Blue v. Hill

ANTHONY BLUE, as the Administrator of the Estate of James E. Blue, Sr., Plaintiff, v. RANDY L. HILL, RUAN TRANSPORT CORP., and AIRGAS USA, LLC, Defendants.

Case No. 5:18-cv-00445-M

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WESTERN DIVISION

August 11, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 27, 2019 (the "Motion") [DE-46]. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

Early in the evening on November 23, 2017, Defendant Randy L. Hill was driving a tractor pulling a trailer on Interstate 85 near Oxford, North Carolina when his tractor-trailer collided with a truck driven by James E. Blue, Sr. ("Decedent"). [DE-1-5, 12 ¶¶ 21, 26] Decedent died later that evening. [DE-1-5, 12 ¶¶ 3, 27]

Plaintiff Anthony Blue, the Administrator of Decedent's estate, filed a complaint in Vance County, North Carolina Superior Court on August 6, 2018, seeking compensatory and punitive damages in connection with Decedent's allegedly-wrongful death. [DE-1-5] Plaintiff sued: (1) Hill in his individual capacity, alleging that Hill's negligence, gross negligence, and/or willful and wanton disregard for Decedent's safety was a proximate cause of the collision; and (2) Defendants Ruan Transport Co. ("Ruan") and Airgas USA, LLC ("Airgas"), alleging that they are vicariously liable for Hill's conduct.¹ [DE-1-5]

On September 13, 2018, Defendants filed a notice of removal in this court, invoking the court's diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.² [DE-1] Defendants answered the complaint on September 19, 2018. [DE-12] In their answer, Defendants admitted that, at the time of the collision: (1) the tractor driven by Hill was owned by Ruan, and that Hill was driving the tractor with the permission and consent of, and while acting within the course and scope of his employment with, Ruan; and (2) Hill's tractor was pulling a trailer owned by Airgas. [DE-12 ¶¶ 11, 16, 25] Defendants generally denied Plaintiff's allegations otherwise, and asserted defenses including, inter alia: (1) an allegation that Decedent was contributorily negligent; and (2) a specific denial that Hill had a relationship with Airgas sufficient for the latter to be held vicariously liable for Hill's conduct. [DE-12 at 7-8]

On September 27, 2019, Defendants filed the Motion, seeking summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ("Rule 56"). [DE-46] In support, Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because: (1) Decedent was contributorily negligent; (2) Plaintiff cannot forecast sufficient evidence that Defendants were grossly negligent; (3) Plaintiff cannot forecast evidence of conduct sufficient to support a punitive-damages award, or that Ruan or Airgas participated in or condoned any such conduct by Hill; and (4) Plaintiff cannot forecast evidence that Airgas had a relationship with Hill sufficient to hold Airgas vicariously liable for Hill's conduct. [DE-47] In opposition, Plaintiff concedes that he lacks evidence to support an award of punitive damages, but otherwise argues that there exist genuine issues of material fact requiring trial on the issues of: (1) Defendants' negligence; (2) Defendants' gross negligence; (3) Decedent's contributory negligence; and (4) Airgas's relationshipwith Hill. [DE-57 at 2-3] The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for adjudication. [see DE-74 ¶ 6; DE-83 ¶ 5]

II. Legal standards

A party moving for summary judgment on a claim or defense bears the burden of "show[ing] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" on that claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Within the meaning of Rule 56: (1) a fact is "material" if a jury's decision regarding the fact's existence or nonexistence "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law"; and (2) a dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which [the movant] believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute as to a material fact by: (1) "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials[,]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); or (2) showing that the record "do[es] not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that [the nonmovant] cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact[,]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Record evidence supporting a motion for summary judgment or an opposition thereto must be proffered in a form that is admissible, or the party must satisfactorily explain the admissible form in which the evidence would be admitted at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 538-39 (4th Cir. 2015).

The Fourth Circuit has said:

When the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with evidence which shows more than some metaphysical doubt that genuine and material factual issues exist. A mere scintilla of evidence presented by the nonmoving party is insufficient to circumvent summary judgment. Rather, the nonmoving party must convince the court that upon the record taken as a whole³ a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party.

Austin v. Clark Equip. Co., 48 F.3d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings" and, pursuant to Rule 56(c), to "designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). Regarding the court's duty in deciding whether a nonmovant has demonstrated the existence of genuine and material factual issues, the Anderson Court said:

Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . . The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.

477 U.S. at 255. Or as the Fourth Circuit put it another way, the nonmovant is entitled "to have the credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed, his version of all that is in dispute accepted, [and] all internal conflicts in it resolved favorably to him[.]" Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979). However, evidence proffered by the nonmovant that is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative" of the issues will not defeat an otherwise-meritorious motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; see also Austin, 48 F.3d at 836 ("A mere scintilla of evidence presented by the nonmoving party is insufficient to circumvent summary judgment."). Moreover, "it is the duty of the court to withdraw the case from the jury when the necessary inference is so tenuous that it rests merely upon speculation and conjecture." Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 241 (4th Cir. 1982)(quotations omitted).

In sum, where the district court concludes that—based upon the record taken as a whole, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant as described above—a reasonable jury could render a verdict in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment must be denied. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Where, in light of the same, the court concludes that a jury could not reasonably render a verdict in the nonmovant's favor, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 249-50.

III. Analysis

As noted above, Plaintiff has conceded that he lacks evidence sufficient to support an award of punitive damages, and the court accordingly grants Defendants summary judgment on that claim.

Plaintiff argues, however, that there exist genuine disputes as to material facts requiring trial on the questions of whether: (1) Defendants were negligent; (2) Decedent was contributorily negligent; (3) Defendants were grossly negligent; and (4) Airgas had a relationship with Hill sufficient for the imposition of vicarious liability. [DE-57 at 2-3]

Regarding Plaintiff's claims based upon Hill's alleged ordinary negligence, while they have moved for summary judgment on certain defenses that could defeat those claims as a matter of law, Defendants have not moved for summary judgment on those claims themselves; indeed, in their initial brief, Defendants appear to concede that Plaintiff has developed sufficient evidence of Hill's ordinary negligence to require a trial. [see DE-47 at 13 ("a jury will be asked to decide if Defendant Hill's actions constitute ordinary negligence")] For the avoidance of doubt, to the extent Defendants intended to affirmatively move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's ordinary-negligence claims, that motion is denied, and because Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on their asserted defenses to those claims as set forth below, trial is required.

The court will address the remaining issues in turn.

a. Decedent's contributory negligence

Defendants first argue that the evidence shows that Decedent was driving 15 miles per hour at the time of the collision, and that the collision took place after dark in an area where the posted speed limit was 70 miles per hour.⁴ [DE-47 at 3-8; DE-49-1 at 30-31] Defendants argue that Decedent's slow speed was negligent and a proximate cause of the collision...