Bless v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Office

ROBERT BLESS, Plaintiff, v. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE;TOM DART in his official and individual capacity;DEWAYNE HOLBROOK; JOSEPH WAYS, SR.;ZELDA WITTLER, SHERYL COLLINS; EDWARD DYNER;HENRY HEMPHILL; ROSEMARIE NOLAN;COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S MERIT COMMISSION;COOK COUNTY, a unit of local government, Defendants.

No. 13 C 4271

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

August 3, 2020

Judge John Z. Lee

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In 2013, the Cook County Sheriff's Merit Commission ("Merit Board") issued an administrative decision directing the Cook County Sheriff's Office ("Sheriff's Office") to terminate Police Officer Robert Bless. Invoking Illinois's Administrative Review Law, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-102, Bless asks the Court to vacate that decision and order the Sheriff's Office to reinstate him. For the reasons below, Bless's motion is granted in part and denied in part.¹

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Bless served as a police officer with the Sheriff's Office until the Merit Board voted to fire him on May 6, 2013. R.² at 24-28. During the last few years of his employment with the Sheriff's Office, Bless also worked secondary employment as a lawyer and as a McHenry County Board Commissioner. Id. at 488, 496-97.

In September 2008, Bless suffered serious injuries as a result of a car accident that occurred while he was on duty. Id. at 435, 512-15. At the time, Bless was placed on injured on-duty status and granted temporary disability benefits. Id. For the next two years, Bless collected those benefits; at the same time, he continued to work as a lawyer and Commissioner. Id. at 489-98.

Under the Sheriff's Office's rules, an employee may only work other jobs if he or she submits a secondary employment request form and receives authorization. Id. at 1083-91. Bless claims that he properly submitted secondary employment forms for both his law practice and his role with McHenry County. Id. at 499, 507-08. Defendants dispute this, asserting that Bless had not submitted any requests from early 2009 through late 2010. Id. at 498-500, 509, 511, 560-61.

For that reason, the Office of Professional Review ("OPR"), a division of the Sheriff's Office, brought administrative charges against Bless in May 2011. Id. at 692-93. Following an investigation, the Sheriff's Office filed formal charges beforethe Merit Board in October 2011. Id. at 18-23. In its complaint, the Sheriff's Office accused Bless of driving without first obtaining authorization from his physician, engaging in unapproved secondary employment, and lying to investigators. Id.

B. The Merit Board's Decision

After holding a three-day evidentiary hearing that featured testimony from ten witnesses, the Merit Board issued a written decision on May 6, 2013. R. at 24-28. Among other factual findings, the Board concluded that:

• "[Bless] was classified as injury duty status. . . .; [s]uch status precluded [him] from driving. . . . ; [and] he was in fact driving . . . in violation of his classification." Id. at 26.

• "[Neither] Respondent's Department nor designee gave authorization to the Respondent to engage in secondary employment in 2009 through and including November 23, 2010." Id. at 27.

• "[T]he Respondent made an inaccurate and false statement when [he told investigators] that he did submit a secondary employment [form] each year for Bless & Associates [his law firm]." Id. at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Based on those findings, the Merit Board ordered the Sheriff's Office to terminate Bless. Id. at 27. In reaching that result, the Board emphasized that "the egregiousness of Respondent's acts set[ ] this matter apart from others." Id. "The evidence clearly demonstrates that the Respondent lied," the Board explained, "so [as] to continue looting Cook County taxpayers by continuing to receive temporary disability checks." Id. "This Respondent was sworn to uphold the public trust of not just the taxpayers of Cook County," the Board continued, "but also the public trust of the taxpayers of McHenry County." Id. Shortly after the Merit Board released its decision, Bless filed suit in this Court.

II. Legal Standard

Illinois's Administrative Review Law governs this claim and empowers courts to review agency decisions. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-110. In doing so, courts must take agencies' factual findings as "prima facie true and correct" and refrain from reweighing the evidence. Id.; see Launis v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 603 N.E.2d 477, 481 (Ill. 1992). "Rather, review is limited to determining whether findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence, and if not, whether those findings supported the administrative decision." Wright v. Vill. of Franklin Park, No. 05 C 3696, 2008 WL 820560, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2008) (citing Launis, 603 N.E.2d at 484).

Still, the deference owed to an agency's decision is not "boundless." Kouzoukas v. Ret. Bd. of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 917 N.E.2d 999, 1011 (Ill. 2009) (citation omitted). "Although a decision may be supported by some evidence, which if undisputed would sustain the administrative finding, it is not sufficient if upon a consideration of all the evidence, the finding is against the manifest weight." McRay v. Ross, No. 17 C 01588, 2018 WL 2432164, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2018) (citing Bowlin v. Murphrysboro Firefighters Pension Bd. of Trs., 857 N.E.2d 777, 782 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)). That means that review "cannot amount to a rubber stamp of proceedings below." Bowlin, 857 N.E.2d at 782.

In reviewing "an administrative agency's decision to discharge an employee," courts follow "a two-step process." Marzano v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Merit Board, 920 N.E.2d 1205, 1208 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). At the first step, courts ask whether anagency's "findings of fact are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." Walker v. Dart, 30 N.E.3d 426, 435 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (citation omitted). At the second step, courts analyze whether those "findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for [the agency's] conclusion that cause for discharge exists." Id.

III. Analysis

The threshold question is whether this Court retains jurisdiction to hear Bless's administrative review claim. In the accompanying order, the Court granted summary judgment in Defendants' favor as to Bless's federal claims. See 8/3/2020 Order, ECF No. 466. When "all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial," the Seventh Circuit has held that "the usual practice is to dismiss . . . state supplemental claims." Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999). One exception is when "the statute of limitations has run on the pendent claim, precluding the filing of a separate suit in state court." Sharp Electronics Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 505, 514-15 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

That exception applies here. Under Illinois law, courts may only consider an administrative review claim if it is filed within thirty-five days of an agency's decision. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-103. But Bless lodged his claim here, rather than in state court. And, because Illinois courts reject equitable tolling in this context, Bless's filing of the claim in federal court within thirty-five days would not toll the limitations period. See Van Milligen v. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 868 N.E.2d 1083, 1093 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Davis v. Cook Cty., 534 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2008) (in deciding questions of supplemental jurisdiction, federal courts should considerwhether a state court would apply "a rule of tolling"). Given that an Illinois court would likely refuse to hear Bless's administrative review claim, the Court exercises its discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over that claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). With that, the Court turns to the merits.

Bless argues that the Court should set aside the Merit Board's decision for three reasons.³ First, the Board's decision is too vague to permit proper review; second, each of the Board's factual findings contradict the manifest weight of the evidence; third, even if the Board's findings were accurate, those findings would not justify discharge.

A. Vagueness

At the outset, Bless casts the Board's decision as so vague as to preclude meaningful review. An agency must provide "in writing, a reasoned explanation for its decision in [each] case, complete with findings and conclusions." Medina Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Health Facilities & Servs. Review Bd., 992 N.E.2d 616, 621 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). In doing so, the agency must "adequately articulate the bases of their action, showing a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Id. at 620.

To the extent that Bless casts the Board's entire decision as vague, that objection is unsubstantiated. While brief, the four-page opinion summarizes the evidence presented, arrives at factual findings, and links those findings with legal conclusions. And, contrary to Bless's suggestion, the Board had no obligation to discuss each exhibit entered and witness tendered. What matters is that the decision is sufficiently detailed for a court to "conduct a meaningful review of the issues." Roman v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Merit Bd., 17 N.E.3d 130, 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). Read as a whole, the Board's opinion clears that hurdle.

This result accords with Roman, the case upon which Bless relies. In Roman, a court chastised the Board for "fail[ing] to provide any analysis or explanation whatsoever in its initial decisions." Id. at 156 (emphasis added). Here, by contrast, the Board outlined the evidentiary basis for its findings and the legal conclusions they support. Taken as a whole, the Board's decision is not so vague that this Court cannot review it.

B. Factual Findings

When reviewing an administrative decision under Illinois law, the first step is to decide whether the agency's "findings of fact are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." Walker, 30 N.E.3d at 435. In...