Blackmon v. Adams Cnty.

LYDIA ROBERTA BLACKMON, et al. PLAINTIFFS v. ADAMS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al. DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 5:21-CV-62-KS-RHWR

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Western Division

May 5, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KEITH STARRETT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

For the reasons provided below, the Court grants Defendants' Motion to Strike [27]. The Court also grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [14].

I. Background

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case. Plaintiffs are former public defenders in the Circuit Court of Adams County. They claim that Defendants - Adam County and individual members of its Board of Supervisors -paid them less than similarly-situated white and male public defenders. They also claim that Defendants altered the manner in which the county provided public defenders in order to eliminate them from the job. Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [14] and a Motion to Strike [27]. Both motions are ripe.

II. Motion to Strike

Defendants filed their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [14] on December 13, 2021. Plaintiffs sought and received numerous extensions of time to respond to the motion. Ultimately, they missed their deadline and filed a motion [24] seeking leave to file the response out of time. The Court granted the motion, but Plaintiffs never filed the response. Nevertheless, the Court will deem the response filed, as Plaintiffs attached a copy of it to their motion seeking leave to file it out of time. See Attachments to Motion for Leave to File [24-1, 24-2, 24-3].

Defendants filed a Motion to Strike [27] one of the exhibits to Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [14]. Specifically, Plaintiffs attached a copy of a notice of claim dated December 15, 2020, addressed to the Adams County Chancery Clerk. Exhibit to Motion for Leave to File [24-2]. Defendants argue that the Court may not consider the exhibit when addressing the pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [14]. Plaintiffs did not respond to the Motion to Strike [27].

Motions for judgment on the pleadings are subject to the same standard of review as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC v. La. State, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010). “To be plausible, the complaint's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (punctuation omitted). The Court must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. But the Court will not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Id.

Likewise, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2010) (punctuation omitted). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

“The court's review is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Ironshore Europe DAC v. Schiff Hardin, LLP, 912 F.3d 759, 763 (5th Cir. 2019). The Court may also consider matters of public record, Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, n. 3 (5th Cir. 1995), and any other matters of which it may take judicial notice. Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011). “If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56, ” and “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). However, the “district court has complete discretion to either accept or exclude the evidence.” Gen. Retail Servs., Inc. v. Wireless Toyz Franchise, LLC, 255 Fed.Appx. 775, 783 (5th Cir. 2008).

The Notice of Claim [24-2] was not attached to the Complaint or the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. It is not a matter of public record, and Plaintiffs have not argued that the Court may take judicial notice of it. Therefore, the Court may not consider it without converting the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to a Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court's typical practice has been to decline to convert such motions. See, e.g. D.M. v. Forrest County Sheriff's Dep't, 2020 WL 4873486, at *2 (Aug. 19, 2020). Therefore, the Court declines to consider the notice of claim and grants Defendants' Motion to Strike [27] the Notice of Claim attached as an exhibit to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File [24-2].

III. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [14]

A. Judicial Immunity

First, Defendants argue that Adams County and the individual board members are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from liability as to Plaintiffs' federal claims. Defendants argue that they are entitled to judicial immunity because Plaintiffs were paid by the Board of Supervisors in accordance with judicial orders from a circuit court judge. In other words, Defendants contend that judicial immunity extends to them because they were following a judge's orders.

“An official acting within the scope of his authority is absolutely immune from a suit for damages to the extent that the cause of action arises from his compliance with a facially valid judicial order issued by a court acting within its jurisdiction.” Mays v. Sudduth, 97 F.3d 107, 113 (5th Cir. 1996). Indeed, “[u]nder Mississippi law, the judge is the ultimate authority for the supervision of the court in his jurisdiction.” Brooks v. George County, 84 F.3d 157, 168 (5th Cir. 1996). However, “[a]s the officer's immunity derives from that of the issuing judge, the order must be one for which the judge is absolutely immune from suit.” Mays, 97 F.3d at 114.

To determine whether a judge is entitled to judicial immunity, the Court applies “a functional approach, which looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Id. at 110. Generally, “judges enjoy absolute immunity for judicial acts performed in judicial proceedings.” Id. To determine whether an official is entitled to judicial immunity, the Court focuses on the nature of the disputed actions, rather than the identity of the actor. Hulsey v. Owens, 63 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1995).

Although there is no “precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity, ” the law recognizes a distinction “between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). “Administrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not . . . been regarded as judicial acts.” Id. at 228. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that a judge acted “in an administrative capacity when he demoted and discharged” a probation officer. Id. Such employment decisions, while “important in providing the necessary conditions of a sound adjudicative system, ” are “not themselves judicial or adjudicative.” Id. at 229.

The Fifth Circuit has provided a four-factor test. Davis v. Tarrant County, 565 F.3d 214, 222-23 (5th Cir. 2009). The Court should consider: “(1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judge's chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity.” Id. at 222. “These facts are broadly construed in favor of immunity.” Id. at 223.

Plaintiffs' allegations focus on three issues: 1) their receipt of $800.00 less per month than the other public defenders from September 2019 until the Board of Supervisors planned to establish an Office of Public Defender; 2) the Board of Supervisors abandoning the plan to establish an Office of Public Defender, and 3) their exclusion from the list of potential public defenders used by the Court after the Board of Supervisors abandoned the plan to establish an Office of Public Defender.

1. § 1983 Claims Against the County

First, “defenses such as absolute quasi-judicial immunity, that only protect defendants in their individual capacities, are unavailable in official-capacity suits.” Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 2000). Therefore, the Court rejects this argument as applied to the County or the individual Defendants in their official capacities.

2. Unequal Pay

Plaintiffs alleged that the Board of Supervisors approved a budget for the Circuit Court, and that the Circuit Court judges issued pay orders for the public defenders. Plaintiffs further alleged that in December 2019, Judge Sanders increased the monthly pay of public defenders appearing before her, but that Judge Blackwell did not. Each individual Defendant in this case is a member of the Adams County Board of Supervisors, and it appears to be undisputed - based on Plaintiffs' own allegations - that Defendants did not set the amount of Plaintiffs' pay. Rather, they executed a pay...