Blake v. Recovery Network of Programs, Inc.

655 F.Supp.3d 39

Tammy BLAKE, Plaintiff, v. RECOVERY NETWORK OF PROGRAMS, INC., Defendant.

No. 3:22-cv-19 (VAB)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

Signed February 10, 2023

James V. Sabatini, Vincent F. Sabatini, Sabatini & Associates, Newington, CT, for Plaintiff.

Phyllis M. Pari, Letizia, Ambrose & Falls, P.C., New Haven, CT, for Defendant.

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

VICTOR A. BOLDEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Tammy Blake ("Plaintiff") has sued her former employer, Recovery Network of Programs, Inc. ("RNP"), alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act ("CFEPA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60 et seq. Compl., ECF No. 1-1. Ms. Blake alleges that she was subject to gender-based discrimination while working for RNP and that the company wrongfully terminated her after she requested leave under the Family Medical Leave Act to care for her disabled foster children.

RNP has moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that Ms. Blake's factual allegations do not present a plausible claim for relief and that her state law gender discrimination and retaliation claims are time-barred. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 8.

For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

RNP's motion is denied as to Ms. Blake's FMLA retaliation claim (Count One).

RNP's motion is granted as to Ms. Blake's FMLA interference claim (Count Two), CFEPA associational disability claim (Count Three), CFEPA hostile work environment claim (Count Four), and CFEPA retaliation claim (Count Five). These claims are dismissed.

To the extent the deficiencies identified in this ruling can be addressed, Ms. Blake may file a motion for leave to amend the Complaint, along with the proposed Amended Complaint, by March 10, 2023.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

According to the Complaint, Ms. Blake was hired by RNP as a medicating nurse in 2013 and worked for the company until she was terminated on April 6, 2020. See Compl. ¶¶ 5-6, 22.

The Complaint alleges an incident in February 2018 in which Ms. Blake was falsely accused of refusing to count a client's pills. See id. ¶ 9. After one of Ms. Blake's counselors allegedly made this accusation, Ms. Blake allegedly approached Clara Roberts to discuss it. See id. ¶¶ 10, 12.¹ At this point, according to the Complaint, Clinical Coordinator Edgardo Reyes aggressively told Ms. Blake, "I'm involved in this now and I'm Clara's supervisor so whatever you have to say to her you can say in front of me." See id. ¶ 13.

Mr. Reyes allegedly had a history of speaking to Ms. Blake in an aggressive tone. Id. ¶ 14. At some unspecified date, Mr. Reyes also allegedly ignored Ms. Blake's pages for assistance while answering pages from a male nurse. Id. ¶ 16.

Ms. Blake alleges that the same male nurse repeatedly arrived late to work and used his cell phone for personal reasons while on the job. See id. ¶¶ 25-26. Even though this conduct violated RNP's policies, this nurse was allegedly promoted from medicating nurse to be LPN supervisor. See id. ¶ 27.

On February 18, 2018, Ms. Blake allegedly filed a hostile work environment complaint with RNP's human resources department, but she alleges that the complaint was not adequately addressed. Id. ¶¶ 17-18.

Two years later, further problems arose when Ms. Blake allegedly applied for FMLA leave. Ms. Blake allegedly has two foster children who suffer from anxiety and depression. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21. On March 13, 2020, Ms. Blake allegedly completed an FMLA request for intermittent absences in order to take her foster children to medical appointments related to these conditions. See id. ¶ 21.

Less than four weeks later, on April 6, 2020, RNP allegedly terminated Ms. Blake's employment. Id. ¶ 22. RNP allegedly explained that Ms. Blake was being terminated for willful misconduct, but Ms. Blake alleges that she had not engaged in willful misconduct. Id. ¶¶ 23-24.

B. Procedural History

On December 6, 2021, Ms. Blake filed her Complaint in Connecticut Superior Court. Compl. The Complaint asserts claims for FMLA retaliation (Count One); interference with FMLA rights (Count Two); disability discrimination by association under the CFEPA (Count Three); gender-based harassment and hostile work environment under the CFEPA (Count Four); and CFEPA retaliation (Count Five). Id. ¶¶ 31-54.

On January 6, 2022, RNP removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.

On April 6, 2022, RNP filed a motion to dismiss. See Mot. to Dismiss; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9 ("Mem.").

On May 25, 2022, Ms. Blake filed an objection to RNP's motion to dismiss. Pl.'s Obj. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 14 ("Opp'n").

On June 22, 2022, RNP filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss. Reply to Obj. to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18 ("Reply").

On September 27, 2022, the case was transferred from Judge Alfred V. Covello to Judge Victor A. Bolden. Order of Transfer, ECF No. 26.

On January 24, 2023, the parties filed a Rule 26(f) Report, and on January 25, the Court issued a Scheduling Order. Rule 26(f) Report, ECF No. 36; Scheduling Order, ECF No. 37.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Any claim that fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" will be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), a court applies a "plausibility standard" guided by "[t]wo working principles." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

First, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ("While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). Second, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Thus, the complaint must contain "factual amplification . . . to render a claim plausible." Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009)).

When reviewing a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court takes all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The court also views the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draws all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Cohen v. S.A.C. Trading Corp., 711 F.3d 353, 359 (2d Cir. 2013); see also York v. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, 286 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2002) ("On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting the complaint's allegations as true.").

A court considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) generally limits its review "to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint, the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the complaint by reference." McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). A court may also consider "matters of which judicial notice may be taken" and "documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit." Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993); Patrowicz v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 140, 144 (D. Conn. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

In her Complaint, Ms. Blake asserts claims for: (1) retaliation for asserting her rights under the FMLA; (2) interference with her FMLA rights; (3) disability discrimination in violation of the CFEPA; (4) gender-based hostile work environment in violation of the CFEPA; and (5) retaliation for filing a complaint about a discriminatory workplace practice, in violation of the CFEPA. See Compl. ¶¶ 31-54.

RNP argues that each of Ms. Blake's claims fail because the Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. See Mem. at 1. RNP also contends that Ms. Blake's state law hostile work environment and retaliation claims are time-barred.

The Court will address each claim in turn.

A. The FMLA Claims

"The Family and Medical Leave Act provides broad protections to employees who need to take time away from work to deal with serious health conditions of the employee or her family." Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). To enforce these protections, the FMLA "creates a private right of action to seek both equitable relief and money damages against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction should that employer interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of FMLA rights." Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The FMLA authorizes claims for both retaliation and interference. See Woods, 864 F.3d at 166. An employee may bring an interference claim when the employer "has prevented or otherwise impeded the employee's ability to exercise rights under the FMLA." Id. "Retaliation claims, on the other hand, involve an employee actually exercising her rights or opposing perceived unlawful conduct under the FMLA and then being subjected to some adverse employment action by the employer." Id. (internal...