Blind Hunting Club, LLC v. Martini

169 N.E.3d 1121

BLIND HUNTING CLUB, LLC and Brian Lane, Appellants-Defendants,

v.David MARTINI and Theresa Farrell, Appellees-Plaintiffs.

Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-PL-1868

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED April 20, 2021

Attorney for Appellants: Michael J. Chapman, Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis, LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio

Attorney for Appellee – David Martini : R. Patrick Magrath, Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, Madison, Indiana

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Blind Hunting Club, LLC and Brian Lane (collectively, "BHC") appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs David Martini and Theresa Farrell on their complaint for a declaratory judgment regarding the scope of an easement. BHC raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of Martini and Farrell and denied BHC's motion for summary judgment.¹

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Martini and Farrell own neighboring properties in Guilford with frontage on York Ridge Road. Blind Hunting Club, LLC (the "Hunting Club") owns 440 acres adjacent to the Martini and Farrell properties that is zoned agricultural. Pursuant to a 2016 "Easement and Maintenance Agreement" (the "agreement") entered into by the prior owners of the properties, the Hunting Club (the "dominant estate") has an easement over Martini's and Farrell's properties (the "servient estates") to access its land from York Ridge Road.²

[4] The agreement provides, in relevant part, as follows:

WHEREAS there has long been an easement to the Dominant Estate [now held by the Hunting Club] from York Ridge Road which runs through the Servient Estate[s, now held by Martini and Farrell,] for access to farm homes; and

WHEREAS the easement has been consistently referenced in the deeds in the Dominant Estate's chain of title as "the farm privilege of a gateway from the York Ridge Road ... as said is now located and traveled and running in a westwardly direction until it intersects the land that is deeded ..." or "reserving the right of way over the last above described premises for farm privilege," or "the right to use of a lane or private roadway from said farm to public road[.]"

* * *

EASEMENT

* * *

Subject only to the conditions stated herein , Grantor[s] hereby convey[ ] and grant[ ] to Grantees an unrestricted right of ingress, egress, use and access to, over, across and upon a perpetual easement ("Easement") being twenty (20) feet of even width ... to provide access for farm equipment, pedestrian and vehicular traffic to and from the Dominant Estate , to and from the physically open and publicly dedicated roadway commonly known as York Ridge Road.

Grantor[s’] grant of the Easement herein is subject to the following condition, and Grantees do hereby covenant and agree to limit the use of said Easement for the ingress and egress to no more than two (2) residences in total, that may hereafter be constructed and located on the two (2) parcels that comprise the Dominant Estate[.]

Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 62-63 (emphases added; some omissions in original).

[5] In April 2017, the Hunting Club leased 150 acres of its property to Jeff and Brandon Feiss. The Feisses used the property to plant and harvest corn and soybeans as part of a commercial farming operation. They also used the easement to transport various large pieces of farming equipment to their property. The Feisses terminated their lease with the Hunting Club in May 2019.

[6] In 2019, the Hunting Club leased its 440-acre property to Lane. Lane lives on the property, and he uses it to operate a fee-based hunting club, where members pay to hunt birds and deer. Lane does not raise the birds but purchases them from suppliers, holds them in pens, and releases them into fields to be hunted. See Tr. at 51, 55. Lane also uses 150 acres to plant and tend milo grain, which he does not harvest but which serves as cover for the birds to be hunted. Id. at 56. Lane uses the easement granted by the agreement to provide members of his hunting club with access to the property.

[7] On November 18, 2019, Martini and Farrell filed an amended complaint against BHC in which Martini and Farrell sought a declaratory judgment regarding the easement.³ Specifically, Martini and Farrell asked the court to declare that the easement is "limited to farm and residential use" and "specifically prohibits" BHC's use of the easement for its hunting business. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 60.

[8] Thereafter, Martini and Farrell filed a motion for summary judgment. In a supporting memorandum, Martini and Farrell asserted that the easement is "limited to that of farming activity or to a residence on the real estate." Id. at 90. And Martini and Farrell asserted that Lane was "admittedly" using the easement to allow members of his hunting club to access the property in order to hunt birds that Lane had procured from outside sources. Id. Accordingly, Martini and Farrell maintained that BHC's "current usage" of the easement "does not fall into the categories allowed by" the agreement. Id.

[9] BHC responded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. BHC asserted that the plain language of the agreement gives it "a broad general ingress and egress easement" not limited to residential or farm use. Id. at 99. But BHC contended that, if its use of the easement were limited to farm or residential uses, then its operation of an "agrotourism business, a game preserve ... and an upland bird and whitetail deer hunting club" is a farm use consistent with the language of the agreement. Id. at 102.

[10] The court entered summary judgment for Martini and Farrell. In its order, the court found that the language of the agreement demonstrates that "the framers of the [a]greement intended the following: you can farm the land, and/or you can build up to 2 homes on the land." Id. at 122. And the court found that BHC's hunting operation "is a business not contemplated by the framers of the Easement Agreement" and that BHC's "use of the easement for th[is] business purpose[ ] is thus not permitted." Id. at 124. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[11] BHC contends that the trial court erred when it denied BHC's motion for summary judgment and entered summary judgment for Martini and Farrell. The Indiana Supreme Court has explained that

[w]e review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: "Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of ... the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " Williams v. Tharp , 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C)). "A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences." Id. (internal citations omitted).

The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to "demonstrate [ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue," at which point the burden shifts to the non-movant to "come forward with contrary evidence" showing an issue for the trier of fact. Id. at 761–62 (internal quotation marks and substitution omitted). And "[a]lthough the non-moving party has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his day in court." McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys. , 916 N.E.2d 906, 909–10 (Ind. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Hughley v. State , 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (omission and some alterations original to Hughley ). " ‘The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter our standard for review, as we consider each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " SCI Propane, LLC v. Frederick , 39 N.E.3d 675, 677 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Reed v. Reid , 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012) ).

[12] Here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its summary judgment order. While such findings and conclusions are not required in a summary judgment and do not alter our standard of review, they are helpful on appeal for us to understand the reasoning of the trial court. See Knighten v. E. Chicago Hous. Auth. , 45 N.E.3d 788, 791 (Ind. 2015).

[13] The parties do not dispute the underlying facts. Rather, on appeal, the parties dispute whether the agreement allows BHC to use the easement to operate a fee-based hunting club. Thus, this appeal requires that we interpret the agreement. Cases involving contract interpretation generally are particularly appropriate for summary judgment. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc. v. Wilmoth , 70 N.E.3d 833, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

[14] It is well settled that, "[w]hen construing an instrument granting an easement, the trial court must ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties, which is determined by proper construction of the instrument from an examination of all the parts thereof." McCauley v. Harris , 928 N.E.2d 309, 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Particular words and phrases cannot be read alone, as the parties’ intention must be gleaned from the instrument as a whole. Id. at 315. Further, "[a] document is ambiguous only when reasonable persons find it subject to more than one interpretation." Kwolek v. Swickard , 944 N.E.2d 564, 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[15] Here, the operative provisions of the agreement provide as follows:

Subject only to the conditions stated herein, Grantor[s] hereby convey[ ] and grant[ ] to Grantees an unrestricted right of ingress, egress, use and access to, over, across and upon a perpetual easement ... to

...