Blumstein-Torrella v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.

1

KARYN BLUMSTEIN-TORRELLA, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND BARBARA BELLAFATTO, Principal P.S. 36, Defendants.

No. 19-cv-3492 (ALC)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

August 9, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Karyn Blumstein-Torrella brings this action against Defendants New York City Department of Education (“NYC DOE” or “DOE”) and Barbara Bellafatto for (1) interference and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”); (2) disability discrimination, retaliation and hostile work environment under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) and New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”); (3) age discrimination, retaliation and hostile work environment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), NYSHRL and NYCHRL; (4) religious discrimination, retaliation and hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), NYSHRL and NYCHRL. Defendants move to partially dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

When determining whether to dismiss a case, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.^[1]Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011). The following facts alleged in the Amended Complaint are thus assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion.

Plaintiff is an employee of NYC DOE. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 ¶ 7.) She is a practicing Roman Catholic and 47 years old. (Id. ¶ 8.) She suffers from Celiac disease Hashimoto's disease, Rheumatoid Arthritis, and Fibromyalgia, and has a history of breast cancer. (Id.)

In 2015, after a medical transfer, Plaintiff was assigned to P.S. 36, where Defendant Bellafatto was Principal. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that when Bellafatto realized that she would have to pay Plaintiff's salary out of the school budget, she gave Plaintiff an “Unsatisfactory” performance rating. (Id.) This was later overturned by Plaintiff's union representative. (Id.) On June 23, 2016 Plaintiff also received a disciplinary letter for excessive absences, even though those absences were medically justified. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff was granted FMLA intermittent leave from December 8, 2016 through December 8, 2017. (Id. ¶ 13.) Notwithstanding Plaintiff's FMLA status, Bellafatto still issued disciplinary notices for time and attendance issues related to Plaintiff's health conditions and her religious observance. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that she received lower performance evaluations from Bellafatto than she had received from other previous supervisors. (Id. ¶ 21.)

Plaintiff also alleges that Bellafatto questioned her religious observance. On October 31, 2016, Bellafatto told Plaintiff that she should attend church at night, instead of during the day like Bellafatto did. (Id. ¶ 15.) Again, on October 30, 2017, Bellafatto asked Plaintiff about her surname name being Blumstein-Terrella and asked Plaintiff to elaborate on her religious beliefs. (Id. ¶¶ 1516.) Bellafatto claimed that Plaintiff did not submit the necessary paperwork in time to take religious leave for All Saints Day, even though Plaintiff had submitted the paperwork several weeks beforehand. (Id. ¶ 16.) On December 8, 2017, Bellafatto improperly logged an FMLA absence as a religious observance day, which allegedly negatively impacted Plaintiff's compensation. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff alleges that another employee, Lisa Sefcik, was treated differently when she asked for religious observance of Ascension Thursday on May 10 2018. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that Sefcik was granted leave to observe the holiday, while Plaintiff never received any response to her request. (Id.)

In September 2017, Bellafatto sent Plaintiff to the NYC DOE medical unit, in violation of her protected FMLA leave status. (Id. ¶ 19.) This appointment was postponed, and Plaintiff was told to report to her school assignment. (Id.) When Plaintiff arrived at the school the following day, Bellafatto told her that she was not allowed to stay and placed her into the “ATR pool” and told her to report to a different school. (Id.) Bellafatto was forced to accept Plaintiff back at the school after intervention by Plaintiff's union representative.

On October 19, 2017, Bellafatto told Plaintiff that her FMLA intermittent leave was terminated and that her leave should never have been approved. (Id. ¶ 20.) She also allegedly told Plaintiff “that if [she] was going to be out sick, then [she] should just resign.” (Id.)

On April 13, 2018, Bellafatto told Plaintiff that she was a financial burden to the school due to her high salary and the time off that she required due to her disability. (Id. ¶ 22.) Bellafatto told Plaintiff that because of her high salary, Bellafatto could not hire school aides or buy furniture or supplies that the school needed. (Id.) She also allegedly told Plaintiff that she should resign from her position, take disability retirement or medical leave because she did not foresee Plaintiff's health condition improving in the future. (Id.)

On April 16, 2018, following an arbitration in which Plaintiff filed an “APPR” challenging an observation report from Bellafatto, Plaintiff received a disciplinary letter in her file for time and attendance issues from Bellafatto. (Id. ¶ 23.) The disciplinary letter referenced days off that had been approved for FMLA absences, bereavement, and religious observance. (Id.)

Plaintiff also alleges that Bellafatto never posted an FMLA notice in the school, as she was required to do under the FMLA, until April 26, 2018. (Id. ¶ 24.) She only gave Plaintiff an FMLA eligibility notice on April 26, 2018 after Plaintiff's FMLA leave ended on December 8, 2017. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed two formal complaints against her employer. On May 23, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“SDHR”). (Id. ¶ 25.) She also filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on September 10, 2018. (Id.) Despite her complaint, on or about October 17, 2018, NYC DOE served time and attendance disciplinary charges on Plaintiff, which resulted in a $1,500 fine against her. (Id. ¶ 26.) On December 8, 2018, Plaintiff filed an FMLA leave request for intermittent leave. (Id. ¶ 27.) Bellafatto denied this request in January 2019, after the five-day response requirement under the FMLA. (Id.) Plaintiff received her right to sue letter on February 12, 2019 and filed the instant federal action on April 19, 2019. (Id. ¶ 28.)

Plaintiff alleges that during this period, Defendants' discrimination continued. On April 5, 2019 and June 7, 2019, Bellafatto issued another disciplinary letter to Plaintiff for time and attendance issues. (Id. ¶ 29.) On June 21, 2019, despite receiving no poor observation reports during the school year, Plaintiff alleges that she was retaliated against by Defendants for filing her federal complaint when she was served Section 3020-a disciplinary charges to terminate her employment. (Id. ¶ 30.) She was reassigned from her classes on July 11, 2019 and has been suspended with pay pending a hearing on the disciplinary charges. (Id.) In August 2019, Plaintiff learned that her classroom had been closed due to lead contamination, which she believes contributed to her absences during the prior school year. (Id. ¶ 31.) She also alleges that she was exposed to children who had contagious illnesses which further contributed to her absences during the school year. (Id.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initiated this action on April 19, 2020. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on March 2, 2020. (ECF No 18.)^[2] On April 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed her memorandum of law in opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 19.) On April 17, 2020, Defendants submitted their reply memorandum. (ECF No. 21.) On October 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed a letter attaching Plaintiff's favorable decision of her 3020-a decision. (ECF No. 21.)

LEGAL STANDARD

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “assume all ‘well-pleaded factual allegations' to be true, and ‘determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'” Selevan v. New York Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). Allegations that are “no more than conclusions[ ] are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and “‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement'” or “the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” are not sufficient to show that a plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 555, 557 (2007)). Nor must a court accept as true “legal conclusions” or “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Abandoned Claims

As a threshold issue, the Court will address the claims which Defendants moved to dismiss but which Plaintiff never defended in her opposition to the motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff does not address her claims for hostile work environment based on her religion under Title VII, NYSHRL or NYCHRL hostile work environment based on her disability under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, hostile work environment based on age under the ADEA, the NYSHRL or NYCHRL, and retaliation under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. Accordingly, the Court deems that these claims have been abandoned and are dismissed on that basis. See Pincover v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 592 F.Supp.3d 212, 227 (S....