Bigelow v. Sassafras Grove Baptist Church

247 N.C.App. 401

786 S.E.2d 358

Rev. Carl E. BIGELOW, Plaintiff,

v.SASSAFRAS GROVE BAPTIST CHURCH, Board of Deacons of Sassafras Grove Baptist Church, Willie L. Turner, James Hinton, Louis Henderson, Bobby R. Jones, Roy Johnson, Selma S. Hunter, Cindy Henderson, Rev. David Holloway, and John Does, Defendants.

No. COA15–557.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 10, 2016.

Hicks McDonald Noecker LLP, Greensboro, by David W. McDonald, for plaintiff-appellant.

Law Offices of R. Lee Farmer, Yanceyville, PLLC, by R. Lee Farmer, for defendants-appellees.

GEER, Judge.

Plaintiff, the Reverend Carl E. Bigelow, appeals from an order granting defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff, a former pastor of defendant Sassafras Grove Baptist Church ("the "Church") who became disabled, has brought claims for both breach of contract and violation of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act for failure to pay compensation and benefits plaintiff alleges is due to him pursuant to a written employment contract he entered into with defendants. While defendants have argued that two overlapping doctrines emanating from the First Amendment, the "ministerial exception" and the "ecclesiastical abstention doctrine," preclude the courts from deciding plaintiff's claims, we hold, consistent with other jurisdictions addressing this issue, that those doctrines do not bar courts from resolving contractual disputes not involving ecclesiastical issues and requiring only application of neutral principles of contract and statutory law. We, therefore, reverse the trial court's order.

Facts

On 25 October 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants—the Church and its Board of Deacons, including Willie Turner, James Hinton, Louis Henderson, Bobby Jones, Roy Johnson, Selma Hunter, Cindy Henderson, and the Revered David Holloway—for breach of contract and violation of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. The complaint alleged the following facts.

Plaintiff began serving as a part-time pastor of "the Church," which is located in Yanceyville, North Carolina, in 1975. He held this part-time position until 14 February 2001, during which time he also worked for General Electric Co. ("GE") in Mebane, North Carolina. In order to be eligible for retirement at GE, plaintiff was required to continue working there through 13 February 2013. However, on 14 February 2001, plaintiff resigned his position with GE and entered into a contract with the Church entitled "Agreement of Full Time Pastorship." This contract consisted of several provisions that are pertinent to this appeal:

The Pastor shall serve the church for an indefinite period since there is no scriptural support of tenure. Where as, by [sic] Minister CARL BIGELOW is resigning from his current position of employment and would be eligible for retirement in the next (12) years, the [sic] accepts the liability of his employment and livelihood of his family for the enduring time until retirement.

If the Pastor should become disabled to carry on his work, he shall be paid his full salary until, the disability insurance begin to paid [sic] (which is provide [sic] by church) and relieves church of its responsibility to Pastor.

....

Where as, at any time the church shall become dissatisfied with the services of Pastor and ask for his resignation, the congregation at that time, shall take a vote and be governed by the majority of voting members eligible (members in good standing with church). At that time the church shall pay the Pastor the total package in advance or his services shall continue until such time the church shall meet this requirement.

After 10 years of serving as head pastor of the Church, plaintiff contracted kidney disease in September 2011, was hospitalized, and underwent surgery. As a result, he was no longer able to serve as the pastor of the Church. In addition, because the long-term disability insurance policy mentioned in the employment agreement lapsed prior to plaintiff's disability, plaintiff was without any disability coverage. At this point in time, it appears, based on the complaint, that the Church had ceased all payment of plaintiff's salary and benefits.

Plaintiff filed suit against the Church on 25 October 2013. On 23 December 2013, defendants filed a motion to dismiss contending that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear this dispute and that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Defendants subsequently also filed a motion for summary judgment supported by the affidavits of defendants Willie L. Turner and James Hinton on 30 December 2014.

The trial court heard defendant's motion to dismiss on 6 January 2015. Because plaintiff did not receive proper notice of defendant's motion for summary judgment and the accompanying affidavits, the trial court limited the hearing to the motion to dismiss and did not consider the affidavits.¹ On 20 January 2015, the trial court entered an order granting defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff timely appealed to this Court.

Discussion

"This Court reviews de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss." Transp. Servs. of N.C., Inc. v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 198 N.C.App. 590, 593, 680 S.E.2d 223, 225 (2009). "[T]he question for the court is whether the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory, whether properly labeled or not." Blinson v. State, 186 N.C.App. 328, 335, 651 S.E.2d 268, 274 (2007). "The court must construe the complaint liberally and ‘should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts to support his claim which would entitle him to relief.’ " Leary v. N.C. Forest Prods., Inc., 157 N.C.App. 396, 400, 580 S.E.2d 1, 4 (quoting Block v. Cnty. of Person, 141 N.C.App. 273, 277–78, 540 S.E.2d 415, 419 (2000) ), aff'd, 357 N.C. 567, 597 S.E.2d 673 (2003).

I

We first address whether plaintiff adequately stated claims for breach of contract and violation of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. "The elements of a claim for breach of contract are (1) existence of a valid contract and (2) breach of the terms of that contract." Poor v. Hill, 138 N.C.App. 19, 26, 530 S.E.2d 838, 843 (2000). Here, plaintiff alleged the existence of a written employment contract between himself and the Church, signed by several representatives of the Church on 14 February 2001.

Specifically, plaintiff alleged that he was guaranteed under the contract "salary continuation upon his disability" and "salary, housing, utilities, social security, and medical insurance ... through February 13, 2013" in consideration for his forfeiture of his previous job's benefits. He further alleged that defendants breached this contractual provision upon their refusal to pay his salary and other benefits when he became disabled. These allegations taken as true are sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract.

In arguing that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief, defendants rely on the principle that, in the absence of an employment contract providing for a specified term of employment, plaintiff is an employee at will and cannot sue for breach of contract. This argument is beside the point.

Certainly, it is well established "that absent some form of contractual agreement between an employer and employee establishing a definite period of employment, the employment is presumed to be an ‘at-will’ employment," but in that event, "the employee states no cause of action for breach of contract by alleging that he has been discharged without just cause. " Harris v. Duke Power Co., 319 N.C. 627, 629, 356 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1987) (second emphasis added), disapproved of on other grounds by Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 493 S.E.2d 420 (1997). Thus, Harris mandates that an "at-will" employee cannot state a claim for breach of contract based on wrongful discharge.

The "at will" doctrine does not preclude an at-will employee from suing for breach of contract with respect to benefits or compensation to which the parties contractually agreed. Thus, in Brooks v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 56 N.C.App. 801, 804–05, 290 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1982), when the defendant pointed to "at will" cases in arguing that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue for breach of contract with respect to a severance agreement, this Court held: "Those cases dealt with each employee's right to continued employment and did not deal with the issue of benefits or compensation earned during employment." Those cases are not apposite to the case now before us. See also Way v. Ramsey, 192 N.C. 549, 551–52, 135 S.E. 454, 455 (1926) (acknowledging that minister, who served at pleasure of his church organization, could sue for breach of contract with respect to nonpayment of his salary).

Because plaintiff in this case is not challenging the basis for his dismissal, but only seeks to recover money and benefits owed under the employment contract he alleges he entered into with defendants, the "at will" doctrine is inapplicable. Plaintiff has, therefore, properly alleged a claim for breach of his employment contract's provisions for compensation and benefits.

Plaintiff also alleged a claim under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. Defendants do not address the sufficiency of those allegations. The Wage and Hour Act provides: "Every employer shall pay every employee all wages and tips accruing to the employee on the regular payday. Pay periods may be daily, weekly, bi-weekly, semi-monthly, or monthly." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 95–25.6 (2015). Further, "[a]ny employer who violates the provisions of ... G.S. 95–25.6 ... shall be liable to the employee ... in the amount of their unpaid ... compensation, or their unpaid amounts due under G.S. 95–25.6...." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 95–25.22(a) (2015). See Meehan v. Am. Media Int'l, LLC, 214 N.C.App....