Blake v. Lambert

512 F.Supp.3d 705

Carla BLAKE, Plaintiff

v.Don LAMBERT, and Prentiss County, Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-CV-89-SA-DAS

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Aberdeen Division.

Signed January 12, 2021

Victor Israel Fleitas, Victor I. Fleitas, P.A., Andrew Wallace Stuart, II, Law Office of Andrew W. Stuart, II, Tupelo, MS, for Plaintiff.

James A. Bobo, Justin Wade Sweat, Office of Attorney General State of Mississippi, Jackson, MS, for Defendant Don Lambert.

Casey Langston Lott, Langston & Lott, P.A., Booneville, MS, Frederic Theodore LeClercq, Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, New Orleans, LA, Lawrence Matthew Quinlivan, Zachary Stokes Wessler, Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, LLP, Gulfport, MS, for Defendant Prentiss County.

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION

Sharion Aycock, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Carla Blake initiated this action on June 12, 2017, by filing her Complaint [1] against Prentiss County, Mississippi, and Don Lambert, a Prentiss County School Attendance Officer. Judgment, as to liability only, has been entered against Lambert in his individual capacity. See Order and Judgment [48]. Prentiss County has now filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [66], requesting dismissal of all claims against it. The Motion [66] has been fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule.

Factual and Procedural Background

Sometime before September 2013, Blake had temporary custody of her nephew, S.W., a minor school-age child. S.W. was enrolled in Prentiss County Public Schools, and Blake was listed as S.W.’s contact in school records. On September 5, 2013, Lambert mailed a form letter to Blake informing her that S.W. had five unexcused absences, that she was responsible for making sure S.W. attended school, and that continued accrual of unexcused absences could lead to potential penalties under Mississippi Code § 37-13-91. S.W. continued to accrue unexcused absences. In January of 2014, Lambert contacted Blake by phone, and Blake informed him that she no longer had custody of S.W. and was not S.W.’s caregiver. Blake also informed Lambert that S.W. was now in the custody of his mother, Tracey Perry. Blake gave Perry's contact information to Lambert. According to Blake, Lambert apologized for the confusion and said that he would follow up with Perry. Lambert subsequently talked with Perry by phone. Perry apparently confirmed that she was S.W.’s mother, and informed Lambert that S.W. was sick. Lambert informed Blake and Perry that they needed to contact the school to update the official records as to S.W.’s custody.

On June 10, 2014, Lambert swore out a "General Affidavit" for Blake's arrest, and filed the affidavit in Prentiss County Justice Court. The affidavit charged Blake with contributing to the delinquency of S.W. by refusing or willfully failing to make sure that S.W. attended school, in violation of Mississippi Code §§ 37-13-91, 97-5-39(1). According to school records, S.W. was absent from school at least sixteen days during the 2013-2014 school year.

Based on Lambert's affidavit, the Prentiss County Justice Court Judge issued a warrant for Blake's arrest. Pursuant to this warrant, a Prentiss County Deputy Sheriff arrested Blake at her home on June 12, 2014. Blake was then booked into the Prentiss County Jail, strip searched, and detained in a holding cell for a short period until she was able to arrange bond.

On June 17, 2014, Lambert filed an affidavit in Prentiss County Justice Court requesting dismissal of the charges against Blake stating, "I filed an affidavit on the wrong person by mistake." The Justice Court Judge subsequently dismissed the charges against Blake.

Blake then initiated this action. In her Complaint [1], Blake alleged that Lambert violated her constitutional rights because the affidavit he swore out against her was facially invalid, that Lambert intentionally withheld exculpatory information, and that Lambert recklessly caused Blake's arrest without probable cause. After this Court denied Lambert's request for qualified immunity, Lambert appealed. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Blake's Malley claim but reversed as to Blake's Franks claim. In accordance with the Fifth Circuit's opinion, this Court filed an Order and Judgment [48], specifically entering "summary judgment against Defendant Lambert in his individual capacity for Plaintiff Blake's claim that Lambert violated her Constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). With liability decided, the Plaintiff's Malley claim will be set for a trial on damages following the resolution of the Plaintiff's claims against Prentiss County."

In addition to her claims against Lambert, Blake's Complaint [1] asserts a claim against Prentiss County. Specifically, Blake avers that the County is liable for "maintaining a policy, practice, custom or usage which authorized and mandated subjecting detainees being held on non-violent and non-drug offenses to humiliating strip searches in the absence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause while briefly detained in a holding cell and awaiting bond." In other words, she asserts that the County's policy pursuant to which she was strip searched is unconstitutional as it relates to certain classes of persons taken into custody. The County now seeks summary judgment on that claim.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The rule "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).

In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the non-movant, "but only when ... both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). When such contradictory facts exist, the Court may "not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000).

The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must then "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation omitted).

Analysis and Discussion

As noted above, Blake's claim against the County concerns the constitutionality of the County's policy pursuant to which the visual body cavity search was conducted. Although the parties disagree as to certain issues, the circumstances surrounding the strip search are not in dispute. As stated by the County:

The Prentiss County Jail facility has a Contraband Prevention Policy in place which requires that all incoming detainees/arrestees in the booking area of the Jail be searched for the safety and security of other inmates, jailers, and members of the public who enter the facility (e.g. jail staff, healthcare professionals, clergymen, attorneys, etc.). Therefore, upon her arrival to the Prentiss County Jail, the Plaintiff was strip searched in accordance with Prentiss County Jail's policies and procedures.

[67], p. 1. As to the specifics of the search, the County states:

Once in the strip search room, the single female jailer instructed the Plaintiff to disrobe, squat down, and cough so that the jailer could conduct a visual inspection of the Plaintiff for prohibited contraband and weapons. The strip search lasted approximately two to three minutes, was conducted by the single female jailer in a windowless room, and no one (other tha[n] the single female jailer) could see the Plaintiff or into the room during the strip search.

[67], p. 3. Also of critical importance is the fact that Blake was never taken into the Jail's general population, nor was she ever considered for placement in the facility's general population. She was thereafter released from custody once bond was arranged.

Again, neither party disputes the above-referenced underlying facts. However, while Blake contends that she was subjected to an unconstitutional search, the County asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment because the search was related to legitimate penological concerns and therefore was in compliance with the Fourth Amendment.

Blake makes her claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 makes liable "every person" who, under color of state law, violates federal constitutional rights. Littell v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. , 894 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir. 2018). For this purpose, municipalities, such as Prentiss County, qualify as "persons." Id. (citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978) ).

However, municipalities "cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of their officials. Direct liability is instead required." Jauch v. Choctaw Cty. , 874 F.3d 425, 435 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Monell , 436 U.S. at 692-93, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ; Valle v. City of Houston , 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010) ). "Proof of municipal liability sufficient to satisfy Monell requires: (1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy (or custom).’ " Id. (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston , 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002) ; ...