Blood v. Willow-Wist Farm, Inc.

MAXINE BLOOD, a married woman, Appellant, v. WILLOW-WIST FARM, INC., a Washington corporation;VIKING FEAST ICE CREAM, a Washington business;and "JANE DOE," an individual, Respondent.

No. 81848-1-I

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE

November 16, 2020

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

HAZELRIGG, J. — Maxine Blood was seriously injured while visiting Willow-Wist Farm when an employee of a vendor at the farm turned quickly and collided with her, causing her to fall. She filed a lawsuit alleging negligence against Willow-Wist, the ice cream vendor and the employee who knocked her down. The trial court granted summary judgment for Willow-Wist, finding no genuine issue of material fact that any crowding in the farm store had a causal connection to the vendor's employee colliding with Blood, and dismissed Willow-Wist from the suit. Blood later obtained a judgment against the ice cream vendor. Blood now appeals, alleging that Willow-Wist's summary judgment dismissal and the subsequent denial of her motion for reconsideration of that ruling were improper. We disagree and affirm.

FACTS

Willow-Wist Farm, a dairy farm in Sequim, participated in the Clallam County Farm Tour on October 4, 2014. Viking Feast Ice Cream was a local vendor selling their ice cream products at Willow-Wist Farm that day. Viking Feast is a sole proprietorship owned and operated by Thormod Skald. Skald makes his ice cream with Willow-Wist milk, but is not a wholesale buyer; he orders milk on an as-needed basis. The day of the incident, Skald had employed a friend, Amber Golding, to help with ice cream sales at the Farm Tour event.

At some point on the afternoon in question, Viking Feast ran out of ice cream and arranged to purchase pints from the Willow-Wist farm store to sell at their stand. Skald sent Golding into the farm store, which was on site, to get more pints of ice cream. Blood arrived at Willow-Wist and went into the farm store to obtain a half-pint of milk for her grandson. According to Blood, Golding rushed into the farm store and "hurriedly" grabbed some pints of ice cream from the freezer. Golding then abruptly turned around and collided with Blood, knocking Blood to the ground. Another patron in the store provided testimony that Golding was "in a hurry" and "not really paying attention" when she knocked Blood over. No one testified that anyone else knocked into Golding or Blood to cause the accident.

Blood broke her right femur, which required surgery the next day, a two-month hospitalization in an in-patient rehabilitation center, and other follow up treatment. In March of 2016, Blood filed her complaint against Willow-Wist, Viking Feast, and Golding. Blood alleged that overcrowding in the farm store posed a foreseeable danger to its business invitees and that Willow-Wist failed to maintainthe premises in a safe condition and exercise reasonable case under the circumstances. On August 1, 2016, Willow-Wist filed a motion for summary judgment arguing various theories under which the trial court could dismiss them from the suit. Blood opposed the motion and provided the court with evidence that she argued created sufficient questions of material fact sufficient to overcome the motion for summary judgment. One exhibit was a declaration by Joellen Gill, a Human Factors expert qualified to testify regarding workplace safety standards.

The trial court granted Willow-Wist's motion for summary judgment and Blood filed a motion for reconsideration. The court requested a written response from Willow-Wist. The court eventually denied the motion and issued a memorandum opinion explaining the basis for the denial. After the claim against Willow-Wist was dismissed, Blood secured a judgment against Viking Feast for $628,523.64 in October 2019. Blood then filed this appeal.

ANALYSIS

Blood first assigns error to the trial court's grant of Willow-Wist's motion for summary judgment. This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Mohandessi v. Urban Venture LLC, 13 Wn. App. 2d 681, 692, 468 P.3d 622 (2020). Summary judgment is properly granted when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR56(c). "A material fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation." Owen v. Burlington Ne. and Santa Fe R.R. Co., 153 Wn.2d 780, 789, 108 P.3d 1220 (2005). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the material evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom most favorably for thenonmoving party." Jacobsen v. State, 89 Wn.2d 104, 108, 569 P.2d 1152 (1977). To establish negligence a plaintiff must prove, "'(1) the existence of a duty owed to the complaining party; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a resulting injury; and (4) that the claimed breach was a proximate cause of the injury.'" Milson v. City of Lynden, 174 Wn. App. 303, 309, 298 P.3d 141 (2013) (quoting Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wn.2d 476, 479, 824 P.2d 483 (1992)). "The granting of summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party, after the motion is made, fails to establish any facts which would support an essential element of its claim." Weatherbee v. Gustafson, 64 Wn. App. 128, 131, 822 P.2d 1257 (1992). In our review, we place ourselves "in the position of the trial court and consider the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 226, 770 P.2d 182 (1989).

Blood contends that there was a dispute as to how crowded the farm store was at the time of her injury such that it created an issue of material fact. It is clear, however, that the court provided this inference in Blood's favor when it ruled "[u]nder this standard, the 'store' was crowded." But we agree with the trial court's determination that the proper focus for the inquiry is "the specific area in the store where the incident occurred." This fundamental question highlights Blood's inability to establish proximate cause for her negligence claim as it relates to Willow-Wist.

"Washington law recognizes two elements to proximate cause: Cause in fact and legal causation." Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 777, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). Cause in fact is the "but for" consequences of an act—the physicalrelationship between an act and an injury. Id. at 778. Normally, cause in fact is a question for the finder of fact. Moore v. Hagge, 158 Wn. App. 137, 148, 241 P.3d 787 (2010). "But the court may decide this question as a matter of law if 'the causal connection is so speculative and indirect that reasonable minds could not differ.'" Id. (quoting Doherty v. Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 83 Wn. App. 464, 469, 921 P.2d 1098 (1996)). "Legal cause depends upon whether a defendant's conduct should warrant legal liability as a matter of social policy and common sense." Doherty, 83 Wn. App. at 469. "The question of legal causation is so intertwined with the question of duty that the former can be answered by addressing the latter." Taggart...