Bilinski v. Wills Eye Hosp., CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-02728

RONALD JOSEPH BILINSKI, Plaintiff, v. WILLS EYE HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-02728

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

OCTOBER 26, 2016

PAPPERT, J.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Ronald Bilinski filed suit on June 3, 2016 purporting to bring claims under the United States Constitution, 14 different criminal statutes, the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, the federal regulations regarding the "Protection of Human Subjects" in research, the False Claims Act, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Clayton Act, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Pennsylvania tort law for what appears to be an underlying case of alleged medical malpractice. Bilinski asserts that Dr. Samuel K. Houston, III "started the case" when he negligently and without Bilinski's consent performed an unnecessary operation on Bilinski's right eye. The surgery allegedly left Bilinski blind.

In his amended complaint, however, (ECF No. 6), Bilinski names 27 defendants ranging from Houston to doctors he has never encountered, hospital administrators, secretaries and administrative assistants, alleging that all of them are "collaborators" in a scheme to operate a "monopoly" and "giant criminal empire" by telling the world they are the best, ripping off government medicare with unnecessary operations and false records, covering up injuries and protecting doctors who have committed malpractice by fixing records and lying to or threatening injured patients.

Bilinski is pro se¹ and the Court, in an effort to understand the nature of his grievances, held a status hearing on October 11, 2016. At that hearing, Bilinski provided the Court with background information on his case, including the facts that "when [he] was 14 years old the President of the United States, 1965, Lyndon Byrd Johnson . . . said to [him], you got three wishes," that Johnson directed the FBI to provide him with dogs to protect his family, that he is one of the greatest artists in the world and has done art for Bill Clinton and Aretha Franklin among others, that he "was the guy to tell Malcolm Forbes to go get a motorcycle if he wants to impress a woman" and that Donna Gambino refused to give him a pair of glasses after the operation on his eye because her husband has always been jealous of the Bilinski's brother's toy train collection, which is allegedly one of the largest in the world. (Tr. of Status Hearing, ECF No. 101, 25:10-19, 29:3-11, 32:2-8, 32:13-17, 33:11-16, 36:5-38:17.)

Bilinski has filed several motions asking the Court, among other things, to (i) order the production of video camera tapes and tape recordings (ECF Nos. 8, 9, 10, 63, 66, 67 and 91), (ii) establish a federal rule named after him ("Blind Man Bilinski's Rule") (ECF No. 62) and (iii) add to his complaint claims under yet another statute, the Sherman Act (ECF Nos. 76 and 104). On October 24, 2016 Bilinski filed a 56-page "Summary Motion for Judgment of 100 Million Dollars." (ECF No. 105). The Court considers here three Motions to Dismiss—ECF Nos. 86, 87 and 92—filed on behalf of various Defendants.² For the reasons that follow, ECF No. 92 is granted in full and ECF Nos. 86 and 87 are granted in part.

I.

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level...on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The "mere possibility of misconduct" is not enough. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). However, a court need not accept as true inferences drawn by the plaintiff that are unsupported by facts. See Cal. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. V. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007) (citations and alterations omitted); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). A court should "consider only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim." Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 221 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004). Whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that "requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted).

Under Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787. First, it must "tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, it should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Finally, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

II.

All claims asserted under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution are dismissed because Bilinski has not alleged state action. Suits to enforce constitutional rights are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which private citizens or private, non-governmental corporations are not liable. See Delprato v. Day Chevrolet, Inc., 427 Fed. App'x 86, 88 (2d Cir. 2011). Rather, a lawsuit under § 1983 must allege state action. Id. Bilinski fails to allege state action; his claims relate instead to private actions taken in the context of providing medical care. See Schneller v. Prospect Park Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., No. 08-5704, 2009 WL 1838337, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2009) ("The provision of hospital services is not a traditional public function exclusively reserved for the State.")

All claims asserted under criminal statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 249, 286, 287, 371, 1344, 1346, 1347, 1503, 1512, 1514, 1518 and 1519) are dismissed because these statutes do not provide private causes of action.³ All claims asserted under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act(21 U.S.C. § 803) are also dismissed because the statute does not provide a private cause of action. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349 n.4 (2001) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 337(a)). Likewise, all claims asserted under the federal regulations regarding the "Protection of Human Subjects" in research (45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101, 46.115, 46.116 and 46.117) are dismissed because the relevant statute does not provide a private cause of action. Thomas v. Catlin, 141 Fed. App'x 673, 674 (9th Cir. 2005); Robinett v. United States, 62 F.3d 1433, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

All claims asserted under the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729) are dismissed because Bilinski failed to comply with various filing and service requirements and, in any case, is precluded from pursuing a qui tam action on behalf of the Government due to his status as a pro se litigant. While a private person may bring a civil action for a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729, the statute mandates that "the action shall be brought in the name of the Government." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). Furthermore, "[a] copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses shall be served on the Government pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4)" and "[t]he complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). Bilinski's failure to comply with these requirements alone warrants dismissal with prejudice. See U.S. ex rel. Pilon v. Martin Marietta Corp., 60 F.3d 995, 999 (2d Cir. 1995). However, even absent this omission, Bilinski is precluded from pursuing a qui tamaction on behalf of the Government due to his pro se status. See Gunn v. Credit Suisse Grp. AG, 610 Fed. App'x 155, 157 (3d Cir. 2015).

All claims asserted under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000) are dismissed because this statute prohibits unlawful employment practices by employers and Bilinski has not alleged that he was an employee of any of the Defendants. See Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (upholding dismissal of Title VII claims where plaintiff made no averments that defendants employed him).

All claims brought under the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 18 and 19) are dismissed as Bilinski has not alleged any facts relevant to the substance of these two statutes or any harm allegedly suffered due to statutorily-proscribed conduct. Section 7 of the Clayton Act concerns the acquisitions of corporate stock or assets the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18. Section 7 provides a private cause of action to protect business interests from interference, Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 110 F.2d 15, 18 (3d Cir. 1939), and claims must show demonstrable anti-competitive effects. See Fed. Trade Commission; v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., No. 16-2365, 2016 WL 5389289, at *12 (3d Cir. Sept. 27, 2016). Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits a person from being a director or officer of two or more competing corporations when certain monetary thresholds are met. 15 U.S.C. § 19. Bilinski's bare...