Blessing Auto Repair, Inc v. Pa. State Police

BLESSING AUTO REPAIR, INC. and MARCDER M. GUERRIER, Plaintiffs, v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, ANDREW AVDULLA a/k/a ANDI I. AVDULLA and THE PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-6569

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

August 5, 2021

MEMORANDUM

Joyner, J.

Introduction

Defendant Philadelphia Parking Authority (“PPA”) moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint in its entirety under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and to dismiss Blessing Auto Repair Inc. as a Plaintiff for lacking Article III standing. We grant Philadelphia Parking Authority's Motion to Dismiss.

Factual Background

According to the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint, on May 3, 2019, Pennsylvania State Trooper Andrew Avdulla entered the property of Blessing Auto Repair and informed Mr. Marcder Guerrier, president of Blessing Auto Repair, that his vehicle was being confiscated as part of an investigation. Pls.' Am. Compl., Doc. No. 10, at 1-2. Mr Guerrier's vehicle was then towed from Blessing Auto Repair's property by the PPA to be impounded. Id. at 2; Pls.' Resp. in Opp'n Doc. No. 14, at 1.

That same day, Mr. Guerrier paid the $175.00 towing charge at the impoundment lot but was advised that his vehicle would not be released to him. Pls.' Am. Compl., Doc. No. 10 at 2. Mr. Guerrier alleges that he returned at least two more times to retrieve his vehicle but was denied each time. Id. Mr. Guerrier claims he learned that his vehicle was sold in an auction by the PPA pursuant to a court order and that he did not receive notice before the sale or proceeds from the sale. Id.

Plaintiffs Mr. Guerrier and Blessing Auto Repair brought this civil action against Defendants PPA, Pennsylvania State Police, and Trooper Avdulla in state court. Id. at 1-2. Defendant PPA successfully removed the action to federal court on December 31, 2020. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 11, at 2.

Plaintiffs brought the following claims against all three Defendants in an Amended Complaint: conversion under state law (Count 1); violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 2); civil conspiracy (Count 3); Fourth Amendment violation (Count 4); Fifth Amendment violation (Count 5); and Eighth Amendment violation (Count 6); trespass under state law (Count 7); and a claim for punitive damages (Count 8). Id. at 1-2. Defendant PPA moves to dismiss all claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and all claims brought by Plaintiff Blessing Auto Repair for lack of Article III standing under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Id. at 6. Plaintiffs responded in opposition (Doc. No. 14).

Standard of Review

A Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) requests the Court to dismiss claims that fail to assert a basis upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 698, 678 (2009). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, a Plaintiff's complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. See Id. at 679. However, legal conclusions are not accepted as true and must be supported by sufficient factual allegations. Id. at 678-79.

“To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus. Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). In addition, the Court may consider “an undisputedly authentic document that the defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196; Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).

Discussion

Blessing Auto Repair Lacks Standing

The PPA asserts in their Motion that Blessing Auto Repair lacks standing as a plaintiff and all claims asserted by them should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 11, at 8.

A party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing standing by showing the plaintiff suffered an “injury in fact” or invasion of legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, not hypothetical, or conjectural. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). For an injury to be “particularized, ” the plaintiff must be injured personally and individually by the defendant's conduct. Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 167 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Id. at 560); Spokeo, Inc. v Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). Also, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct, and it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. 561. Without Article III standing, a claim lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b)(1); Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).

Here Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to show that Blessing Auto Repair suffered a particularized “injury in fact.” See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. The PPA asserts that Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to allege how Blessing Auto Repair's legal rights were personally implicated by the impoundment and sale of the vehicle. Def.'s Mem. in Supp., Doc. No. 11, at 21. While the complaint does sufficiently allege how Mr. Guerrier's legal rights were individually impacted, Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient factual allegations that Blessing Auto Repair's legal rights were individually and personally impacted by Defendants' conduct. See Cottrell, 874 F.3d at 167. Plaintiffs assert their claims collectively throughout the Amended Complaint. The only connection plead between Defendants' conduct and Blessing Auto Repair is that Mr. Guerrier's vehicle was parked on Blessing Auto Repair's parking lot when seized by Pennsylvania State Police and that Mr. Guerrier is the president of Blessing Auto Repair. Pls.' Am. Comp., Doc. No. 10, at 1. Plaintiffs repeat conclusory statements throughout the Amended Complaint that Blessing Auto Repair's injuries include “loss of quiet enjoyment of the business premises free of unwarranted entry . . . [causing] embarrassment and humiliation . . . and damage to their business and business reputation”. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs argue in their Response to PPA's Motion that these statements establish Blessing Auto Repair's standing. Pls.' Mem. in Supp., Doc. No. 14, at 18. However, these statements do not sufficiently explain how Defendants' conduct injured Blessing Auto Repair's business or how Blessing Auto Repair suffered a particularized and individual injury separate from Mr. Guerrier's particularized injuries. Conclusory statements without sufficient factual support are not enough to establish Blessing Auto Repair's standing as a Plaintiff. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Therefore, Blessing Auto Repair lacks standing for failing to assert a particularized claim in the Amended Complaint and we dismiss Blessing Auto Repair as a Plaintiff. Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment Claim Is Dismissed

Under Count 4, Plaintiffs claim all Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures when seizing and selling Mr. Guerrier's vehicle. Pls.' Am. Comp., Doc. No. 10, at 6. The PPA argues this claim is inappropriately brought against them because, as Plaintiffs concede in their Amended Complaint, Commonwealth Defendants directed the seizure of the vehicle and turned the vehicle over to the PPA. Id. at 2; Def.'s Mem. in Supp., Doc. No. 11, at 10-11.

A parking authority towing a vehicle is not itself a constitutional violation. Sheller v. City of Philadelphia, No. 11-2371, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144240, at *13, n.2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2012) (citing Mays v. Scranton City Police Dep't, 503 F.Supp. 1255, 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1980) and dismissing a Fourth Amendment claim by reasoning that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation). It is not unreasonable for a Parking Authority to tow and impound vehicles at the direction of police, under municipality code, or warrant. See Berger v. Phila. Parking Auth., 413 F.Supp.3d 412, 418-19 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (reasoning that the Parking Authority did not violate the Fourth Amendment because impounding the plaintiff's vehicle for delinquent parking tickets was authorized under Pennsylvania Law and the Philadelphia Traffic Code); Mawson v. Pittston City Police Dep't, No. 3:16-CV-00400, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8953, at *24 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2017) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) to reason that seizing personal property is not per se unreasonable if it occurs pursuant to a warrant); Place, 462 U.S. at 701 (reasoning a seizure may be reasonable without a warrant if there is a compelling government interest justifying the seizure and the extent of intrusion affected by the seizure is not disproportionate); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (“police often reasonably seize automobiles”). If the decision to seize and tow the vehicle is improper, the controversy is between city law enforcement and the vehicle owner. Mays, 503 F.Supp. at 1264. The important question is who caused the alleged violation. Sheller, No. 112371, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144240, at *15 (citing Addante v. Village Elmwood Park, 541 F.Supp. 497, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1982)).

Here Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead a Fourth Amendment claim against the PPA. Plaintiffs assert in their complaint that the Pennsylvania...