that the litigant is unable to pay the costs of suit. See Walker v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Section 1915 provides that, in order for a court to grant in forma pauperis status, the litigant seeking such status must establish that he is unable to pay the costs of his suit."). "In this Circuit, leave to proceed in forma pauperis is based on a showing of indigence. [The court must]review the affiant's financial statement, and, if convinced that he or she is unable to pay the court costs and filing fees, the court will grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis." Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1084 n.5 (internal citations omitted).

Here, after reviewing the IFP Application, it appears that Biesecker is unable to pay the costs of suit. Therefore, the court will grant her leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

B. Standard of Review - Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

Because the court has granted Biesecker leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must engage in the second part of the two-part analysis and examine whether the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or asserts a claim against a defendant immune from monetary relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) (providing that "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-- . . . (B) the action or appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief"). A complaint is frivolous under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact," Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, and is legally baseless if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1085. As for whether a complaint is malicious,

[a] court that considers whether an action is malicious must, in accordance with the definition of the term "malicious," engage in a subjective inquiry into the litigant's motivations at the time of the filing of the lawsuit to determine whether the action is an attempt to vex, injure or harass the defendant.

Id. at 1086. "[A] district court may dismiss a complaint as malicious if it is plainly abusive of the judicial process or merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims." Brodzki v. CBS Sports, Civ. No. 11-841, 2012 WL 125281, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2012).

Concerning the analysis under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to this subsection is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state claim under section 1915(e)(2)(B)). Thus, to survive dismissal, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (...