Black v. Town of W. Hartford

KENNETH A. BLACK v. TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD ET AL.

AC 43918

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued April 19, 2021

July 13, 2021

Cradle, Suarez and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from an assessment by the Board of Assessment Appeals for the defendant town of West Hartford in connection with certain of the plaintiff's personal property. In his appeal, the plaintiff also named as a defendant the state Office of Policy and Management, claiming that it violated a certain statute (§ 12-71d) in recommending the schedule of motor vehicle values the town used to assess his vehicle. The Office of Policy and Management moved to dismiss the action as against it and the trial court granted the motion on the ground that the action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Held that the judgment of the trial court was affirmed on the alternative ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the action against the Office of Policy and Management because he was not classically aggrieved; the personal and legal interest claimed by the plaintiff, namely, the way in which vehicles are assessed for tax purposes, is common to all taxpayers, and not specific and personal to the plaintiff, and apart from the Office of Policy and Management's recommendation that municipalities use a certain guide's schedule to assess vehicles, the plaintiff did not allege that the Office of Policy and Management had any involvement in the assessment of the plaintiff's vehicle or any other vehicle, the plaintiff recognizing that it was the responsibility of each municipality to perform that function.

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the named defendant's Board of Assessment Appeals revising the assessment of certain of the plaintiff's personal property, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Cobb, J., granted the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Office of Policy and Management and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Kenneth A. Black, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Patrick T. Ring, assistant attorney general, with whom were Joseph J. Chambers, deputy associate attorney general, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, and Clare E. Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellee (defendant Office of Policy and Management).

Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Kenneth A. Black, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his action as against the defendant Office of Policy and Management for allegedly violating General Statutes § 12-71d in recommending the schedule of motor vehicle values that the defendant town of West Hartford (town) used to assess his vehicle for the 2018 tax year.¹ On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We affirm the judgment of the court, but on the alternative ground that the plaintiff lacks standing to maintain the action against the defendant. Because we affirm on this alternative ground, we do not reach the trial court's determination that the action was barred by the defendant's sovereign immunity.

The following facts, which either are undisputed or are taken from the underlying complaint and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; Godbout v. Attanasio, 199 Conn. App. 88, 90-91, 234 A.3d 1031 (2020); are relevant to our consideration of the plaintiff's claim on appeal. On October 21, 2019, the plaintiff, pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a,² filed a complaint with the trial court appealing from the motor vehicle assessment made by the town assessor and the subsequent action of the town's Board of Assessment Appeals (board).³ The complaint alleged the following facts. At all relevant times, the plaintiff was the owner of a 2017 Subaru Crosstrek 2.0L Premium Automatic (vehicle) that was registered in the town. On or about July 1, 2019, the plaintiff received a property tax bill for the vehicle covering the period of October 1, 2018 through September 30, 2019, in the amount of $645.39. The town assessor valued the vehicle at $15,440, which, pursuant to General Statutes § 12-62, was 70 percent of the vehicle's "present true and actual value." On September 12, 2019, the plaintiff appealed to the board "claiming to be aggrieved by the original valuation," and the board reduced the vehicle's assessed value to $14,770. On September 16, 2019, the board sent a "Notice of Change of Assessment" reflecting this reduction to the plaintiff.⁴

The plaintiff next alleged that the defendant "is a duly authorized agency of the State of Connecticut and is responsible for recommending a schedule of motor vehicle value which shall be used by the assessors in each municipality pursuant to . . . [§] 12-71d."⁵ He then alleged that, "[u]pon information and belief, the [defendant] [is] not following . . . [§] 12-71d by basing the motor vehicle tax on the National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) 'clean retail' value instead of the plain language of [§] 12-71d which requires motor vehicle taxes to be based on the average retail price." He further alleged that the "NADA 'clean retail' value of [the plaintiff's vehicle] was . . . $22,050. The base [Manufacturer's Suggested Retail Price (MSRP)] when the vehicle was purchased in May of 2017 was $22,495. . . . This means under the valuation scheme, the over two year old vehicle has lost only $445 in value, or [2] percent of its MSRP. The 'clean retail' value as defined by the NADA does not state 'average' within the text . . . ." To support this assertion, the plaintiff provided in the complaint an excerpt that was allegedly taken from the NADA guides' website, which contained answers to frequently asked questions about values and pricing. The excerpt states: "Clean Retail values reflect a vehicle in clean condition. This means a vehicle with no mechanical defects and passes all necessary inspections with ease. Paint, body and wheels have minor surface scratching with a high gloss finish and shine. Interior reflects minimal soiling and wear with all equipment in complete working order. Vehicle has a clean title history. Because individual vehicle condition varies greatly, users of NADAguides.com may need to make independent adjustments for actual vehicle condition."

The plaintiff attached four documents to the complaint and incorporated them by reference in his allegations.⁶ Among the attachments was a September 28, 2018 memorandum from the defendant to municipal assessors in which the defendant, in accordance with § 12-71d, recommended a motor vehicle pricing schedule to be used for the 2018 Grand List. The memorandum recommended the use of the October, 2018 NADA guides to value certain types of motor vehicles. The memorandum stated that the schedules in the NADA guides "reflect the 100 [percent] average retail price/'[c]lean [r]etail [v]alue' of motor vehicles for the current assessment year . . . . The assessment must reflect [70] percent . . . of the recommended values." Another attachment listed the NADA guides' used car values for the plaintiff's make and model of vehicle with 27,500 miles, as of October 1, 2018. This document provided, among other things, multiple categories of base values for this type of vehicle.⁷ The clean retail value was the highest of these base values.

The complaint sought (1) "declaratory relief that the assessment should be based on the average retail price pursuant to . . . [§] 12-71d rather than [the] NADA 'clean retail' value," (2) "[a] [r]efund of the plaintiff's overpayment of taxes, an amount less than [$2500], exclusive of interest and costs," (3) "[d]eclaratory and other costs pursuant to [General Statutes §§] 12-117a and 52-257, including service fees," and (4) "[s]uch other relief as injunction and equity appertains."

On November 18, 2019, the defendant, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30, moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that "sovereign immunity completely bar[red] the plain- tiff's action against [it]."⁸ The defendant also argued that "the plaintiff ha[d] not exhausted his available administrative remedies," "the plaintiff lack[ed] standing to bring his claims against [the defendant] due to lack of aggrievement," and "the plaintiff's claims against [the defendant] are nonjusticiable because they are not ripe."

On December 2, 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion in which he disputed each of the defendant's arguments. He argued in relevant part that sovereign immunity did not apply because the defendant "acted in excess and contrary to the plain language of [§ 12-71d] . . . ." On the issue of standing, he argued that he had been "personally aggrieved by [the] improper tax valuation and failure of the [defendant] to follow [§ 12-71d]," and provided a list comparing the NADA clean retail value of his vehicle to the values of the same vehicle contained in other guides.⁹ The plaintiff attached to his objection a letter that he purportedly e-mailed to Martin L. Heft, a policy development coordinator in the defendant's Intergovernmental Policy and Planning Division, on June 30, 2019, with "questions . . . in regard to [the defendant's] role with [m]otor [v]ehicle [a]ssessment valuation." The last question in the letter asked: "Why is the clean retail value used in determining the average retail value?" He also attached what he represented to be Heft's reply, which stated in relevant part: "NADA's Used Car and Older Car Guides do not list the average retail prices of vehicles. Instead, they list 'clean retail value.' These terms are synonymous—NADA's clean retail value has the same meaning as the term average retail price or average retail value." On December 10, 2019, the defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff's objection.

On ...