Blizman v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co.

557 F.Supp.3d 571

Edith M. BLIZMAN, Plaintiff,

v.The TRAVELERS HOME AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-01539

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed August 30, 2021

David J. Selingo, Law Offices of David J. Selingo, Kingston, PA, Joseph M. Cosgrove, Law Offices of Joseph M. Cosgrove, Wilkes-Barre, PA, for Plaintiff.

Allison L. Krupp, Brooks R. Foland, Marshall Dennehey, Camp Hill, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, United States Magistrate Judge

Before the Court are three Motions for Summary Judgment in an insurance-coverage action arising from a collision which caused the death of Plaintiff's husband, Joseph Blizman ("Decedent"). Plaintiff Edith M. Blizman, the Executrix of Decedent's estate, seeks a declaration that Defendant's insurance policy provides underinsured motorist coverage for the injury suffered by Decedent at the time of the June 9, 2019, motor vehicle accident. (Doc. 16, at 6). The first motion before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff on December 10, 2020. (Doc. 51). The second is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Travelers Personal Insurance Company ("Travelers") on May 25, 2021. (Doc. 65). The third is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff on June 1, 2021. (Doc. 68).

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant's removal from state court to federal court on September 5, 2019. (Doc. 1). After removal, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on February 21, 2020, which stands as the operative complaint in the matter ("the Complaint"). (Doc. 16).

The parties subsequently consented to the undersigned's jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 17, at 9; Doc. 18).

The allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint are described in full in the Court's Memorandum and Order of December 1, 2020. (Doc. 49; Doc. 50). The Blizmans obtained a car insurance policy from Defendant in March 2008 for three vehicles which they owned ("the Policy"). (Doc. 16, at 2-3). Defendant obtained a waiver of stacked limits for underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage at this time, showing a rejection of "stacked limits of [UIM] coverage under the policy for myself and members of my household" ("the Stacking Waiver"). (Doc. 16, at 2-3; Doc. 23-2, at 2). Also allegedly contained in the Policy was a Household Vehicle Exclusion ("HVE") which exempted bodily injury sustained "by any person ... [w]hile ‘occupying,’ or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any ‘family member’ which is not insured for this coverage under this policy ..." (Doc. 16, at 4).

When the Policy was amended in January 2009 to add a fourth vehicle, Decedent was not provided a new opportunity to reject stacked coverage. (Doc. 16, at 2-3; Doc. 23-2, at 2). In June 2019, a collision occurred in which Decedent suffered fatal injuries while driving his scooter. (Doc. 9-1, at 5). The scooter was insured by Progressive Insurance for UIM coverage up to $25,000. (Doc. 9-1, at 5). The tortfeasor's vehicle was insured by GEICO for bodily injury up to $25,000. (Doc. 9-1, at 5). At the time of the collision, the Policy provided for $100,000 in unstacked UIM coverage for each of the Blizmans’ two covered vehicles, and Plaintiff pursued UIM benefits under the Policy. (Doc. 16, at 2, 5; Doc. 1-1, at 16). Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the Policy provides stacked UIM coverage over Decedent's injuries. (Doc. 16, at 6).

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 6, 2020, which was denied. (Doc. 23; Doc. 50). The instant Motions for Summary Judgment followed. (Doc. 51; Doc. 65; Doc. 68). Both sides have fully briefed the Motions and they are now ripe for disposition. (Doc. 55; Doc. 58; Doc. 59; Doc. 66; Doc. 70; Doc. 73; Doc. 75; Doc. 76; Doc. 77).

II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences "should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." Pastore v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania , 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).

A federal court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Rather, the court must simply "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion," and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits or declarations, answers to interrogatories or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to a genuine issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-movant must produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case which it bears the burden of proving at trial, because "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Furthermore, mere conclusory allegations and self-serving testimony, whether made in the complaint or a sworn statement, cannot be used to obtain or avoid summary judgment when uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence of record. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n , 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) ; see also Thomas v. Delaware State Univ. , 626 F. App'x 384, 389 n.6 (3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential).

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

This factual background is taken from the parties’ Statements of Facts in support of their motions, along with accompanying exhibits. (Doc. 53; Doc. 67; Doc. 69). As required by Local Rule 56.1, all material facts set forth in the Statements will be deemed admitted unless controverted in the opposing parties’ Statements. Where a party disputes facts and supports those disputes in the record, as also required by Local Rule 56.1, those disputes are noted.

Plaintiff Edith M. Blizman is the surviving widow of the Decedent, Joseph Blizman. (Doc. 69, ¶ 1; Doc. 74, ¶ 1). Plaintiff resides at 29 West Chestnut Street in Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, 18205. (Doc. 69, ¶1; Doc. 74, ¶ 1). The Decedent passed away on June 9, 2019, as a direct result of traumatic injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident, as described infra. (Doc. 53, ¶ 2; Doc. 56, ¶ 2). Plaintiff was appointed Executrix of Decedent's estate by the Luzerne County Register of Wills on June 21, 2019. (Doc. 53, ¶ 3; Doc. 56, ¶ 3). The Estate was assigned number 40-19 1282 in Luzerne County. (Doc. 53, ¶ 3; Doc. 56, ¶ 3).

Plaintiff avers that Defendant Travelers Personal Insurance Company a/k/a The Travelers Indemnity Company a/k/a Travelers Property Casualty Companies is a corporate entity authorized to conduct business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, with a place of business located at 1 Tower Square, Hartford, Connecticut, 06183. (Doc. 53, ¶ 4; Doc. 69, ¶ 4). Defendant disputes this, submitting that The Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company issued the subject Travelers Policy, and that this corporation, with a principal place of business in Connecticut, is authorized to conduct business and issues automobile insurance policies in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 56, ¶ 4; Doc. 74, ¶ 4).¹ Travelers is in the business of insuring individuals relative to the ownership and use of motor vehicles in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, including but not limited to insuring individuals for Underinsured Motorist coverage (UIM). (Doc. 53, ¶ 5; Doc. 56, ¶ 5).

On June 9, 2019, Plaintiff and Decedent were insured under a policy of insurance issued by Travelers which covered two automobiles owned by Plaintiff and Decedent. (Doc. 53, ¶ 6; Doc. 51-2, at 6; Doc. 56, ¶ 6). The Policy included coverage for UIM in the amount of $100,000 each person/$100,000 each accident. (Doc. 53, ¶ 7; Doc. 51-2, at 7; Doc. 56, ¶ 7). The Policy's inception date was March 5, 2008. (Doc. 53, ¶ 8; Doc. 51-3, at 2; Doc. 56, ¶ 8). At the time of the Policy's inception, three vehicles were insured under the Policy and Travelers obtained a Rejection of Stacked Limits for UIM coverage on the three vehicles. (Doc. 69, ¶ 8; Doc. 51-3, at 2, 9; Doc. 74, ¶ 8).

In a "change" to the Policy effective January 8, 2009, a fourth vehicle was added (a Jeep Cherokee). (Doc. 69, ¶ 9; Doc. 51-4, at 2; Doc. 74, ¶ 9). The Jeep Cherokee was purchased by Plaintiffs from a friend for use by Plaintiffs’ daughter. (Doc. 69, ¶ 10; Doc. 74, ¶ 10; Doc. 68-4, at 3). At the time the Jeep Cherokee was purchased, Decedent called the insurance agency to report the...