Black v. State

301 So.3d 806

William BLACK a/k/a William Taylor Black, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee

NO. 2019-CP-00116-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

Filed August 18, 2020

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: WILLIAM BLACK (PRO SE)

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALICIA MARIE AINSWORTH, Jackson, ASHLEY L. SULSER

EN BANC.

BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In 2010, William Black pleaded guilty to murder in the Noxubee County Circuit Court. Eight years later, he filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), which the circuit court denied as time-barred and without merit. Black, appearing pro se, now appeals from the circuit court's denial of his PCR motion. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On March 16, 2005, Black was indicted for one count of capital murder (murder during commission of a robbery) and one count of burglary of a dwelling. On March 21, 2005, the circuit court arraigned Black and ordered that any "motion for mental evaluation to determine [Black's] competence, mental retardation and insanity [was] to be filed no later than May 21, 2005." Although no motion for mental evaluation exists in the record, Black attached to his PCR motion a summary report of his "outpatient forensic mental evaluation" by two physicians at the Mississippi State Hospital, dated July 9, 2009. The report stated Black was evaluated by court order upon the State's motion. The detailed report concluded Black was competent to stand trial.

¶3. On May 19, 2010, Black pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of murder.¹ The circuit court found his plea was "freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered." The circuit court sentenced Black to serve life in prison in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC).

¶4. On January 23, 2018, Black filed a PCR motion arguing (1) his guilty plea was not voluntary or intelligent, (2) his due process rights were violated because the circuit court never conducted a competency hearing, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. On December 17, 2018, the circuit court denied Black's PCR motion, finding it time-barred and without merit.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5. "We review the dismissal or denial of a PCR motion for abuse of discretion. We will only reverse if the trial court's decision is clearly erroneous. When reviewing questions of law, our standard is de novo." Ware v. State , 258 So. 3d 315, 317-18 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Hughes v. State , 106 So. 3d 836, 838 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) ).

ANALYSIS

I. Procedural Time-Bar

¶6. Black argues the circuit court erred in finding his PCR motion was time barred. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015) requires a defendant file his PCR motion within three years after the judgment of conviction is entered. Black filed his PCR motion on January 23, 2018, almost eight years after the circuit court entered his judgment of conviction for murder. Therefore, we agree with the circuit court that Black's PCR motion is time-barred.

¶7. Black attempts to overcome the procedural bar by arguing his PCR motion is excepted under Rowland v. State , 42 So. 3d 503, 506 (¶9) (Miss. 2010), which held that "errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights are excepted from the procedural bars of the [Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act]." Black claims his due process rights were violated. In Salter v. State , 184 So. 3d 944, 950 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), we noted that only four types of rights have been recognized to be "fundamental" since Rowland : "(1) the right against double jeopardy; (2) the right to be free from an illegal sentence; (3) the right to due process at sentencing; and (4) the right not to be subject to ex post facto laws."

¶8. Additionally, in Brown v. State , 198 So. 3d 325, 330 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), we recognized that "the due-process right not to stand trial or be convicted while incompetent is a fundamental right not subject to the procedural bars of the Mississippi postconviction relief statutes." (Citing Smith v. State , 149 So. 3d 1027, 1031 (¶8) (Miss. 2014), overruled on other grounds by Pitchford v. State , 240 So. 3d 1061, 1070 (¶49) (Miss. 2017) ). While Pitchford overruled Smith ’s determination that retroactive competency hearings are inadequate protection of due process rights, it confirmed that "[i]t is a violation of due process to try or convict a criminal defendant who is legally incompetent" and that "[t]his prohibition is fundamental to our adversarial system of justice ...." Pitchford , 240 So. 3d at 1067 (¶30) (citations omitted). In its brief, the State recognizes that "a defendant's due process right to not be convicted while incompetent is a fundamental right excepted from the procedural bars. ... However, it is the movant's burden to prove an exception applies." Blount v. State , 126 So. 3d 927, 931 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

¶9. Lastly,

[w]hile ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not traditionally categorized as a ‘fundamental right’ under Rowland , the Mississippi Supreme Court held that ‘under the facts of a particular case, this Court might find that a lawyer's performance was so deficient, and so prejudicial to the defendant, that the defendant's fundamental constitutional rights were violated. However, this Court has never held that merely raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is sufficient to surmount the procedural bar.

James v. State , 266 So. 3d 1029, 1031 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting

Bevill v. State , 669 So. 2d 14, 17 (Miss. 1996) ), cert. denied , 267 So. 3d 281 (Miss. 2019). Our supreme court has determined, however, that "merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars. ‘There must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim before the procedural bar will be waived.’ " Means v. State , 43 So. 3d 438, 442 (¶12) (Miss. 2010) (quoting Crosby v. State , 16 So. 3d 74, 79 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) ). As competency is, and ineffective assistance may be, excepted from procedural bars under Rowland , we address these issues.

II. Voluntariness of Guilty Plea

¶10. Black argues that his guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made because of his mental status at the time of his plea and because he received erroneous advice from his counsel.

¶11. "Before the trial court may accept a guilty plea, the court must determine that the plea is voluntarily and intelligently made and that there is a factual basis for the plea." URCCC 8.04(A)(3).² "To determine whether the plea is voluntarily and intelligently given, the trial court must advise the defendant of his rights, the nature of the charge against him, as well as the consequences of the plea." Burrough v. State , 9 So. 3d 368, 373 (¶11) (Miss. 2009). The PCR petitioner "bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the guilty plea was involuntary." Roby v. State , 282 So. 3d 477, 481 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

¶12. First, a review of the plea transcript does not support Black's claims of mental incapacity. "Great weight is given to statements made under oath and in open court during sentencing." Hoyt v. State , 952 So. 2d 1016, 1020 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Gable v. State , 748 So. 2d 703, 706 (¶11) (Miss. 1999) ). The circuit court questioned Black about his mental state and thoroughly examined Black's ability to understand the plea proceedings and the consequences of his plea. After Black affirmed his ability and desire to plead guilty, the circuit court found that Black's plea was "freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made." Nothing in the plea colloquy indicates Black was mentally infirm and could not understand the proceedings.

¶13. Black further argues that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent because he was "under duress from untreated depression" when he pleaded guilty. A review of his mental evaluation report, plea hearing, and plea petition all belie Black's assertions. Black complains that he was not treated for depression at the time of his plea hearing and that the circuit court "never mentioned the status or treatment of [his] depression[,] only his sobriety." Black points to his July 2009 mental evaluation report, which stated that he "reported experiencing symptoms of depression at the time of the alleged offense." However, the State correctly notes that this is the only statement related to his depression in the entire record, excluding Black's own assertions. Further, the report stated the physicians were unanimous in their opinion that Black had "the sufficient present ability to consult with an attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding in the preparation of his defense, and that he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the nature and object of the legal proceedings against him," as well as "the capacity to understand and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily ... waive or assert his constitutional rights[,] including his right not to incriminate himself." Additionally, the report found Black "was not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the times of the alleged offenses and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his alleged acts ... was not substantially impaired at those times."

¶14. Black's claims are further contradicted by his plea petition, where he swore under oath that he possessed satisfactory physical and mental health at the time of the hearing and that he offered his guilty plea "freely and voluntarily ... of [his] own accord ... with full understanding of all the matters set forth in the indictment." Black does not provide any evidence to support his claim of depression or how his allegedly faulty mental state affected his plea. Therefore, this argument is without merit.

¶15. Black also argues that his plea was involuntary because he received "erroneous advice" from his counsel regarding his...