BNSF Ry. Co. v. Eddy

399 Mont. 180

459 P.3d 857

2020 MT 59

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioner,

v.The Asbestos Claims Court of the State of Montana, Honorable Amy EDDY, Presiding Judge, Respondent.

OP 19-0085

Supreme Court of Montana.

Argued and Submitted: October 30, 2019

Decided: March 11, 2020

For Petitioner: Dale Schowengerdt (argued), Crowley Fleck PLLP, Helena Montana, Steven R. Milch, Crowley Fleck PLLP, Billings, Montana, Jim Roberts, Chad Knight, Anthony Nicastro, Nadia Patrick, Knight Nicastro, LLC, Kansas City, Missouri

For Plaintiffs: Roger Sullivan (argued) Ethan Welder, Jennifer Jeresek Mariman, McGarvey, Heberling, Sullivan & Lacy, P.C., Kalispell, Montana

For Amicus Montana Trial Lawyers Association: Michael D. Cok (argued), Cok Kinzler, PLLP, Bozeman, Montana

Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 This matter comes before the Court after we assumed supervisory control over proceedings pending before the Montana Asbestos Claims Court (Asbestos Court) in In re Asbestos Litigation , Consolidated Case No. AC-17-0694, as applicable to Barnes, et. al. v. State of Montana, et. al. , Cause No. DV-16-111, Montana Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County. We now address on extraordinary review BNSF Railway Company’s (BNSF) contention that the Asbestos Court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the issues of preemption, strict liability, and non-party affirmative defenses. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. We restate the issues as follows:

1. Did the Asbestos Court err by concluding Plaintiff’s claims were not preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act or the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act?

2. Did the Asbestos Court err by concluding BNSF is strictly liable to the Plaintiffs because it engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity?

3. Did the Asbestos Court err by concluding the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 521 does not shield BNSF from strict liability?

4. Did the Asbestos Court err by holding BNSF was not entitled to offer evidence of W.R. Grace’s conduct to refute causation?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mineral Carbon and Insulating Company, later Zonolite Company (Zonolite), began mining vermiculite in Libby, Montana, in 1922. In 1963, W.R. Grace (Grace) acquired the assets of Zonolite, including the mine, which it operated until September of 1990. Grace mined the vermiculite through open strip mining of Vermiculite Mountain, approximately seven miles outside of Libby. Libby was one of only three places in the world where vermiculite was mined, and Grace’s operations in Libby were the largest, producing approximately 80% of the world’s vermiculite ore. From the mine, between 500 and 1,000 tons of vermiculite concentrate was produced per day in the 1970s, rising to between 800 and 1,000 tons in the 1980s.

¶3 The ore body Grace mined contained a significant amount of amphibole asbestos, and processing the ore produced and released dust containing fine asbestos fibers into the air. After mining and processing the vermiculite, its concentrate was loaded onto BNSF’s railcars for transport. BNSF’s tracks run through town, and its railyard is located in downtown Libby.¹

¶4 In response to concerns regarding possible asbestos exposure in Libby, the EPA began investigating in 2000 and placed the site on the Superfund National Priorities List in 2002. In 2003, it released an Initial Pollution Report which revealed "[a]sbestos contaminated materials were hauled and shipped through the [BNSF] railyard, and spilled into the soil for decades," and that "asbestos ... is present in soil, raw ore, ore-concentrate and other soil-like materials at various locations in and around the community including the BNSF railyard." Likewise, the report indicated that "analytical results have shown asbestos levels in soil from 2-5%" in the railyard and that "[b]aseline monitoring along the track conducted by BNSF has found the highest concentrations measured during the sweeping ranges from 7 to 14 f/cc in air. A total of 22 surface soil samples collected along the railroad tracks and its railyard ranged from a trace to less than 1% fibrous amphibole asbestos by weight. In addition, visible unexpanded vermiculite remained at Tracks #1, #2 and #3." These statistics were provided by tests done by BNSF at least a decade after the vermiculite mining operations in Libby had ceased, and after BNSF had attempted to excavate and remediate the property.

¶5 Plaintiffs Tracie Barnes, Kenneth Braaten, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Rhonda R. Braaten, and Gerri Flores have brought claims against several defendants, including BNSF, due to their alleged involvement with the asbestos contamination in Libby. Against BNSF, Plaintiffs claimed negligence and common law strict liability, based on "decades of casting asbestos dust into the Libby community from the industrial level of activities at BNSF facilities." In their complaint, Plaintiffs describe these industrial activities, including the transport of asbestos-containing vermiculite, the spillage of asbestos containing material along BSNF’s tracks and in its railyard, and the continued disruption of the built-up spilled asbestos by BNSF’s trains and workers.

¶6 In October of 2018, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment based on the issues of preemption of Plaintiffs’ claims, BNSF’s strict liability, and the preclusion of BNSF’s defense of non-party conduct. The Asbestos Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion in part, and in two separate orders concluded that (1) Plaintiffs’ claims were not preempted by federal law, (2) BNSF was strictly liable because its actions were abnormally dangerous, and (3) BNSF could not present evidence of non-party conduct to negate causation. Pursuant to M. R. App. P. 14, BNSF filed a petition for writ of supervisory control, which this Court granted on April 16, 2019. The parties fully briefed the issues, and on the Court’s order, presented oral argument on October 30, 2019.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 This Court reviews a district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo , applying the same criteria as the district court.

Beckman v. Butte-Silver Bow Cty. , 2000 MT 112, ¶ 11, 299 Mont. 389, 1 P.3d 348 ; Sprunk v. First Bank Sys. , 252 Mont. 463, 465-66, 830 P.2d 103, 104 (1992). Summary judgment is only appropriate where no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sprunk , 252 Mont. at 466, 830 P.2d at 104. Once the party moving for summary judgment meets its burden of establishing an absence of genuine issues of material fact, the opposing party must present substantial evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact, more than "speculative, fanciful, or conclusory statements." Sprunk , 252 Mont. at 466-67, 830 P.2d at 105. "Important in the determination is whether the material facts are actually disputed by the parties or whether the parties simply interpret the facts differently. ... [m]ere disagreement about the interpretation of a fact or facts does not amount to genuine issues of material fact." Sprunk , 252 Mont. at 466, 830 P.2d at 105.

DISCUSSION

¶8 1. Did the Asbestos Court err by concluding Plaintiff’s claims were not preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act or the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act?

¶9 BNSF argues both the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) preempt Plaintiffs’ claims in this case. Plaintiffs counter that FRSA and HMTA do not preempt their claims based on the plain language of the regulations promulgated under the respective Acts.

¶10 The United States Supreme Court and this Court have "consistently held that preemption is not easily favored." Reidelbach v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. , 2002 MT 289, ¶ 21, 312 Mont. 498, 60 P.3d 418 ; see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr , 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996). Both courts have generally applied a "presumption against preemption." Reidelbach , ¶ 21 (citations omitted). Where a statute contains an express preemption clause, courts "do not invoke any presumption against pre-emption but instead ‘focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ " Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946, 195 L.Ed.2d 298 (2016) (citing Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Whiting , 563 U.S. 582, 594, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011) ); see also CSX Transp. v. Easterwood , 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). However, even if this Court did not apply the presumption against preemption in this case, we would nonetheless conclude that BNSF has not met its burden to demonstrate FRSA and HMTA preempt Plaintiffs’ claims.

¶11 In CSX Transportation , the plaintiff’s husband was killed when a train owned and operated by CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) collided with his truck. Plaintiff alleged CSX was negligent for failing to maintain adequate warning devices at a railroad crossing and for operating a train at an excessive speed, while CSX contended the claims were preempted by FRSA. CSX Transp. , 507 U.S. at 661, 113 S. Ct. at 1736. In determining whether the claims were preempted, the United States Supreme Court examined the plain text of FRSA’s express preemption provision, now 49 U.S.C. § 20106, which provided that "the states are permitted to ‘adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter of such State requirement.’ " CSX Transp. , 507 U.S. at 662, 113 S. Ct. at 1736 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 421 ). The Supreme Court found the specific issue with respect to preemption under this statute was "whether the Secretary of Transportation has issued...