Blehr v. Anderson, A20-0691

955 N.W.2d 613

Eric John BLEHR, Respondent,

v.Jacki Sue ANDERSON, Appellant.

A20-0691

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed January 11, 2021

Courtney A. Lawrence, Matthew J. Barber, Schwebel Goetz & Sieben, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Thomas D. Jensen, Lind, Jensen, Sullivan & Peterson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Kalitowski, Judge.^*

HOOTEN, Judge

In this appeal from judgment entered following a jury trial on respondent's personal-injury claims, appellant challenges the district court's awards of (A) preverdict interest, and (B) costs and disbursements. We affirm.

FACTS

In July 2016, Patrick Anderson and respondent Eric Blehr were involved in a two-vehicle crash on Highway 55. The crash occurred when Anderson, who was driving a John Deere Gator all-terrain vehicle, attempted to turn left from Highway 55 directly into respondent's path of travel. Respondent, who was driving a Pontiac passenger vehicle, was seriously injured in the crash, and Anderson was killed.

Respondent sent Anderson's automobile insurer a letter dated January 26, 2017 (the January 26 letter). The January 26 letter was sent to an insurance claims office and was printed on the letterhead of the law firm retained by respondent. The January 26 letter stated that the law firm had been retained to represent respondent in connection with the July 2016 accident, and sought to "confirm the existence and amount of coverage." The January 26 letter also sought the claim number and any information that the insurance claims office had in its possession regarding the claim.

In August 2018, respondent commenced this action against appellant Jacki Sue Anderson, personal representative of the Estate of Anderson. Following a jury trial, both Anderson and respondent were found to be at fault. The jury apportioned 75% of the fault to Anderson, and 25% to respondent. The jury then awarded damages to respondent in the amount of $90,301.39.

Respondent petitioned for taxation of costs and disbursements and moved for preverdict interest, additur or a new trial regarding his past general damages, and costs under Minn. R. Civ. P. 68. The district court granted respondent's motion for conditional additur in the amount of $15,000 for past pain and suffering. Appellant accepted the additur under protest.

After appellant accepted the additur, the district court entered its amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment. The district court determined that the January 26 letter "was sufficient to constitute a ‘notice of claim’ " under Minn. Stat. § 549.09 subd. 1(b), because the letter "specifically identified the parties, the precipitating event, and the intent of [respondent], sufficient to put [appellant] on notice of a claim." The district court concluded that under section 549.09, respondent was entitled to $21,935.87 in preverdict interest, which was "computed by taking [10%] of the net verdict of $78,901.04 from January 26, 2017," the date of the purported notice of claim, "to November 6, 2019 (date of verdict)."

In addition to preverdict interest, the district court determined that respondent was entitled to $24,729.95 in costs and disbursements. The district court also found that the rule 68 amount of $95,000 offered to respondent "is less favorable than [respondent's] award of $110,880.92, which sum was determined by adding the net award of $78,901.04 to [respondent's] taxable costs and disbursements of $10,377.82 through October 22, 2019, and his preverdict interest of $21,602.06." The district court concluded that because respondent's "award is greater than his Rule 68 offer, he is entitled to double the costs incurred." The district court, therefore, entered judgment in favor of respondent in the amount of $139,714.36. This appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err in determining the amount of preverdict interest?

II. Did the district court abuse its discretion in awarding costs and disbursements?

ANALYSIS

I. Did the district court err in determining the amount of preverdict interest?

Appellant challenges the district court's award of preverdict interest, arguing that the district court erred by (A) concluding that the January 26 letter constituted a "notice of claim" for purposes of triggering the date on which to begin calculating preverdict interest; (B) calculating preverdict interest at a rate of 10%; and (C) awarding preverdict interest on the additur damages.

Preverdict-interest awards are reviewed de novo. Duxbury v. Spex Feeds, Inc. , 681 N.W.2d 380, 390 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 2004). We also apply a de novo standard of review to a district court's interpretation of the preverdict-interest statute. Miller v. Soo Line R.R. , 925 N.W.2d 642, 655 (Minn. App. 2019).

A. Notice of claim

Awards of preverdict interest "are designed to serve two functions: (1) to compensate prevailing parties for the true cost of money damages incurred, and (2) to promote settlements when liability and damage amounts are fairly certain and deter attempts to benefit unfairly from delays inherent in litigation." Solid Gold Realty, Inc. v. Mondry , 399 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Minn. App. 1987). The preverdict-interest statute provides: "Except as otherwise ... allowed by law, preverdict ... interest on pecuniary damages shall be computed ... from the time of the commencement of the action or a demand for arbitration, or the time of a written notice of claim , whichever occurs first." Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (emphasis added).

Appellant argues that the district court erred by concluding that the January 26 letter constituted a "notice of claim" under section 549.09, subdivision 1(b). This argument requires us to interpret the meaning of "notice of claim," a phrase not defined in the statute. Because "notice of claim" is not defined by statute, it is given its plain and ordinary meaning. Central Hous. Assocs., LP v. Olson , 929 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Minn. 2019). "When a word or a phrase has a plain meaning, we presume that the plain meaning is consistent with legislative intent and engage in no further statutory construction." Shire v. Rosemount, Inc. , 875 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Minn. 2016).

To ascertain the plain meaning of a word, appellate courts "often consult dictionary definitions." Wayzata Nissan, LLC v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. , 875 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Minn. 2016). The word "notice" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as:

Legal notification required by law or agreement, or imparted by operation of law as a result of some fact .... A person has notice of a fact or condition if that person (1) has actual knowledge of it; (2) has received information about it; (3) has reason to know about it; (4) knows about a related fact; or (5) is considered as having been able to ascertain it by checking an official filing or recording.

Black's Law Dictionary 1227 (10th ed. 2014). And Webster's defines "notice" as "information, announcement or warning." Webster's New Dictionary of the American Language 973 (2nd ed. 1972).

The word "claim" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as:

A statement that something yet to be proved is true.... The assertion of an existing right; any right to payment or to an equitable remedy, even if contingent or provisional .... A demand for money, property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right ....

Black's Law Dictionary 301 (10th ed. 2014).

Here, the January 26 letter is a written statement addressed to Anderson's insurance claims office, printed on the letterhead of a law firm identifying all of the attorneys of the law firm, the firm's address, and main telephone number, and signed by an attorney of the law firm right above his direct telephone number. The January 26 letter also contains the date of the accident and what appears to be Anderson's insurance policy number. The body of the letter in its entirety provides:

We have been retained to represent [respondent] in connection with injuries sustained in the above accident.

Please confirm the existence and amount of coverage and provide us with your claim number.

Our office would also appreciate color copies of any property damage photographs, accident scene photographs, repair estimates and any statements concerning this loss.

Your courtesies are appreciated.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by concluding that the January 26 letter constituted a "notice of claim" under section 549.09, subdivision 1(b) because "[a]ll it does is: (a) introduce counsel, and (b) seek information." Appellant argues that the "real notice of claim from respondent's counsel came on March 8, 2018, when [he] made a settlement demand, which included $95,761 in medical expenses, and $7,910 in wage loss."

Appellant's argument that the January 26 letter does not constitute a notice of claim under section 549.09, subdivision 1(b) focuses on the lack of a formal demand for a specific payment. We acknowledge that the January 26 letter does not seek payment of a specific amount of money. But appellant cites no published Minnesota caselaw supporting its position that such a formal demand is necessary, and our research has failed to uncover such a case. In fact, the Minnesota federal district courts have recognized that no Minnesota appellate court has defined "written notice of claim" for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b). See Creekview of Hugo Ass'n, Inc. v. Owners Ins. Co. , 386 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1067 (D. Minn. 2019) ("Minnesota courts have not defined precisely what constitutes a ‘written notice of claim’ in the context of an insurance dispute ...."). Accordingly, as the parties agreed at oral argument, the issue before us is one of first impression.

Despite the dearth of published Minnesota caselaw interpreting the phrase "notice of claim" contained in section 549.09, subdivision 1(b), this court, in an nonprecedential decision, recognized that a written notice of claim need not...