Blazek v. ADT Sec.

JOSEPH J. BLAZEK, Plaintiff, v. ADT SECURITY LLC, Defendant.

No. 19-cv-01822

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

February 23, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Franklin U. Valderrama United States District Judge

Plaintiff Joseph J. Blazek (Blazek) worked as a residential alarm system installer for Defendant, ADT SECURITY LLC (ADT). ADT fired Blazek after he was injured on the job and supposedly unable to perform his job. Blazek filed suit against ADT alleging that ADT (1) discriminated against him on the basis of age and disability, violating the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq. and the Americans with Disability Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., and (2) failed to return his personnel file, violating the Illinois Personnel Records Review Act (IPRRA), 820 ILCS 40 et seq. R. 21, First Amended Compl.^[1](FAC).

Before the Court is ADT's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. R. 51, Mot. Summ. J. For the reasons stated below, ADT's motion is granted.

Background

I. Procedural History of ADT's Motion for Summary Judgment

ADT filed its motion for summary judgment on September 25, 2020. R. 46. The original briefing schedule, entered on September 10, 2020, required Blazek to file his response by October 23 2020. R. 43. Blazek did not file a response. This case was reassigned to this Court on September 28, 2020. R. 50. Based on this Court's standing order regarding citations, ADT filed an amended motion for summary judgment on September 30 2020. R. 51. Approximately thirty days later, ADT filed a reply in support of its motion. R. 53. This Court entered a minute entry explaining that it would rule on ADT's motion by CM/ECF. R. 56. Shortly thereafter, Blazek filed a motion for reconsideration of ADT's motion for summary judgment, which the Court construed as a motion for leave to file a response to ADT's motion for summary judgment. R. 57. The Court, in recognition that district courts may “exercise their discretion in a more lenient direction,” especially when one of the parties is pro se, granted Blazek leave to file a response to ADT's motion for summary judgment. See Cartwright v. Cooney, 2013 WL 2356033, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2013) (internal citations omitted). R. 61. In response to ADT's motion, Blazek filed a Declaration, statement of facts, and accompanying exhibits, and response to ADT's statement of facts, but did not file any response brief containing argument or substantively addressing ADT's memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. R. 63, 64, 65, 67-69. ADT then filed its reply and response to Blazek's statement of facts. R. 70, 71.

II. Local Rule 56.1 Statements and Responses

As a preliminary matter, the Court must address the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements of material facts. R. 48, DSOF; R. 65, Pl.'s Resp. DSOF; R. 64, PSOAF; R. 70, Def.'s Resp. PSOAF.^[2]When “a party moves for summary judgment in the Northern District of Illinois, it must submit a memorandum of law, a short statement of undisputed material facts [(L.R. 56.1 Statement)], and copies of documents (and other materials) that demonstrate the existence of those facts.” ABC Acquisition Co., LLC v. AIP Prod. Corp., 2020 WL 4607247, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2020) (citing N.D.Ill. Local R. 56.1(a)). The Local Rule 56.1 statement must cite to specific pages or paragraphs of the documents and materials in the record. Id. (citing Ammons v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 818 (7th Cir. 2004)). Under Local Rule 56.1(b) and (e), the nonmovant must counter with a response to the separate statement of facts, and either admit each fact, or, “[t]o dispute an asserted fact, a party must cite specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact and must concisely explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact.” N.D.Ill. Local R. 56.1(e)(2)-(3). “Asserted facts may be deemed admitted if not controverted with specific citations to evidentiary material.” Id.; see Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009) (“When a responding party's statement fails to dispute the facts set forth in the moving party's statement in the manner dictated by the rule, those facts are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion.”); see also Daniels v. Janca, 2019 WL 2772525, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2019). If the non-moving party asserts additional facts not included in the moving party's statement of facts, the nonmoving party is to file a statement of additional material facts “that attaches any cited evidentiary material not attached to the [moving party's statement of facts] or the non-moving party's response [thereto].” N.D.Ill. Local R. 56.1(b)(3). The Seventh Circuit has “consistently upheld district judges' discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1.” Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGo, Inc., 919 F.3d 405, 414 (7th Cir. 2019). Local Rule 56.1 “aims to make summary-judgment decisionmaking manageable for courts.” Id. at 415.

The Local Rule 56.1 requirements apply to pro se litigants. See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that even pro se litigants must follow rules of civil procedure.”) (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)); Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[P]ro se litigants are not entitled to general dispensation from the rules of procedure or court imposed deadlines.”); Harris v. Coppes, 2019 WL 2435847, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“[Plaintiff's] pro se status does not excuse him from complying with Local Rule 56.1.”) (collecting cases).

As ADT points out in its reply, many of Blazek's denials to ADT's statement of material facts are evasive, or fail to cite to any evidentiary material that controverts the asserted fact. Reply at 2; see Pl.'s Resp. DSOF ¶¶ 12, 20, 25, 28, 30, 31, 36, 41. Other denials purport to impermissibly change Blazek's own deposition testimony.

Reply at 2-3; see Pl.'s Resp. DSOF ¶¶ 12, 14, 19, 37, 41; Com. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Aires Env't Servs., Ltd., 259 F.3d 792, 799 (7th Cir. 2001) (a party may not “‘patch-up potentially damaging deposition testimony' with a contradictory affidavit.”) (citing Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 769 (7th Cir.1999)). Finally, in his unsigned Declaration purporting to deny certain facts, Blazek includes denials without citation to the record, relies upon hearsay to controvert facts, and depends upon documents not produced in discovery in this matter. Reply at 3; see Def.'s Resp. PSOAF ¶¶ 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29.

As a result, where Blazek did not respond to certain purported facts of ADT's by offering admissible evidence of his own, the Court accepts as true the facts set forth in ADT's Local Rule 56.1 statement, “to the extent th[ose] facts [a]re supported by admissible and docketed evidence.” Kreg, 919 F.3d at 411 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also will not consider Blazek's denials wherein Blazek seeks to defeat summary judgment by contradicting his own deposition testimony. LaFary v. Rogers Group, 591 F.3d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 2010). To the extent Blazek's Declaration includes statements without citation to the record, or where Blazek lacks foundation for an assertion, the Court will not consider those statements. See, e.g., Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (finding portions of an affidavit not based on personal knowledge to be speculative and lacking in foundation) (citing Joseph P. Caulfield & Assocs., Inc. v. Litho Prods., Inc., 155 F.3d 883, 888 (7th Cir. 1998) (Affidavit testimony “that was necessarily speculative and lacking in foundation ... is insufficient.”)).

However, to the extent Blazek supports his denials of ADT's statement of facts, or his additional statements of fact, with admissible and docketed evidence, the Court will consider them. N.D.Ill. Local R. 56.1(b)(2)-(3).

III. Material Facts

The following facts are set forth favorably to Blazek, the non-movant, as the record and Local Rule 56.1 permit. See Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 691 (7th Cir. 2012); Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2003). While the Court draws all reasonable inferences from the facts in Blazek's favor, the Court does not “necessarily vouch[] for their accuracy.” Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, 805 F.3d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); see also Knopick v. Jayco, Inc., 895 F.3d 525, 527 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted) (“Given this summary judgment lens, we do not vouch for the objective truth of all of these facts.”). This background section details all material undisputed facts and notes where facts are disputed.

A. Blazek's Employment

Blazek was employed by ADT as a residential installer until April 27, 2016. DSOF ¶ 4, PSOAF ¶ 1. As a residential installer, Blazek's duties were to install and repair alarm systems. DSOF ¶¶ 6-7. He typically worked alone. DSOF ¶ 8. Blazek was a member of a bargaining unit represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 134. DSOF ¶ 4. The terms and conditions of his employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement. DSOF ¶ 5.

B. The Incident

On December 1, 2015 Blazek was emptying his truck in the parking lot of ADT's Oak Brook office, when he tripped in a pothole, injuring his knee and wrist. DSOF ¶ 9. Two supervisors, Ken Bobak (Bobak) and Ron Fiegge came out to assist him. PSOAF ¶ 9. Bobak drove Blazek to the hospital. Id. Blazek was treated at the hospital for knee and arm pain, instructed to follow up with his doctor, and released. DSOF ¶¶ 9, 11; PSOAF ¶ 9. Blazek's wife drove him home. PSOAF ¶ 10. He was off work for eight days. DSOF ¶ 11.

On January 18, 2016,...