Bikkina v. Mahadevan

PREM BIKKINA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAGAN MAHADEVAN, Defendant and Appellant.

A156582

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR

January 14, 2020

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on January 14, 2020, be modified as follows:

1. On page 12, the first two full sentences and their accompanying citations:

"There is no reporter's transcript of the trial to support these assertions, and Mahadevan's citations to the complaint and a settlement conference brief are insufficient. (See Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 154 [trial briefs in the record are no substitute for reporter's transcript showing actual testimony].) This argument therefore fails. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)"

are replaced with:

"Mahadevan has demonstrated only a conflict in the evidence, not that Bikkina knowingly or purposefully presented false evidence, so he has not established fraud."

There is no change in judgment.

The requests for publication and judicial notice are denied. The petition for rehearing is also denied.

Date: __________

/s/_________ P. J.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG14717654)

Jagan Mahadevan appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from a judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 and his motion to quash post-judgment discovery.¹ He argues the judgment is void and the trial court had no jurisdiction to enforce post-judgment discovery against him. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Prem Bikkina sued Mahadevan for falsely stating that Bikkina had fabricated various research results and plagiarized several academic works when Bikkina was a doctoral student in engineering at the University of Tulsa in Oklahoma. He alleged claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. A jury returned a special verdict for Bikkina on all counts and awarded $776,000 in damages. In response to Bikkina's request for punitive damages, the jury found that Mahadevan had engaged in malice, oppression, or fraud.

Immediately after the jury delivered the verdict on liability and compensatory damages, Bikkina offered to waive the punitive damages phase of trial if Mahadevan would waive his right to appeal the verdict. Mahadevan was not in the courtroom so Mahadevan's counsel, Jeremy Tissot, left the courtroom and phoned Mahadevan to present the offer. Following a 15-minute conversation, Tissot returned to the courtroom and announced that there was an agreement on Bikkina's proposed stipulation. The clerk entered the stipulation in the minutes and the trial judge dismissed the jury.

Following the trial, Mahadevan returned to his home in Texas. On February 15, 2018, at 4:12 PM Central Standard Time, Mahadevan filed a bankruptcy petition in Texas. The trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict on the same day. Mahadevan avers, based on his description of a phone conversation with court staff, that the judgment was filed at 4:19 PM Pacific Standard Time (i.e., 6:19 PM Central Standard Time). Mahadevan notified the trial court and Bikkina of his bankruptcy filing the next day. Ten days later, Mahadevan moved to dismiss the bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy court ordered the case dismissed on March 19, 2018.

The judgment instructed Bikkina to file a memorandum of costs and motion for interest on the judgment from the date of Mahadevan's offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. Bikkina therefore moved to amend the judgment to add an award of costs and to specify the date that interest began to accrue on the judgment. Mahadevan did not oppose the motion and the trial court entered the amended judgment on August 1, 2018.

A short time later, Mahadevan moved to vacate the stipulation, judgment, and amended judgment under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473 and 663. Mahadevan claimed he had not agreed to waive his right to appeal the jury verdict and argued the resulting judgment was therefore void. He attacked the amended judgment on various substantive grounds, such as that the interest was miscalculated, Bikkina's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and there were errors in the jury instructions. Mahadevan also argued the judgment was void because it was entered in violation of theautomatic stay created by Mahadevan's bankruptcy filing. The trial court denied the motion.

Around this time, Bikkina served Mahadevan with special interrogatories and requests for production of documents under the procedures for requesting discovery from a judgment debtor under sections 708.020 and 708.030. Mahadevan moved under sections 410.10, 410.30, and 418.10 to quash these discovery requests based on due process and inconvenience of forum. The trial court denied this motion as well.

II. DISCUSSION

We begin by delineating the scope of Mahadevan's arguments that we will consider in this appeal. Mahadevan's notice of appeal indicated he was appealing from (1) the judgment, (2) the order denying his motion to vacate the judgment, (3) the order denying his motion to quash discovery; and (4) an order directing the parties to meet and confer concerning Bikkina's discovery requests. Bikkina moved to dismiss the appeal because Mahadevan waived his right to appeal the judgment and because the appeal from the judgment was untimely under California Rules of Court, rule 8.104. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104 [notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after service of notice of entry of judgment]. This court granted Bikkina's motion as to Mahadevan's appeal from the final judgment but denied it as to the other post-judgment orders. This court ordered the parties to limit their briefing to the post-judgment orders and not to address the merits of the judgment. Mahadevan's brief nonetheless discusses substantive defects he perceives in the jury's verdict and the resulting judgment. We will not address such arguments.

A. Motion under section 473²

1. Automatic bankruptcy stay

Mahadevan argues the judgment is void because it was entered in violation of the automatic stay created by his bankruptcy filing. He contends the trial court thereforeerred in denying his motion under section 473, subdivision (d), because that statute allows a court to "set aside any void judgment or order." (§ 473, subd. (d).) We review de novo a ruling based on section 473, subdivision (d). (Talley v. Valuation Counselors Group, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 132, 146.) However, if a trial court resolved conflicting evidence to decide whether a judgment was void, we review that ruling for abuse of discretion. (Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1441 & fn. 5.)

"The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic stay of the commencement or continuation of any action against a bankrupt debtor or against the property of a bankruptcy estate. (11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4); U.S. v. Dos Cabezas Corp. (9th Cir. 1993) 995 F.2d 1486, 1491.) Actions taken in violation of the stay are void, even where there is no actual notice of the stay. (In re Schwartz (9th Cir. 1992) 954 F.2d 569, 571.)" (Pioneer Construction, Inc. v. Global Investment Corp. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 161, 167.)

Mahadevan asserts it is undisputed that the judgment was entered several hours after he filed for bankruptcy, so that the judgment is necessarily void. He further contends that because the judgment was void, the amended judgment is likewise void. We disagree.

Federal courts have recognized an exception to the automatic bankruptcy stay for ministerial acts. "This exception stems from the common-sense principle that a judicial 'proceeding' within the meaning of [Title 11 United States Code] section 362(a) ends once a decision on the merits has been rendered. Ministerial acts or automatic occurrences that entail no deliberation, discretion, or judicial involvement do not constitute continuations of such a proceeding." (McCarthy, Johnson & Miller v. North Bay Plumbing, Inc. (In re Pettit) (9th Cir. 2000) 217 F.3d 1072, 1080 (In re Pettit).) Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann (2d Cir. 1994) 21 F.3d 522 (Rexnord) applied this exception in circumstances analogous to those here. In that case, the plaintiff moved for entry of judgment based on a defendant's breach of a settlement. (Id. at pp. 524-525.) At a hearing on the motion, the district court stated orally that it would grant the motionand enter judgment for the plaintiff and endorsed the motion papers to that effect. (Id. at pp. 525, 528.) After the hearing but before the district court's order was docketed, the defendant filed for bankruptcy. (Id. at p. 525.) The Second Circuit held that the docketing of the judgment did not violate the stay. (Id. at p. 528.) "The judicial proceedings were concluded at the moment the judge directed entry of judgment, a decision on the merits having then been rendered." (Ibid.)

The ministerial principle applies here. The jury's verdict rendered the decision on the merits of Bikkina's claims and the parties' subsequent stipulation to waive the punitive damages phase of trial (discussed further below) resolved the only other pending issues. At that point, no further deliberation or decision by the jury or the court on those claims was necessary or permitted. Mahadevan is correct that the trial court modified Bikkina's proposed judgment to instruct him to file a memorandum of costs and motion for prejudgment interest based on his section 998 offer. But precisely because this instruction left the issues of costs and interest for future proceedings, this aspect of the judgment did not embody any judicial decision beyond what the jury verdict already...