Blankenship v. Caterpillar Global Mining, LLC

964 F.Supp.2d 578

Stephanie BLANKENSHIP, Plaintiff,

v.CATERPILLAR GLOBAL MINING, LLC, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 5:12–cv–06040.

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia.

Aug. 9, 2013.

Brian L. Ooten, Shaffer & Shaffer, Madison, WV, Richard W. Walters, Shaffer & Shaffer, Charleston, WV, for Plaintiff.

Joseph S. Turner, Seyfarth Shaw, Chicago, IL, Thomas E. Scarr, Jenkins Fenstermaker, Huntington, WV, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

IRENE C. BERGER, District Judge.

The Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 33), attached exhibits, its memorandum in support (Document 34), Plaintiff's response in opposition (Document 35), attached exhibits, and Defendant's Reply (Document 37). After careful consideration of the parties' written submissions and the entire record, the Court, for the reasons stated herein, finds that Defendant's motion should be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 23, 2012, Plaintiff, Stephanie Blankenship, filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, West Virginia,against Caterpillar Global Mining LLC f/k/a Bucyrus International Inc., claiming it violated the West Virginia Human Rights Act (“WVHRA”), West Virginia Code § 5–11–9, by refusing to hire her because of her sex. (“Compl.”) (Document 1–1 at 4–8.) Plaintiff alleges that she applied for six warehouse worker positions with Defendant between October 2010 and November 2011. ( Id. ¶¶ 9–15.) ¹ Plaintiff further alleges that during her first interview, it was established that she was well qualified for the position based upon her various certifications and employment history. ( Id. ¶ 11.) Although she was not chosen for the position, Plaintiff alleges that she was encouraged to reapply. ( Id. ¶ 12.) After being advised for the sixth time that she had not been chosen to fill the warehouse position for which she applied, Plaintiff alleges that she wrote a letter to Defendant's local offices and headquarters inquiring into why she had been repeatedly passed over. ( Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) Plaintiff alleges that in her letter she stated that she believed she was not being hired because she was a female and that Defendant refused to offer any explanation or deny her allegation. ( Id. ¶ 16.) Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, damages for lost wages and benefits, as well as emotional distress, attorney fees and costs, prejudgment interest on all amounts claimed and such other relief as the Court may find appropriate. ( Id. ¶ 23.) ²

On September 28, 2012, Defendant removed this action to the Southern District of West Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, claiming that this Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (“Notice of Removal”) (Document 1.) Defendant states that there is complete diversity among the parties and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. ( Id. at 1–2.) In support, Defendant attaches an un-notarized affidavit of Dianna Alexander, the HR Consultant for Defendant, to show that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 based upon Plaintiff's claim of lost wages and benefits. (Document 1–3 at 1–3.)

On May 30, 2013, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.'s Mot.”) (Document 33), attached exhibits and memorandum in support. (“Def.'s Mem.”) (Document 34).³ Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice because she cannot establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination in violation of the WVHRA and because no reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant's reasons for hiring other candidates are pretext for gender discrimination. (Def.'s Mot. at 2; Def's Mem at 10.) Defendant outlines its hiring process and discusses each of the five warehouse worker positions Plaintiff applied for and explains why other workers were hired for those positions. (Def.'s Mem. at 3–7.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not set forth any evidence that its reasons for hiring other workers are pretextual or were motivated by Plaintiff's status as a female. ( Id. at 16–17.) Therefore, Defendant argues that its Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. ( Id.)

On June 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed her Response in Opposition (“Pl.'s Resp.”) (Document 35) and attached exhibits.⁴ She asserts that this is a “mixed motive” case, and therefore, she only needs to prove that a forbidden intent was a motivating factor in Defendant's decisions not to hire her. ( Id. at 10.) Plaintiff argues that she, as well as other qualified female applicants, were repeatedly passed over for warehouse worker positions with Defendant because of their sex. ( Id. at 10–14.) Plaintiff specifically discusses two hiring decisions in which she was passed over for a less qualified male worker and argues that those decisions were motivated by Plaintiff's sex. ( Id. at 11–12.) Plaintiff also asserts that Mr. Dickinson, who has been responsible for hiring employees at the Beckley warehouse for eight years, had never offered a position to a female until after she brought this action. ( Id. at 12–13.) Plaintiff argues that in viewing the facts in the light most favorable to her, it is clear that Defendant discriminated against qualified female warehouse worker applicants for many years because of their sex. ( Id. at 13–14.) Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. ( Id.)

On June 18, 2013, Defendant filed its Reply (“Def.'s Rep.”) (Document 37), wherein it argues that the decisions to hire other applicants for the five warehouse worker positions reveals no evidence that Plaintiff would have been hired “but for” her gender. ( Id. at 1–2.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff was either not as qualified as the successful candidates or did not submit her resume for the position. ( Id. at 2–6.) Defendant also argues that any subsequent changes in its hiring process are inadmissible pursuant to Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. ( Id. at 5 fn. 3.) ⁵ Defendant then emphasizes that Plaintiff, during her deposition, could not even articulate her reasons for believing she was not hired because she is a female. ( Id. at 6.) When asked “[w]hat makes you think that [you were not hired] because of sex?” Plaintiff answered “I feel—I'm not sure at this time.” ( Id.) Defendant stresses that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to establish that the reasons offered for its hiring decisions are pretext and that the decisions were actually based upon gender discrimination. ( Id.)

II. JURISDICTION

The threshold question for the Court to consider is whether it has federal subject matter jurisdiction in this case. By statute, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Defendant removed on the basis of Section 1332, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). (Notice of Removal at 2.) Defendant has the burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See, White v. Chase Bank USA, NA., Civil Action No. 2:08–1370, 2009 WL 2762060, at *1 (S.D.W.Va. Aug. 26, 2009) (Faber, J.) (citing McCoy v. Erie Insurance Co., 147 F.Supp.2d 481, 488 (S.D.W.Va.2001) (Haden, J.)).

Defendant states that there is complete diversity among the parties because Plaintiff is a citizen of West Virginia, whereas Defendant is a citizen of Delaware and Wisconsin. (Notice of Removal at 1–2.) Defendant also states that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 based upon Plaintiff's request for lost wages and benefits. ( Id.) In support, Defendant attaches an affidavit of Dianna Alexander, its HR Consultant, to show that had Plaintiff been hired as a warehouse worker in October 2010, she would have made at least $78,000 in wages and employment benefits. (Document 1–3 at 1–3.) Ms. Alexander explains that a warehouse worker hired in October 2010 would earn approximately $63,350.70 in total regular and over-time pay from October 2010 to the time of the removal. ( Id. at 2.) She also asserts that the value of the benefits package provided to warehouse workers during that time would equal $11,150.50. ( Id. at 2–3.) Moreover, the benefits to a warehouse worker include a 401(k) match program whereby if a worker paid six percent of their pay to the 401(k) plan, the value of Defendant's contribution would be approximately $2,300.00. ( Id. at 3.) Finally, Ms. Alexander values the benefit of the pension plan contribution during this time period at $1,218.00. ( Id.) Based upon the foregoing, Ms. Alexander states that the value of the pay and benefits from October 2010 to the time of removal would exceed $75,000.00. ( Id.)

Upon consideration of Defendant's Notice of Removal and Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court finds that Defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, based on the record, the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The well-established standard in consideration of a motion for summary judgment is that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 549, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct....