Blackburn v. Town of Kernersville, 1:14CV560

TERESA BLACKBURN, ADRIAN MARTINEZ-PEREZ, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF KERNERSVILLE, OFFICER J. L. REDDEN,in his individual capacity, OFFICER E. G. SHUMATE,in his individual capacity, OFFICER K. L. CULLISON,in his individual capacity, OFFICER M. W. LONG,in his individual capacity, OFFICER R. L. JOYNER, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

1:14CV560

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

February 25, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the United States Constitution, as well as various state law claims. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 33) based on qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs' federal claims, public official immunity as to their state claims, and Plaintiffs' failure to establish municipality liability. In addition, Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Additional Discovery (ECF No. 36). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion, and denies Plaintiffs' motion.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The role of the court is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter" but rather "to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must "resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable" to the nonmoving party. Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996)). Where, as in this case, qualified immunity has been raised by the defendants, "this usually means adopting . . . the plaintiff's version of the facts." Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)).

II. FACTS

On May 22, 2014, Plaintiffs, Teresa Blackburn ("Blackburn") and Adrian Martinez-Perez ("Martinez-Perez"), went to Chalarka Tax Office in Kernersville, North Carolina to open two businesses. (ECF No. 11 ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs were accompanied by Leonardo Lopez Garcia ("Garcia"). (Id. ¶ 24.) At some point after Plaintiffs arrived at the tax office, the owner, Elizabeth Chalarka ("Chalarka"), placed a call to the Kernersville Police Department ("KPD").¹ (Id. ¶ 25.)

In response to the call dispatched as "a man with a gun" at "the 100 block of Main Street" (ECF No. 35-3 at 2:25-3:1), Kernersville police officers R. L. Joyner ("Joyner"), J. L. Redden ("Redden"), E. G. Shumate ("Shumate"), M. W. Long ("Long"), and K. L. Cullison ("Cullison") arrived at the tax office (see ECF No. 11 ¶ 26). Joyner was the first officer torespond (ECF No. 35-2 at 4:5-9) and upon arrival approached Garcia who matched the police dispatch's description (ECF No. 35-3 at 3:1-25). Joyner frisked Garcia for weapons and found none. (ECF No. 35-3 at 3:24-25.) While Garcia was being detained, Redden arrived. (See ECF No. 37-1 at 11:16-24, 12:10-21, 14:1-6.) Joyner left Redden outside with Garcia and entered the tax office. (ECF No. 35-2 at 5:2-7, 14-22.) Redden performed a second frisk of Garcia during which Martinez-Perez approached, asked Redden the reason for his frisk of Garcia, and told Redden that Garcia was unarmed. (ECF No. 37-1 at 14:13-23, 15:3-20, 16:7-9.) A verbal exchange ensued between Redden and Martinez-Perez in which Redden told Martinez-Perez to "wait his turn." (Id. at 15:18-25, 16:1-11.) Martinez-Perez walked away and sat on a nearby windowsill. (ECF No. 35-2 at 9:9-11.)

After Redden completed his frisk of Garcia, he approached Martinez-Perez and told him to stand up. (Id. at 10:2-7.) Redden then asked Martinez-Perez if he had any weapons. (Id.) Martinez-Perez responded by telling Redden that he was carrying a pocketknife in his pocket for work and, with his hands raised, pointed to his pants pocket. (See ECF No. 35-4 at 4:4-9; ECF No. 37-1 at 19:10-20:6; ECF No. 11 ¶ 31.) During Redden's encounter with Martinez-Perez, Shumate arrived on the scene and approached with his gun pointed at Martinez-Perez (see ECF No. 35-1 at 3:8-11, 4:13-16; ECF No. 35-4 at 4:4-5). Despite his compliance with Redden's attempted frisk (see ECF No. 35-6 at 2:1-11), the officers threw Martinez-Perez to the ground, and Shumate placed his foot on Martinez-Perez's shoulder (see ECF No. 35-1 at 5:21-24; ECF No. 37 at 3; ECF No. 37-1 at 20:4-9). While on the ground, Martinez-Perez was kicked by multiple officers and struck in the face by Redden beforebeing arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the backseat of a patrol car. (See ECF No. 35-4 at 4:10-13; ECF No. 35-6 at 2:7-13; 37-1 at 23:11-21.)

While handcuffed and under arrest, Martinez-Perez was told by Redden that a $5 dollar bill, found on the ground, had white powder on its face and tested positive for cocaine. (See ECF No. 37-3 at 6:7-8, 9:16-23, 10:24-25.) Martinez-Perez adamantly denied ownership of the bill. (ECF No. 37 at 3; ECF No. 37-3 at 10:24-11:1-7.) Officer Long, who had performed the test on the $5 bill, then conducted a canine sniff around the exterior of Blackburn's vehicle. (ECF No. 37-3 at 7:7-8, 13:17-14:1.) Following the canine's alert on the vehicle, Long and Cullison searched the vehicle's interior. (Id. at 14:12-15, 16:1-20.) Although no narcotics were found during the officers' search of the vehicle, the officers seized $16,000 found inside the vehicle in Blackburn's purse. (ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 41-42.) Upon hearing that his fellow officers were seizing Blackburn's money, Redden told the officers that Martinez-Perez also had "a large . . . amount of money in his pocket." (ECF No. 35-2 at 20:2-12.) Redden was then directed to seize the $4,000 in Martinez-Perez's pocket. (Id. at 20:14-15.) Martinez-Perez was charged with resisting arrest and simple possession of a controlled substance. (ECF No. 11 ¶ 45.) Blackburn was not charged with a crime. (Id. ¶ 47.) On June 3, 2014, Plaintiffs initiated this action in state court which was removed to this Court on July 2, 2014. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.)

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant officers now move for summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs' federal claims and on public official immunity as to Plaintiffs' state claims.Defendant Town of Kernersville moves for summary judgment based on Plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate municipality liability.

A. Plaintiffs' Federal Claims

In evaluating whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must conduct a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the officers' conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right in question was "clearly established" at the time of the violation such that it was objectively reasonable that the defendants would have had "fair warning" that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.² Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865-66 (2014); see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).

Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that a constitutional violation has occurred, while the Defendant officers bear the burden of proving that their actions did not violate a clearly established right. Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377-78 (4th Cir. 2007).

1. Fourth Amendment Claims

a. Plaintiff Adrian Martinez-Perez

Martinez-Perez argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when: (i) he was subjected to an unlawful seizure by Redden; (ii) he was subjected to a warrantless arrest and search by Redden and Shumate; (iii) his seizure was unlawfully extended for Long toconduct a canine sniff of the vehicle; and (iv) his funds were unlawfully seized by Redden. ³ (ECF Nos. 11 ¶¶ 52-63; 37 at 9-11.) The officers contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Martinez-Perez's Fourth Amendment claims because: (i) Plaintiff has failed to establish that constitutional violations occurred; and (ii) even if Plaintiff can establish that constitutional violations occurred, he has failed to show that it would have been apparent to an objectively reasonable officer that his conduct violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. (ECF No. 35 at 13.)

The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The key inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness in light of the specific circumstances surrounding the police officers' encounter with the Plaintiffs. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). This is an objective standard which requires a balancing of "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." Scott, 550 U.S. at 383 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)); see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.

(i) Plaintiff's Seizure by Redden

A seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurs "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry, 392 U.S. at 16; see Scott, 550 U.S. at 381. The Fourth Amendment does, however, allow police officers to conduct brief, investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion "supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot.'" United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). The reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a stop depends on "both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability." Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

In determining whether Redden had reasonable suspicion to stop and question Plaintiff, the Court must "assess...