Blango v. Ludovico

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EMMANUEL BLANGO, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM LUDOVICO, JR., JENNIFER MEDINA ZACCAGNINI, CONNECTION, INC., COURTNEY RING, CAITLIN HIRSCH, and BRIANNA WISNIEWSKI, Defendants.

No. 3:23-cv-00212 (SVN)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

January 29, 2024

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS, AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

SARALA V. NAGALA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Following his release from state prison on special parole status after twenty-one years' incarceration for a sexual assault offense, Plaintiff Emmanuel Blango was transferred to the January Center, a residential sex offender treatment facility located on the grounds of Corrigan Correctional Center in Uncasville, Connecticut. There, he was allegedly subjected to restrictions on his liberty akin to imprisonment, despite that the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles (“BOPP”) had imposed conditions of residence in a halfway house and community sex offender treatment upon his release from prison.

He now brings claims on behalf of himself and a putative class for violations of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments and for common law false imprisonment against several defendants Parole Officer William Ludovico, Jr., in his individual capacity, and Chairperson of the BOPP Jennifer Medina Zaccagnini in her official capacity (“the State Defendants”); Connection, Inc. (“Connection”), the private entity that owns and operates the January Center pursuant to a contract it holds with the State of Connecticut; and Connection employees Courtney Ring (Director), Caitlin S. Hirsch (Head Clinical Officer) and Brianna Wisniewski (Assistant Clinical Officer) (“the individual Connection Defendants,” and together with Connection “the Connection Defendants”). Plaintiff argues that his transfer to the January Center following his incarceration resulted from impermissible administrative modification of his judicially-imposed sentence and was tantamount to continued detention past his mandatory release date. Plaintiff also brings a First Amendment claim against the State Defendants only, based on restrictions imposed on his Internet and social media use during his term of special parole.

The State and Connection Defendants have each filed separate motions to dismiss. For the reasons explained herein, as to the State Defendants, the Court finds that Ludovico is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims, though these claims may proceed against Zaccagnini. Additionally, the Court holds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged injury in fact in support of standing for his First Amendment claim. As to the false imprisonment claim, the Court finds that Ludovico is entitled to absolute immunity and the claim is not plausibly alleged against Zaccagnini, which Plaintiff concedes.

As to the Connection Defendants, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the Connection Defendants were state actors for section 1983 purposes and that the individual Connection Defendants were personally involved in the constitutional deprivations. But he has failed to allege a Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment claim against the individual Connection Defendants because he has failed to show they acted with deliberate indifference. The Court finds, however, that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims against Connection itself, because it has offered no arguments for dismissal of the claims against it. The Court dismisses the false imprisonment claim as to all Connection Defendants.

Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint beyond the proposed complaint he annexed to his motion, which only included new allegations relevant to Plaintiff's standing for his First Amendment claim, to address the deficiencies with the first amended complaint identified in this ruling.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Special Parole

The Court sets forth the following explanation of special parole under Connecticut law as background. Unlike regular parole, which allows an inmate to be released from prison under supervision prior to the completion of his or her maximum prison sentence, special parole is an additional period of supervision akin to probation that begins only after the expiration of an inmate's maximum term of imprisonment. Conn. Office of Legislative Research Rep. 2008-R-0175, Special Parole (2008), available at https://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0175.htm (last visited January 26, 2024). Under Connecticut law, a sentencing court may impose a period of special parole for a criminal defendant convicted of certain offenses if it determines, “based on the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's prior criminal record and the defendant's history of performance on probation and parole, that a period of special parole is necessary to ensure public safety.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125e(b)(1); see also id. § 53a-70a(b) (requiring imposition of five-year special parole term for a defendant convicted of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree). In imposing a sentence of special parole, the sentencing court can recommend that an individual comply with any of the conditions set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30, relating to conditions of probation and discharge. Id. § 54-125e(b)(2). These include, among others, that the person reside “in a residential community center or halfway house approved by the Commissioner of Correction,” and “satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation.” Id. §§ 53a-30(a)(9), (17).

After the expiration of his term of imprisonment, a person who has been sentenced to special parole is “automatically transferred to the jurisdiction of the chairperson of the BOPP.” Id. § 52-125e(a). The BOPP is situated within the Connecticut Department of Correction, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-124a, and the Department of Correction is responsible for supervising individuals during their terms of special parole, id. § 54-125e(a). The BOPP may require that the person comply with the conditions the sentencing court recommended; in addition, a person sentenced to special parole “shall also be subject to such rules and conditions as may be established by the [BOPP] or its chairperson.” Id. § 54-125e(b)(2). In practice, according to Plaintiff's complaint, the BOPP “effectively has the authority to impose any conditions it wishes on a person serving a sentence of special parole.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 17 ¶ 17.

The BOPP may “retake or reimprison any convict upon parole, for any reason that such panel, or the chairman with the approval of the panel, deems sufficient.” Id. § 54-126. “[W]hen a defendant violates special parole, he is subject to incarceration only for ‘a period equal to the unexpired portion of the period of special parole.'” State v. Tabone, 292 Conn. 417, 429 (2009) (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-128(c)).

B. Plaintiff Blango and The January Center

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from Plaintiff's amended complaint and assumed to be true for purposes of this ruling. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Plaintiff was convicted of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree in Connecticut state court on March 24, 2004, and was sentenced to twenty-one years of incarceration and five years of special parole on July 1, 2005. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. While the sentencing court's judgment is not part of the record before the Court, no party suggests that the sentencing court recommended any particular conditions of special parole, as it was permitted to do under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-124e(b)(2).

On or about October 28, 2022, the BOPP panel held a hearing to set the conditions of Plaintiff's special parole, which was to begin upon his release from prison on December 9, 2022. Id. ¶ 19. The panel ordered as part of his special parole that Plaintiff must: (1) have no contact with the prior victim; (2) consume no alcohol; (3) undergo “sex offender treatment in the community”; and (4) live in a “halfway house.” Id. ¶ 20. The written order further stated: “You will participate in a behavioral management program for problem sexual behavior. You must follow the instructions of program staff as to your course of treatment and may not make any changes without the express permission of the program staff or your parole officer.” Id. ¶ 21.

On December 2, 2022, Plaintiff met with Parole Officer Ludovico to discuss his upcoming special parole. Id. ¶ 23. Ludovico required that Plaintiff sign as a condition of his release a “Computer Access Agreement,” which on information and belief is the standard BOPP Form PCS 3202 (Rev 4/22/2009) used for sex offenders on special parole (the “Computer Access Agreement”). Id. ¶ 25. The Agreement imposes several restrictions, including that Plaintiff may only use computers and the Internet as authorized by his parole officer, and may not access “inappropriate” websites, or social media entirely. Id. ¶ 26. Ludovico also informed Plaintiff that he was to be transferred to the January Center, a decision Plaintiff contends, on information and belief, was made independently by Ludovico, rather than the BOPP panel. Id. ¶¶ 29-30.

The January Center is a residential treatment facility for sex offenders located on the grounds of Corrigan Correctional Center and operated by Connection pursuant to a contract it holds with the Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”). Id. ¶¶ 31-32, 37. It is the most restrictive sex offender treatment program in the State of Connecticut. Id. ¶ 31. Individuals convicted of sex offenses have been transferred to the January Center when...