Blackburn v. Shelby County

770 F.Supp.2d 896

Judy BLACKBURN, Plaintiff,

v.SHELBY COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 2:07–cv–02815–JPM–dkv.

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division.

Feb. 18, 2011.

Randall Blake Tolley, Law Office of Randall B. Tolley, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.Hite McLean, Jr., Law Offices of Hite McLean, Jr., Memphis, TN, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE

JON PHIPPS McCALLA, Chief Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Shelby County's (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry (“D.E. ”) 67), filed June 7, 2010. ¹ On June 26, 2010, Plaintiff Judy Blackburn (“Plaintiff”) filed a response in opposition (D.E. 70).² On July 12, 2010, Defendant replied to Plaintiff's response and moved the Court to strike portions of Plaintiff's response. (D.E. 87.) Plaintiff responded to Defendant's Motion to Strike on July 26, 2010. (D.E. 88.)

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant's Motion to Strike is DENIED as MOOT.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Plaintiff's employment with the Shelby County Sheriff's Office (“SCSO” or “Defendant”). Plaintiff is a fifty-four year old female Sergeant with the SCSO. She asserts claims for sex discrimination, age discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn.Code Ann. § 4–21–101 et seq. Plaintiff also asserts a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Plaintiff filed two separate complaints against Defendant, the first on December 18, 2007 with facts related to her first EEOC charge (D.E. 1), and the second on August 29, 2008 with facts related to her second EEOC charge (D.E. 1 in Case No. 2:08–cv–02565–JPM–egb). On May 18, 2009, the Court consolidated these cases. (D.E. 17.) On July 29, 2009, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, consolidating the allegations from her separate complaints and including facts related to her third EEOC charge. ( See generally Am. Compl. (D.E. 25).)

Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. (Def.'s Mem. 1, 25.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). So long as the movant has met its initial burden of “demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, and the nonmoving party is unable to make such a showing, summary judgment is appropriate. Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 353 (6th Cir.1989). In considering a motion for summary judgment, however, “the evidence as well as all inferences drawn therefrom must be read in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Kochins v. Linden–Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir.1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

When confronted with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must support the assertion that a genuine dispute exists as to one or more material facts by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence ... of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B); see also Abeita v. TransAm. Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 250 (6th Cir.1998). However, “ ‘[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient.’ ” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989) ( quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

A genuine issue of material fact exists for trial “if the evidence [presented by the nonmoving party] is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's allegations center around three EEOC charges. The Court addresses these allegations in turn.

A. Allegations Arising from First EEOC Charge

Plaintiff began her employment with the SCSO as a deputy sheriff in 1987. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s UMF ¶ 1.) Plaintiff was promoted to the rank of Sergeant in February 1997. ( Id. ¶ 2.) After successive assignments to the Narcotics Division from 1992 to 1997, the Internal Affairs Division in 1997, and the Detectives Division from 1997 to 2000, Plaintiff was transferred to the Narcotics Division as the Case Management Sergeant (“CM Sergeant”) on October 26, 2000. (Dep. of Judy Blackburn, March 19, 2010 (“March Dep.”) (D.E. 67–4) 28–29; Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s UMF ¶¶ 11–13.) Plaintiff held the position of CM Sergeant in the Narcotics Division until April 22, 2006. ( Id. ¶ 15.)

The Narcotics Division is divided into enforcement teams and specialized units that provide support for the enforcement teams, including the Equipment/Technical Unit, the Seizure/Forfeiture Unit, the Intelligence Unit, and the Case Management and Clerical Support Unit. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s UMF ¶ 4.) Each of these support units is supervised by a sergeant. ( Id.) The position of Case Management Sergeant, to which Plaintiff was transferred in 2000, supervises the Case Management and Clerical Support Unit. ( Id. ¶ 5; Def.'s Ex. No. D454.³) As the CM Sergeant for the Narcotics Division, Plaintiff was in a support position, responsible for the case tracking system, narcotics state prosecutorial cases, internal clerical operations of the narcotics division, and the supervision of the civilian secretarial staff. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s UMF ¶¶ 8, 16.) The job description for CM Sergeant lists sixteen additional duties, the last of which is: “Available for Narcotic Enforcement Duties.” (Def.'s Ex. No. 454.)

Plaintiff's allegations of sex and age discrimination in her first EEOC complaint arise from her assignment to the Narcotics Division as the CM Sergeant under the supervision of Lieutenant David Ducrest (“Lt. Ducrest”), the Executive Officer, and Captain Wayne Goudy (“Capt. Goudy”), the Commanding Officer.⁴ (April 26, 2006 EEOC Charge No. 490–2006–01126 (“First EEOC Charge”) (D.E. 25–1); Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s UMF ¶ 23; David Ducrest's Verified Statement (“Ducrest Statement”) (D.E. 67–3) ¶ 14.)

Prior to June 2005, Plaintiff was often permitted to perform enforcement duties and go out on special details. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s UMF ¶ 32.) After Capt. Goudy was assigned to Narcotics in June 2005, however, Plaintiff alleges her requests to participate on special details or to help as extra manpower for enforcement duties were denied and ignored. (Aff. of Pl. Judy Blackburn (“Blackburn Aff.”) (D.E. 71–1) 1; Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s UMF ¶ 32.) Plaintiff identified three instances when her requests were denied: a federal roundup on October 25, 2005, a saturation on February 17, 2006, and a federal roundup on March 22, 2006.⁵ (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s UMF ¶¶ 33, 36.) On another occasion, when Lieutenant Richard Nelson (“Lt. Nelson”) asked Lt. Ducrest if Plaintiff could fill in for an enforcement team member who was going to be out for the week, Lt. Ducrest said no, explaining that Chiefs Odom and Wing would have a “fit” if they found out that Lt. Nelson had a “sergeant over the secretaries” out there. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s UMF ¶ 45; Blackburn Aff. 4–5.) Plaintiff alleges that, on other occasions, she was given excuses such as “[y]ou're too old to ride with the cowboys,” “you'll get dirty,” or “you might have a heart attack.” (Blackburn Aff. 3.) On each of the dates Plaintiff alleges she was denied enforcement duties, she worked a regular eight-hour shift performing her duties as the CM Sergeant. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s UMF ¶ 38.)

Between December 2005 and February 2006, Plaintiff alleges she was denied training opportunities that other male sergeants were given, including supervisory management training in December 2005 and meth training in February 2006. (Am. Compl. 4; First EEOC Charge.) According to Plaintiff, though she requested to participate in training exercises that would have kept her enforcement tactics up to date, her requests were denied. (Blackburn Aff. 4.)

Plaintiff also alleges that she was “denied proper supervisory evaluation process by Lt. Ducrest and Capt. Goudy.” (Blackburn Interrogs. Resp. 4.) According to Plaintiff, her “supervisory issues regarding clerical personnel were not supported and in fact ignored” even though “[o]ther male supervisors of Plaintiff's rank were given full attention for their units.” (Am. Compl. 5; Blackburn Aff. 2–3; Blackburn's Interrogs. 3–4.)

In February 2006, Plaintiff went to the Special Operations Office to meet with Insp. Allen. (March Dep. 130.) Plaintiff was very upset and explained to Insp. Allen that she was upset over the way she was being treated in the Narcotics Division. ( Id. 130–31.) She also expressed her unhappiness about her supervisory and case management problems, and the unfair treatment she felt she was receiving. ( Id. at 131....