Bishop v. United States

310 A.3d 629

Leonard E. BISHOP, Appellant,

v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 22-CO-0650

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued October 18, 2023

Decided February 29, 2024

Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (1994-FEL-012247), (Hon. Jason Park, Trial Judge)

Cecily E. Baskir for appellant.

Mark Hobel, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Matthew M. Graves, United States Attorney, Chrisellen R. Kolb, and Nicholas P. Coleman, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.

Before Howard and Shanker, Associate Judges, and Steadman,^* Senior Judge.

Shanker, Associate Judge:

This post-conviction matter arises out of a motion by appellant Leonard Bishop under the Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act, D.C. Code § 24-403.03 ("IRAA"). The IRAA provides for a second look at lengthy prison sentences for individuals convicted of offenses they committed before the age of twenty-five. Mr. Bishop and his co-defendant, Rodney Brown, were convicted in 1996 of multiple offenses, including first-degree murder while armed, in connection with a shooting that left one person dead, Mr. Bishop was sentenced to life in prison. This court affirmed Mr. Bishop’s convictions on direct appeal.

In 2022, Mr. Bishop filed a motion for early release under the IRAA. The trial court denied his motion. Although Mr. Bishop had demonstrated some progress toward rehabilitation, the trial court held that other factors, such as the violent nature of the underlying offense and his disciplinary history while incarcerated, counseled against early release.

We conclude that the trial court misapplied one of the statutorily enumerated IRAA factors. We therefore vacate the order and remand to the trial court for reconsideration in light of this opinion.

I. Background

A.

We derive the following facts from the IRAA order on appeal, which followed a hearing. On November 25, 1994, Metropolitan Police Department officers responded to a shooting at the 600 block of 46th Place, SE, Washington, D.C. Upon arrival, officers found several people suffering from gunshot wounds, including Andre Newton, who later died from his wounds, and Carrington Harley, who was seriously injured. At least two others were injured as well. Officers arrested Mr. Bishop and Mr. Brown the following month in connection with the shooting. Mr. Bishop was nineteen years old at the time of the incident.

A grand jury returned an indictment charging both Mr. Bishop and Mr. Brown with one count of first-degree murder while armed, five counts of possessing a firearm during a crime of violence, four counts of assault with the intent to kill while armed, one count of mayhem while armed, and one count of carrying a pistol without a license. In 1996, after a joint trial, a jury found both defendants guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Mr. Bishop to 101 years and 8 months to life in prison. This court affirmed Mr. Bishop’s and Mr. Brown’s convictions on direct appeal. See Brown v. United States, 934 A.2d 930 (D.C. 2007).

B.

Following his direct appeal, Mr. Bishop filed a number of collateral challenges to his convictions or sentence or otherwise sought early release.¹ Underlying this appeal is Mr. Bishop’s 2022 motion for a reduced sentence under the IRAA, D.C. Code § 24-403.03. The IRAA provides that a court shall reduce the sentence of an eligible defendant if the court finds, after considering eleven enumerated factors, that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any person or the community and that the interests of justice warrant a sentence modification.

In his motion, which he supported with over fifty exhibits, Mr. Bishop argued that he "has matured from a troubled youth born into adversity into a responsible adult who deserves a second chance at liberty" and that the "IRAA’s statutory factors weigh in favor of modifying [his] sentence." Mr. Bishop highlighted, among other things, his advancements and successes while incarcerated; letters supporting his release by "numerous individuals, including jail wardens and program supervisors"; and expert reports attesting to his lack of dangerousness and suitability for reentry into the community. The government opposed Mr. Bishop’s motion, largely on the basis of his "lengthy and concerning disciplinary history." The government also noted that several victims objected to Mr. Bishop’s early release; that Mr. Bishop lacked significant vocational training; and that Mr. Bishop "has yet to demonstrate his acceptance of responsibility" for his offenses.

The trial court held a hearing on Mr. Bishop’s IRAA motion. Mr. Bishop called several witnesses, including a D.C. Jail official in charge of educational and vocational training, a former corrections officer, and a clinical and forensic psychologist.

The trial court issued an order denying Mr. Bishop’s IRAA motion, reviewed in more detail below. After reviewing the eleven factors set forth in D.C. Code § 24-403.03(c), the court first concluded that Mr. Bishop failed to "establish[] his lack of dangerousness" due to the violent nature of his offense and his disciplinary record while incarcerated. Although Mr. Bishop had "taken steps to rehabilitate himself and prepare himself for reentry into society," the trial court noted "a number of … high severity offenses" that involved "violence or the possession of dangerous weapons." Second, the court found that the interests of justice did not weigh in favor of early release. The trial court acknowledged that Mr. Bishop has "served almost three decades and nearly his entire adult life in prison." Nevertheless, the "heinous, violent" nature of the underlying offenses, opposition from the victims, and Mr. Bishop’s disciplinary record while incarcerated counseled against his early release.

This appeal followed.

II. Legal Background and the Trial Court’s Order

A.

[1] Originally passed by the District of Columbia Council in 2016, the IRAA "establishes a sentence review procedure intended to … ensur[e] that all juvenile offenders serving lengthy prison terms have a realistic, meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on their diminished culpability and their maturation and rehabilitation." Williams v. United States, 205 A.3d 837, 846 (D.C. 2019). The function of the IRAA is to provide a "second look" at lengthy prison sentences for individuals convicted of offenses they committed before the age of twenty-five. Comm. on the Judiciary and Pub. Safety, Rep. on B23-0127, the "Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Amendment Act of 2020" at 18 (Nov. 23, 2020) ("2020 Committee Report").

[2] The Council initially passed the IRAA in response to several "constitutional imperatives" declared by the Supreme Court in a series of cases holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders. Williams, 205 A.3d at 846; see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). For those already sentenced to life without parole, "the Eighth Amendment does not require States ‘to guarantee eventual freedom’ to juvenile offenders who are ineligible for [life-without-parole] sentences." Williams, 205 A.3d at 845 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455). Instead, "[t]he Eighth Amendment demands only that those offenders be afforded ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’ " Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455). The IRAA provides just such an opportunity. Id. at 849.

Underlying both the IRAA and the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment juvenile jurisprudence is a body of scientific evidence "demonstrat[ing] that the frontal lobes of the brain, which control executive functions like planning, working memory, and impulse control …[,] may not be fully developed until the mid-twenties." Comm. on the Judiciary, Rep. on B21-0683, the "Comprehensive Youth Justice Amendment Act of 2016," at 3 (Oct. 5, 2016) ("2016 Committee Report"). "As a result, adolescents have a more difficult time grasping long-term consequences and are more likely to have impaired judgment[.]" Id. Juveniles and young adults may exhibit a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," heightened "susceptib[ility] to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure," and a "more transitory, less fixed" personality than older adults. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (internal quotation marks omitted). Youth raised in unstable, violence-ridden circumstances are particularly vulnerable. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455 ("[C]hildren are more vulnerable to negative influences …[,] have limited control over their own environment[,] and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.") (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Young offenders therefore possess "reduced culpability" for their crimes and an increased "capacity for rehabilitation and growth." 2016 Committee Report at 4; see Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 195, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). Accordingly, "none of the goals of penal sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—provides an adequate justification" for sentences of life without parole for young offenders, who must be provided a meaningful opportunity for release. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (citation omitted).

[3–5] Following these principles, under the IRAA, a court "shall reduce a term of imprisonment imposed upon a defendant for an offense committed before the defendant’s 25th birthday" if two conditions are satisfied.² D.C. Code § 24-403.03(a). First, the defendant must have been "sentenced pursuant to § 24-403 or § 24-403.01" or "committed pursuant to § 24-903" and have ...