Blaney v. Saul

SANDRA BLANEY, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner,Social Security Administration, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-12009-ADB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

October 21, 2020

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT

BURROUGHS, D.J.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Sandra Blaney's motion for attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), in the amount of $7,750.44. [ECF No. 32]. Defendant Andrew Saul, the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner"), filed a response to Blaney's request, disputing the fee amount. [ECF No. 33]. For the following reasons, Blaney's motion is GRANTED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Blaney filed an application for both Title II Disability Insurance Benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income on September 16, 2015. [ECF No. 12-5 at 2, 9]. On February 26, 2016, both applications were denied. [ECF No. 12-4 at 2, 6]. Blaney applied for reconsideration on May 23, 2016, and her applications were again denied on September 14, 2016. [ECF No. 12-2 at 13-14; ECF No. 12-4 at 18, 21]. Blaney then requested a hearing, which proceeded before Administrative Law Judge Alexander Klibaner ("ALJ Klibaner") on July 12, 2017. [ECF No. 12-4 at 24; ECF No. 12-2 at 44-93]. ALJ Klibaner denied Blaney's claims on October 6, 2017. [ECF No. 12-2 at 13-37]. On December 5, 2017, Blaney filed a request for review of ALJ Klibaner's decision, which the Appeals Council denied on July 23, 2018. [ECF No. 12-4 at 76; ECF No. 12-2 at 2-4]. On September 25, 2018, Blaney filed a Complaint in this Court to review the Commissioner's decision, [ECF No. 1], and on March 19, 2019, she filed a motion to reverse the Commissioner's decision, [ECF No. 13].

On April 10, 2019, this Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Donald L. Cabell ("MJ Cabell"). [ECF No. 14]. On April 23, 2019, the then-Acting Commissioner, Nancy A. Berryhill, filed a motion for an order affirming the decision under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). [ECF No. 16]. On May 28, 2019, Blaney filed a motion to remand to the agency under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), raising a new ground for relief. [ECF No. 19]. On March 16, 2020, MJ Cabell issued a Report and Recommendation in which he recommended that the Court deny the Commissioner's motion for an order affirming the decision, grant Blaney's March 19, 2019 motion to reverse, and deny Blaney's May 28, 2019 motion to remand. [ECF No. 28]. On March 31, 2020, this Court adopted MJ Cabell's Report and Recommendation, [ECF No. 30], and remanded the case to the Social Security Administration. [ECF No. 31]. Having succeeded in securing a remand, Blaney filed a motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to the EAJA on June 29, 2020. [ECF No. 32].

II. DISCUSSION

A. Entitlement to Award

The EAJA provides that:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless thecourt finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, "eligibility for a fee award in any civil action requires: (1) that the claimant be a 'prevailing party'; (2) that the Government's position was not 'substantially justified'; (3) that no 'special circumstances make an award unjust'; and, (4) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), that any fee application be submitted to the court within 30 days of final judgment in the action and be supported by an itemized statement." Comm'r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990). As set forth below, the Court finds that each criterion is met in this case.

First, Blaney claims she is a prevailing party by virtue of this Court's remand to the Commissioner. [ECF No. 32 at 1]. "In cases reviewing final agency decisions on Social Security benefits, the exclusive methods by which district courts may remand to the Secretary are set forth in sentence four and sentence six of [42 U.S.C.] § 405(g)." Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 296 (1993). The Supreme Court has held that a Social Security plaintiff who obtains a remand reversing the Commissioner's decision under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is the "prevailing party" under the EAJA. Id. at 301-02. Here, the Court entered judgment reversing the Commissioner's decision and remanding this action to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and, thus, Blaney is the prevailing party.

Second, Blaney argues that the Commissioner's position denying her disability benefits despite the significant procedural errors committed by the Commissioner, including an erroneous assessment of Blaney's mental residual functional capacity ("RFC"), was not substantially justified. [ECF No. 32 at 1]. "The Supreme Court has explained that for a government position to be 'substantially justified,' it must have 'a reasonable basis in law and fact' and be 'justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.'" McDonald v. Sec'y of Health & HumanServs., 884 F.2d 1468, 1475 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 n.2 (1988)). "The burden of showing that the position was substantially justified is on the government, and both the underlying agency position and the government's litigation position must qualify as substantially justified to avoid paying attorneys' fees." Whitzell v. Barnhart, 429 F. Supp. 2d 361, 365 (D. Mass. 2006). As the Commissioner did not contest this component of Blaney's motion, the Court finds that he has failed to meet his burden to show that the agency's position was substantially justified.

Third, the Commissioner "has the burden of demonstrating 'special circumstances' justifying denial of attorneys' fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)." Rodrigues v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-30207, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142430, at *4-5 (D. Mass. Oct. 20, 2015). The Commissioner has made no showing of any "special circumstances," and after reviewing the record, the Court finds that none exist that would make an award of attorneys' fees "unjust."

Finally, Blaney contends that her request is timely, and she supports her request with an itemized statement of fees and costs. [ECF No. 32]. The EAJA's requirement that a party file a fee application within thirty days of final judgment is jurisdictional and, as such, cannot be waived by the parties. Howitt v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 897 F.2d 583, 584 (1st Cir. 1990) (collecting cases). The Supreme Court has provided that "[a]n EAJA application may be filed until 30 days after a judgment becomes 'not appealable'—i.e., 30 days after the time for appeal has ended." Shalala, 509 U.S. at 302 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(G)). Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), the judgment in this case became "not appealable" sixty days after its entry. Thus, Blaney had ninety days from the entry of judgment to file her EAJA petition, and the Court finds that her request was timely.

B. Scope of Award

Even when a plaintiff has established that she is the prevailing party, the Court may "adjust the fee upward or downward" depending on the plaintiff's level of success in his or her case. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). Blaney contends that she is entitled to fees for all work conducted in pursuit of her case. See [ECF No. 32]. The Commissioner does not dispute that Blaney is entitled to an appropriate fee, but contends that her fee award should be reduced to exclude costs associated with the time spent on her unsuccessful arguments, namely those related to her physical abilities and the legitimacy of the ALJ's appointment. [ECF No. 33 at 3-4].

As the fee applicant, Blaney "bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. Blaney submitted an itemized statement of fees in support of her request for an award of $7,750.44, which represents a total of 38.40 attorney hours expended at a rate of $200.35 per hour and 0.60 paralegal hours expended at a rate of $95.00 per hour. [ECF No. 32-1 at 1-3].¹

The Commissioner does not object to Blaney's attorneys' hourly rate, but he asserts that Blaney is entitled to an award of only $4,344.49. [ECF No. 33 at 1]. The Commissioner arrived at this number by deducting attorneys' hours that he deemed non-compensable because they represented time spent on Blaney's unsuccessful arguments. [Id. at 4-6]. The Commissionerargues that the Court has "no discretion to award compensation for time devoted to unsuccessful arguments." [Id. at 6 (citing McDonald, 884 F.2d at 1480)].

In Hensley, the Supreme Court found that in the context of a statute similar to the EAJA, "[t]he congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties requires that . . . no fee may be awarded for services on [an] unsuccessful claim" because "work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved." 461 U.S. at 435 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).² In determining whether fees associated with a particular argument are compensable, "the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436.³ The fact that a plaintiff is successful on some arguments does not automatically salvage the compensability of time spent on an unsuccessful argument.See id. ("If . . . a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount. ...