Bledsoe v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

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ANTHONY BLEDSOE, Plaintiff, v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC., Defendant.

No. 23-CV-03146 (HG) (JAM)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

March 15, 2024

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

HECTOR GONZALEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The Complaint in this action was filed originally in New York State Supreme Court, Queens County, on March 31, 2023. ECF No. 1-2 (Complaint). Pro se Plaintiff Anthony Bledsoe alleges that Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc. discriminated against him on the basis of his race, sexual orientation, and disability in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C §§ 12101 et seq., the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8-101 et seq. ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 1.^[1] Plaintiff also alleges wage and hour violations, which the Court construes as claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). Defendant removed the case to this Court on April 26, 2023. ECF No. 1 (Notice of Removal). On May 3, 2023, Defendant filed a pre-motion letter requesting a conference in anticipation of filing a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 4 (Delta's PreMotion Conference Letter). On May 4 2023, the Court denied Delta's request for a conference and instead granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. In that Order, the Court advised Plaintiff that Defendant's pre-motion letter “identifies several likely legal deficiencies in the Complaint,” and granted him permission “to file an amended complaint by June 5, 2023 to cure these alleged legal deficiencies if he is inclined to do so.” May 4, 2023, Text Order. Plaintiff did not amend his Complaint, and the instant motion followed. ECF No. 5 (Delta's Notice of Motion); ECF No. 6 (Delta's Memorandum of Law). For the reasons set forth herein, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

BACKGROUND^[2]

Plaintiff was hired by Defendant as a Ramp Agent on April 4, 2022. ECF 1-2 ¶ 8. After completing his training a few weeks later, id. ¶ 9, Plaintiff first reported to work in late May 2022, id. ¶ 16. On May 28, 2022, his third day on the job, id. ¶ 17, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with other Delta employees while checking his shift assignment at a computer in a breakroom, id. ¶ 23. During the altercation, one of the employees pushed Plaintiff away from the computer Plaintiff was using, and a second employee called Plaintiff a “faggot.” Id. Others gathered around Plaintiff and started shouting. Id. Following this incident, Delta apparently suspended Plaintiff in some form and, after conducting an investigation, fired him. Id. ¶¶ 25, 30, 34; ECF No. 7 at 10. On July 29, 2022, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter informing him that following “a complete and thorough review of [his] employment situation, including [his] history . . . at Delta and the reasons for [his] suspension and employment review ....the decision ha[d] been made to end [his] employment.” ECF No. 1-2 at 38 (Ex. H to Complaint). This action followed.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).^[3] A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful that the plaintiff's pleadings should be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that, even after Twombly, courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”).

In addition to requiring sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief, pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must provide a short, plain statement of claim against the defendant so that it has adequate notice of the claims against it. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). A pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. To satisfy this standard, the complaint must, at a minimum “disclose sufficient information to permit the defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff Has Failed to Plead Sufficiently That He Was Discriminated Against Because of His Race or Sexual Orientation

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual with respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff asserting a Title VII discrimination claim must allege facts showing that “(1) the employer took adverse action against him and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision,” which can be shown “by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2015).

The NYSHRL prohibits an employer from, inter alia, “discharg[ing] from employment” or “discriminat[ing] against [an] individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” “because of” an individual's race, sexual orientation, or disability. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a); see also id. §§ 292(21), (27), (37) (defining these terms). The NYCHRL contains similar prohibitions against discrimination “because of the actual or perceived” race, sexual orientation, or disability of a person. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a). In view of the NYCHRL's broad construction in favor of plaintiffs asserting discrimination claims, the Court “must analyze NYCHRL claims separately and independently from any federal and state law claims.” See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013). Historically, the NYSHRL's liability standard was coextensive with Title VII's, but recent amendments to the statute set it at a level either “identical” to or at least “closer” to the NYCHRL. See Yost v. Everyrealm, Inc., 657 F.Supp.3d 563, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Accordingly, if Plaintiff fails to state a claim even under the most lenient NYCHRL, his claim will similarly fail under the NYSHRL. See id.; see also Lettieri v. Anti-Defamation League Found., No. 22-cv-9889, 2023 WL 5152447, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2023) (on a motion to dismiss, if NYCHRL claims fail, “parallel claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL fail, as well”).

At the pleading stage, under Title VII, a plaintiff does not need to allege specific facts establishing each element of aprima facie case of discrimination. Vega, 801 F.3d at 86-87. But a complaint must have facts that “plausibly suppor[t]” that “the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, was qualified, suffered an adverse employment action, and has at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Johnson v. Andy Frain Servs., Inc., 638 Fed.Appx. 68, 70 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 309-10 (2d Cir. 2015) (an employment discrimination complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face). Under the more relaxed NYCHRL, “a plaintiff need only show differential treatment of any degree based on a discriminatory motive.” See Keles v. Davalos, 642 F.Supp.3d 339, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2022). Still, the NYCHRL is “not a general civility code,” and a plaintiff must still sufficiently allege that a defendant had a discriminatory motive, or, in other words, “treated [him] less well at least in part because of his protected characteristic[s].” See Syeed v. Bloomberg, L.P., 568 F.Supp.3d 314, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2021); Moore v. Hadestown Broadway Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 23-cv-4837, 2024 WL 989843, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2024) (applying the NYCHRL's “lenient pleading standard” to NYSHRL claims). For the reasons stated herein, all of Plaintiff's allegations fall below even this minimal floor.

With respect to his claim of discrimination based on sexual orientation, Plaintiff makes a non-specific assertion of discrimination in the form of an “anti-gay environment” at Delta, ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 30, and points to the May 28, 2022, altercation during which an unidentified coworker called him a “faggot.” Id. ¶ 23. Neither of these allegations is sufficient to sustain a claim of discrimination under Title VII. The claim of an “anti-gay environment” is conclusory and unsupported by any other allegation in either the Complaint or the Opposition. The use of the epithet by a non-managerial, unidentified coworker, that is otherwise unconnected to the adverse employment action, is not enough to permit the Court to infer that Delta's termination of Plaintiff was motivated by a discriminatory intent. Dixon v. Int'l Fed'n of Accts., 416 Fed.Appx. 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2011) (“isolated derogatory remark” made by someone with no role in plaint...