Blackmore v. Powell

59 Cal.Rptr.3d 527

150 Cal.App.4th 1593

Barry BLACKMORE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Donna Lisa POWELL and Susan Diana Schmitter, Defendants and Appellants.

No. B185326.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4.

May 22, 2007.

Cox, Castle & Nicholson, Stanley W. Lamport and James R. Repking, Los Angeles, for Appellants and Defendants.

The Dolan Law Firm and Peter Brown Dolan, Los Angeles, for Respondent and Plaintiff.

MANELLA, J.

Respondent Barry Blackmore initiated an action against appellants Donna Lisa Powell and Susan Diana Schmitter for a declaration that he was entitled to build a garage on an easement appurtenant to his property, and for other relief, including a permanent injunction. Following trial, a judgment was entered in Blackmore's favor on his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. On appeal, appellants contend the trial court erred in interpreting the easement to permit respondent to build a garage, and that the easement, so construed, contravenes the Subdivision Map Act (Gov.Code, § 66410 et seq.) (Map Act).¹ We reject these contentions and affirm.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying dispute concerns adjoining parcels of residential real property in Glendale. In December 1979, Richard Hunt, the owner of one of these parcels, executed a grant deed conveying an easement to the owners of the other parcel, Thomas and Barbara Young. According to the grant deed, the easement was for "parking and garage purposes" over a defined area on Hunt's property encompassing 6,138.29 square feet. The grant deed was recorded on December 11, 1979. In May 1998, appellants purchased the property formerly owned by Hunt. Respondent bought the property formerly owned by the Youngs in 2003, and later obtained a building permit from the City of Glendale to erect a two-car garage covering approximately 660 square feet—roughly 11 percent—of the easement.

On June 29, 2004, respondent filed a complaint alleging that appellants had prevented him from building a garage on the easement. The complaint sought declaratory relief, an injunction, and damages. Trial in the action was subsequently bifurcated.

On March 28, 2005, a bench trial occurred on respondent's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. At trial, appellants conceded that the 1979 deed created an easement on their property, and they did not challenge appellant's entitlement to park vehicles on it. They contended that the deed did not accord appellant the right to build a garage, and that construing the easement to encompass this right would violate the Map Act.

The trial court heard testimony from appellant Powell and respondent, and the parties stipulated that there was no evidence that a permanent structure had previously been erected on the easement. Powell testified that appellants had received a title insurance policy disclosing the easement when they bought the property. Respondent testified that much of the easement was hilly, and that a portion of the easement would be excavated to provide a flat pad for the garage.

The trial court issued its statement of decision on June 6, 2005. Noting that there was "little dispute as to the facts involved," the trial court concluded that the 1979 deed, by its express terms, authorized respondent to build a garage on the easement; it further determined that respondent was entitled to exclusive use of the garage. It rejected appellants' contention that the easement, so construed, violated the Map Act, concluding that respondent's exclusive use of the garage did not constitute a subdivision of property within the meaning of the Act. The trial court awarded a judgment in respondent's favor on his claims for declaratory relief, and appellants noticed an appeal from this ruling.

On May 6, 2006, following a second bench trial on respondent's claim for damages, the trial court filed a judgment denying this claim and incorporating its prior judgment. Appellants also noticed an appeal from this judgment, and their two appeals were subsequently consolidated.

DISCUSSION

Appellants challenge the trial court's rulings on two related grounds. First, they contend the trial court misinterpreted, the rights accorded respondent under the grant deed. Second, they contend the trial court's determinations regarding the easement contravene the Map Act. As we explain below, both contentions are mistaken.²

A. Exclusive Rights Regarding the Garage

Appellants contend that the trial court's interpretation of the grant deed awards respondent an ownership interest in their land, rather than an easement. The crux of their argument is that according respondent the right to build a garage on the easement for respondent's exclusive use amounts to awarding respondent ownership in fee simple (or its equivalent) of a portion of their property. We disagree.

Generally, easements are distinguished from estates in land such as ownership in fee, tenancy in common, joint tenancy, and leaseholds, which are forms of possession of land. (12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Real Property, §§ 9-10, pp. 59-60; § 382, pp. 446-447.) "`An easement involves primarily the privilege of doing a certain act on, or to the detriment of, another's property.' [Citation.] An easement gives a nonpossessory and restricted right to a specific use or activity upon another's property, which right must be less than the right of ownership. [Citation.]" (Mehdizadeh v. Mincer (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1306, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 284, quoting Wright v. Best (1942) 19 Cal.2d 368, 381, 121 P.2d 702.) Thus, "[t]he owner of the easement is not the owner of the property, but merely the possessor of a `right to use someone's land for a specified purpose....'" (Cody F. v. Falletti (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1242, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, quoting Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Godwin Liv. Trust (9th Cir.1994) 32 F.3d 1364, 1368; see Kazi v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2001) 24 Cal.4th 871, p. 881, 103 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 15 P.3d 223 [An easement "represents a limited privilege to use the land of another ..., but does not create an interest in the land itself."].)

The easement here is appurtenant: it attaches to respondent's property, the so-called "dominant tenement," and burdens appellants' property, the so-called "servient tenement." (Cushman v. Davis (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 731, 735, 145 Cal. Rptr. 791.) Because the 1979 grant deed created the easement, the burden imposed on appellants' property is determined by the terms of the deed. (County of Sacramento v. Pacific Gas & Elec. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 300, 313, 238 Cal.Rptr. 305.) "Where the easement is founded upon a grant, as here, only those interests expressed in the grant and those necessarily incident thereto pass from the owner of the fee." (Pasadena v. California-Michigan etc. Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 576, 579, 110 P.2d 983.) Appellants thus retain "every incident of ownership not inconsistent with the easement and the enjoyment of the same." (Dierssen v. McCormack (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 164, 170, 82 P.2d 212).

Nonetheless, appellants may not use their property "in a way that obstructs the normal use of the easement." (12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Real Property, § 412, p. 484.) "Whether a particular use by the servient owner of land subject to an easement is an unreasonable interference with the rights of the dominant owner is a question of fact for the trier of fact," whose findings are binding upon the appellate court if properly supported by the evidence. (Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc. (1995) 37 Cal. App.4th 697, 702, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 810.)

Here, the deed conveyed "[a]n easement for parking and garage purposes." "In construing an instrument conveying an easement, the rules applicable to the construction of deeds generally apply. If the language is clear and explicit in the conveyance, there is no occasion for the use of parol evidence to show the nature and extent of the rights acquired." (Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 703, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 810.) As the trial court correctly observed, the term "garage," as used in the deed, means putting or storing a vehicle in a garage. (E.g. Webster's Third New Internat. Diet. Unabridged (2002) p. 935 ["garage .. *vt.../...: to keep or put in a garage"].) Because there was no evidence that a garage ever stood on the easement, the trial court properly concluded that the express language of the deed authorized respondent to build a garage.

The trial court further concluded that respondent was entitled to exclusive use of the garage as "a necessary incident" of the easement, reasoning that a shared garage would generate disputes about allocation of parking spaces, security, and maintenance costs. In view of the evidence presented at trial, we see no error in the determination that nonexclusive use of the garage would interfere unreasonably with respondent's rights. (Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 703, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 810.)

We recognize that in Pasadena v. California-Michigan etc. Co., supra, 17 Cal.2d at page 578, 110 P.2d 983, our Supreme Court remarked, in dictum, that an "`exclusive easement'" is an unusual interest in land" that "has been said to amount almost to a conveyance of the fee," and observed that "[n]o intention to convey such a complete interest can be imputed to the owner of the servient tenement in the absence of a clear indication of such an intention." In that case, no "serious claim" was presented that an exclusive easement had been conveyed. (Id. at pp. 578-579, 110 P.2d 983.) Whether a socalled "exclusive easement" constitutes ownership in fee, rather than an easement, depends upon the circumstances of the case (Otay Water Dist v. Beckwith (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1048, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 223), including the terms of any applicable conveyance (Raab v. Casper (1975) 51 Cal. App.3d 866, 876-877, 124 Cal.Rptr. 590). Thus, a conveyance that "`"...