Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia

56 F.Supp.3d 10

Mikeisha Blackman, et al., Plaintiffs

v.District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 97–1629 PLF

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed July 17, 2014

Carolyn W. Houck, Law Offices of Carolyn W. Houck, Myrna Lee Fawcett, Bonita A. Jones–Moon, Fawcett & Fawcett, Paul S. Dalton, Options Public Charter School, Ronald Lee Drake, Ron Drake Lee Office, Tilman L. Gerald, Law Offices of Tilman L. Gerald, Angela Lipscomb, Jane Irene Ryan, Latoya Brisbane, Lindsey Bishop Lang, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, Margaret A. Kohn, Law Office of Margaret Kohn, Donna L. Wulkan, Law Offices of Donna L. Wulkan, James E. Brown, James E. Brown & Associates, PLLC, Ellen Douglass Dalton, Friendship Public Charter School, Washington, DC, Paul S. Dalton, Options Public Charter School, Carolyn W. Houck, Law Offices of Carolyn W. Houck, Jesse P. Goode, Department of Human Services, Joseph B. Tulman, University of DC, David A. Clarke School of Law, Roberta L. Gambale, James Brown and Associates, PLLC, Ira A. Burnim, Julia Marie Graff, Travis A. Murrell, Anna Elizabeth Jenefsky, Karen D. Alvarez, Laura Nicole Rinaldi, Matthew I. Fraidin, Emily B. Read, Julia Marie Graff, Washington, DC, James E. Williams, Elizabeth T. Jester, Jester & Willam, Great Falls, VA, Haylie Michelle Iseman, Michael J. Eig, Michael J. Eig & Associates, PC, Matthew B. Bogin, Law Office of Matthew B. Bogin, Chevy Chase, MD, Diana Marjorie Savit, Savit & Szymkowicz, LLP, Bethesda, MD, for Plaintiffs.

Amy Caspari, Ellen A. Efros, Juliane T. Demarco, Laura George, Richard Allan Latterell, Office of the Attorney General, Cary D. Pollak, Jonathan F. Potter, Robert Ray Rigsby, Office of Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia, Daniel Herbert Margolis, Patton Boggs LLP, Jeffery Thomas Infelise, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Robert C. Utiger, DC Office of the Attorney General, Victoria Lynne Healy, Chad Wayne Copeland, Maria L. Merkowitz, Veronica A. Porter, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Cathye Hopkins, Veleter Mazych, DCPS General Counsel, Peter J. Nickles, DC Government, Washington, DC, Laurie Pouzzner McManus, Arlington, VA, for Defendants.

Claim of Denyce Hubbard, legal guardian and next friend of T.C.

OPINION AND ORDER

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Court

This action was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the rights of the plaintiff class members under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. This matter is now before the Court on the motion of class member Denyce Hubbard for $27,251.25 in attorneys' fees and costs. Defendant, the District of Columbia, opposes the motion. Upon consideration of the parties' papers, the relevant legal authorities, and pertinent portions of the record in this case, the Court grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's motion, and awards to plaintiff fees and costs in the amount of $20,162.75, representing $20,090.50 in attorneys' fees and $72.25 in costs.¹

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Denyce Hubbard is the legal guardian and next friend of T.C., a student eligible to receive special education and related services from the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”). In December 2012, plaintiff filed a request for a due process hearing to challenge T.C.'s educational placement under her individualized education program (“IEP”). R & R at 2. On January 28, 2013, an administrative hearing officer found that DCPS had denied T.C. a free, appropriate public education required under the IDEA when it failed to provide an appropriate placement for T.C. Id. The hearing officer ordered DCPS to place T.C. in a fulltime, segregated, therapeutic environment and to provide T.C. art therapy at least once a week for the remainder of the 2012–2013 school year.Id.

DCPS did not provide art therapy in a timely fashion, however, and on June 21, 2013, plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. In her motion, plaintiff sought an order directing DCPS to immediately provide art therapy in compliance with the hearing officer determination and compensatory education for the services which T.C. had been denied. PI Mot. at 15.

The Court referred the preliminary injunction motion to Special Master Elise Baach. See Minute Order dated June 26, 2013. The parties presented their arguments to the Special Master on July 10, 2013. R & R at 6. After considering the parties' arguments, the Special Master convened a teleconference with the parties on July 12, 2013, in which she explained that “due to the delay in providing art therapy, T.C. would prevail in this action,” and she “asked the parties to discuss the details of a proposed order regarding T.C.'s art therapy sessions.” Id. On July 19, 2013, plaintiff filed a status report notifying the Court that the parties had reached an agreement regarding the art therapy sessions. Status Report at 1; R & R at 6. The Court subsequently denied the motion for preliminary injunction as moot. See Minute Order dated August 5, 2013.

Plaintiff now moves for an award of $27,179.00 in attorneys' fees and $72.25 in costs for the time and effort involved in obtaining the favorable settlement.²

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court previously has set forth the appropriate analytical framework for determining the award of attorneys' fees and costs in special education cases like this one. See Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 59 F.Supp.2d 37, 42–44 (D.D.C.1999). To recover reasonable attorneys' fees, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she is a prevailing party in the litigation. Id. at 40–41 ; see alsoBlackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 328 F.Supp.2d 36, 42–45 (D.D.C.2004). For a party to constitute a prevailing party, it must have succeeded on a significant issue raised in the litigation and secured some of the benefit sought. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (internal quotation omitted). In addition, this benefit must reflect a change in the legal relationship between the parties, and that change must be judicially sanctioned in some way. Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 328 F.Supp.2d at 45 (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604–05, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) ). Once it has determined that the plaintiff is a prevailing party, the Court then must determine whether the fees sought are reasonable by calculating “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate”—the so-called “lodestar” fee. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. See e.g., In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1423 n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1989) ; Sierra Club v. Jackson, 926 F.Supp.2d 341, 346 (D.D.C.2013).

On the issue of reasonableness, a plaintiff must submit supporting documentation with the motion for attorneys' fees, providing sufficient detail so that the Court can determine “with a high degree of certainty ” that the hours billed were actually and reasonably expended, that the hourly rate charged was reasonable in view of the attorney's reputation and level of skill and experience with respect to this type of case, and that the matter was appropriately staffed to do the work required efficiently and without duplicative billing. In re Olson, 884 F.2d at 1423, 1428–29 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation omitted); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 397 F.Supp.2d 12, 14 (D.D.C.2005). At a minimum, a fee applicant must provide some information about the attorney's billing practices, hourly rates, and skill and experience, as well as the nature of the attorney's practice as it relates to this kind of litigation and the prevailing market rates in the community. Rooths v. Dist. of Columbia, 802 F.Supp.2d 56, 60 (D.D.C.2011) ; Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 397 F.Supp.2d at 14–15. Once a plaintiff has provided such information, there is a presumption that the number of hours billed and the hourly rate are reasonable, and the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's showing of reasonable hours and reasonable hourly rates for attorneys of the relevant level of skill and expertise. See Watkins v. Vance, 328 F.Supp.2d 23, 26 (D.D.C.2004). “[I]n the normal case the Government must either accede to the applicant's requested rate or provide specific contrary evidence tending to show that a lower rate would be appropriate.” Covington v. Dist. of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1109–10 (D.C.Cir.1995) (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec'y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C.Cir.1982) ); see also Rooths v. Dist. of Columbia, 802 F.Supp.2d at 60.

III. DISCUSSION

In support of her motion for fees, plaintiff has submitted an itemized invoice documenting the hours billed by the two attorneys and one paralegal who worked on this case and the bill of costs. Statement of Attorneys' Fees and Bill of Costs, Fee Mot. Ex. 19. Plaintiff also has filed declarations by the two attorneys and one paralegal attesting to their levels of experience and billing practices. Declaration of Charles Moran (“Moran Decl.”), Fee Mot. Ex. 15; Declaration of Tanjima Islam (“Islam Decl.”), Fee Mot. Ex. 17; Declaration of Steve Nabors (“Nabors Decl.”), Fee Mot. Ex. 18.

The District opposes the motion on the grounds that plaintiff cannot achieve “prevailing party” status under a settlement agreement and that the number of hours and the hourly rates billed by plaintiff's counsel are unreasonably high. See Fee Opp. These arguments are addressed in turn.

A. Fees May Be Awarded For A Settlement Agreement Entered Into Under Supervision Of The Special Master

As a procedural matter, the District objects to paying any fees because the plaintiff has not received a judicial decision and therefore is not a prevailing party. See Fee Opp. at 7–9. This argument is foreclosed by this Court's decision...