Blanda v. Cooper/T. Smith Corp.

599 F.Supp.3d 385

Douglas BLANDA

v.COOPER/T. SMITH CORPORATION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-CV-678-JWD-SDJ

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.

Signed April 20, 2022

Anthony David Irpino, Bobby Hawkins, Irpino Law Firm, New Orleans, LA, Patrick Hillary Hufft, Hufft & Hufft, APLC, New Orleans, LA, for Douglas Blanda.

David Michael Flotte, Kevin Frey, Morgan Kelley, Austin S. Glascoe, Marcelle P. Mouledoux, Salley, Hite, Mercer & Resor, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Cooper/T. Smith Corporation.

RULING ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON SEAMAN STATUS

JOHN W. deGRAVELLES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Seaman Status (Doc. 17) ("Motion ") brought by Petitioners in Limitation/Defendants Cooper/T. Smith Corporation ("CTS Corp.") and Cooper/T. Smith Mooring Co., Inc. ("CTS, Inc.") (collectively "CTS"). It is opposed by Claimant/Plaintiff Douglas Blanda ("Blanda" or "Plaintiff"). (Doc. 21.) CTS filed a reply brief. (Doc. 24.) The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this personal injury suit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 et seq. , and general maritime law or alternatively, under Section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (Doc. 1-1 at 2, ¶ III.) He claims that on April 18, 2018, he was injured on a vessel owned by CTS Corp. while working as a seaman for the same company. (Doc. 1-1 at 3–4, ¶¶ VI and VIII.) He claims the accident and injuries were caused by the negligence of CTS Corp. and the unseaworthiness of its vessel. (Id. at 2–4, ¶¶ III., VI. and VIII.)

Specifically, he alleges that he was injured while assisting in the mooring of "an oceangoing vessel called the M/V Sea Victory" to a buoy in the Mississippi River at the Valero # 3 buoys. (Doc. 21 at 2 (citing Doc. 17-4 at 2).) The M/V Sea Victory lowered a mooring line to the CTS mooring vessel (sometimes referred to as a "launch vessel"), either the Captain Scott or the Captain Jack. (Doc. 21-2, Blanda Deposition, at 96–98.) He claims he was injured when he "attempted to pick up and move [the] heavy line [while] in an unsteady boat owned and operated by [CTS Corp.]" (Doc. 1-1 at 3, VI.) More specifically, while "trying to put this big, giant, heavy, wet, greasy [mooring] line on top of this bar so I [could] get ready to put it on the hook, [ ] that's when my back got tight." (Doc. 21 at 2 (quoting Doc. 21-2, Blanda Deposition, at 96).)¹

According to CTS, Blanda was employed by CTS, Inc. from August 2014 to the spring of 2020. (Doc. 17-2, Defendants’ Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ("SUMF"), ¶ 1.) CTS claims he was employed as a lineman. (Id. ) Blanda urges that he was employed by CTS Corp. from some time in 2013 until approximately April of 2020. (Doc. 21 at 1.)² He claims that he was "a ‘blend of lineman and deckhand ... until October of 2019,’ and then was ‘an operator/deckhand [the] majority of the time’ between October 2019 and April 2020." (Id. at 1–2 (citing Doc. 21-2 at 20).)

Plaintiff's Petition was filed originally in the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge and, on October 8, 2020, removed to this Court. (Doc. 1.) CTS Corp. and CTS, Inc. filed a Petition for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability on December 11, 2020, (Docket Number 20-838, Doc. 1.) Blanda filed an answer and claim in that proceeding. (Id. Doc. 10.) On April 12, 2021, the Limitation proceeding was consolidated with Blanda's suit. (Id. Doc. 19.)

The Motion of CTS Inc. and CTS Corp.³ asks the Court to find as a matter of law that Blanda was not a seaman. (Doc. 17.)

II. STANDARD

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the mover bears his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal citations and emphasis omitted).

If, as here, the dispositive issue (in this case, seaman status) is one on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential part of the nonmoving party's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265. ("[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.") Stated another way, "[w]here the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to the absence of evidence and thereby shift to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating ... that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial." Kim v. Hospira, Inc. , 709 F. Appx 287, 288 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In such a case, the party moving for summary judgment is not required to "negate the elements of the nonmovant's case," but may "satisfy [its] burden under Celotex " by "assert[ing the] absence of facts supporting the elements of the plaintiffs’ theory of recovery". Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075, 1076 n.16 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). See also Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P. , 864 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2017) ("[I]t has long been the rule that when the nonmovant has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may make a proper summary judgment motion, thereby shifting the summary judgment burden to the nonmovant, with an allegation that the nonmovant has failed to establish an element essential to that party's case."); Sanchez v. Am. Pollution Control Corp. , 542 F. Supp. 3d 446, 450 (E.D. La. 2021).

Once the mover has met its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party who must establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Am. Pollution Control , 542 F. Supp. 3d at 450 (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). "A genuine issue of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.’ " Mudrick v. Cross Equip. Ltd. , 250 F. App'x 54, 56 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp. , 234 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) )). Stated another way, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate in any case where the evidence is so weak or tenuous on essential facts that the evidence could not support a judgment in favor of the non-moving party." Barnes v. Vannoy , No. 19-764, 2022 WL 562793, at *1 (M.D. La. Jan. 31, 2022), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Barnes v. Vanoy , No. 19-764, 2022 WL 554655 (M.D. La. Feb. 23, 2022) (citing Little , 37 F.3d at 1075 ).

The non-mover's burden is not satisfied by "conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence." Little , 37 F.3d at 1075 (citations and internal quotations omitted). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. , 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Further:

In resolving the motion, the court may not undertake to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes; so long as the evidence in the record is such that a reasonable jury drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party could arrive at a verdict in that party's favor, the court must deny the motion.

Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc. , 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).

In the context of the specific summary judgment before the Court, the "determination of whether an injured worker is a seaman under the Jones Act is a mixed question of law and fact and it is usually inappropriate to take the question from the jury[.]" Becker v. Tidewater , Inc., 335 F.3d 376, 386 (5th Cir. 2003). See also Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai , 520 U.S. 548, 554, 117 S.Ct. 1535, 137 L.Ed.2d 800 (1997) ("The seaman inquiry is a mixed question of law and fact, and it often will be inappropriate to take the question from the jury."); Bernard v. Binnings Const. Co. , 741 F.2d 824, 828 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[S]ummary judgment on seaman status is proper ‘where the only rational inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the worker is not a seaman.’ ") (quoting Beard v. Shell Oil Co. , 606 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1979) ); Starks v. Advantage Staffing , LLC, 202 F. Supp. 3d 607, 611 (E.D. La. 2016) ("[T]he issue of seaman status is ordinarily a jury question, even when the claim to seaman status is marginal.") (quoting White v. Valley Line Co. , 736 F.2d 304, 305 (5th Cir. 1984) ). "Thus, summary judgment on seaman status in Jones Act cases is rarely proper." Starks , 202 F. Supp. 3d at 611 (citing Bouvier v. Krenz , 702 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1983) ).

III. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

A. Argument of CTS

All parties agree (Doc. 17-1 at 7; Doc. 21 at 10) that the test for seaman status is set forth in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis , 515 U.S. 347, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995).

First, ... an employee's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.... Second, ... a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in

...