Bogan v. MTD Consumer Grp. Inc.

SHEANETER J. BOGAN PLAINTIFF v. MTD CONSUMER GROUP INC DEFENDANT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14-CV-225-SA-DAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI ABERDEEN DIVISION

July 1, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Sheaneter Bogan, a black female, claims her employer MTD Consumer Group terminated her because of her race and gender in violation of Title VII. MTD filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment [41]. The Court has considered the motion, responses, rules, and authorities, and finds as follows:

Factual and Procedural Background

Bogan worked at MTD's Verona, Mississippi plant for approximately twenty-one years in various positions. Around 2009-2010, Bogan completed her Tool and Die degree at Itawamba Community College's Tupelo campus, and thereafter sought promotion into MTD's Tool and Die department. Bogan received a position in May 2011 on the night shift as a machinist in Tool and Die and worked there for several months. On her own request, in March 2012, Bogan transferred to the day shift, where she worked until her termination in April 2013.

Both before and after Bogan completed her Tool and Die degree, she pursued a Social Work degree at the University of Mississippi. The facility manager Ron Bateman and the Tool and Die manager Doug Grant initially permitted Bogan flexible work hours to accommodate her class schedule. In Fall 2012, however, the manager of Human Resources ("HR") Tab Cherry learned of this practice and notified Bogan's supervisors that her schedule violated company policy. According to Cherry, employees may only receive flexibility with classes that are work- related, and Bogan's social work classes did not qualify for such treatment. Grant informed Bogan in December 2012 that MTD would not accommodate her class schedule beyond the Fall semester. She would be held to the normal day-shift hours, 5:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.

Shortly thereafter, Grant and Bateman noticed from Bogan's time sheets that she was working irregular hours at the plant. For example, on one Saturday in January, Bogan logged fifteen hours, but the next Monday, she worked less than four hours. To resolve these issues, Grant and Bateman met with Bogan on January 15, 2013 at approximately 4:30 p.m., and reiterated that Bogan could not attend classes during her working hours and could not deviate from her normal schedule.

Bogan testified that directly after the meeting, she went back to her area to clean her machine and stayed at work until 7:00 pm. This action prompted Cherry to issue Bogan a "final disciplinary notice." Bogan appealed the final disciplinary notice to a peer review board, which is comprised of five randomly drawn employees. In February 2013, the board upheld the disciplinary action.

In Spring 2013, Cherry began receiving reports through other students that Bogan was attending classes at the University of Mississippi's Tupelo campus, and he instituted an investigation. Cherry discovered that on April 23, Bogan left MTD's facility at 10:49 a.m. and returned to work at 11:47 a.m. Cherry confronted Bogan about her absence, and Bogan admitted that she occasionally attended a social work class during the middle of the work day. According to Cherry's investigation document, Bogan stated that she drove for ten minutes from MTD's Verona facility to the University of Mississippi's Tupelo campus, attended class for twenty minutes, and drove ten minutes back to Verona.

Cherry suspended Bogan pending investigation and terminated her on April 25, 2013. Bogan appealed the termination decision to the review board, which again upheld Cherry's decision by secret ballot. Of the five randomly selected employees on the board, one was a white male, and four were black females. MTD reassigned Bogan's duties to a white male.

Bogan filed an EEOC charge, received her right-to-sue letter, and then initiated this suit, alleging unlawful retaliation and discrimination based on age, gender, and race. She voluntarily dismissed her retaliation claim and has since conceded her age discrimination claim. The Court will address her remaining claims of race and gender discrimination.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must then "go beyond the pleadings" and "set forth 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Importantly, conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments have never constituted an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1997); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

Discussion and Analysis

Bogan attempts to establish her Title VII termination claims with circumstantial evidence, and therefore seeks to navigate the familiar burden-shifting framework first set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chemicals Corp., 492 F.3d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 2007). Bogan must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, after which the burden shifts to MTD to produce a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating her. Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219-20 (5th Cir. 2001). If MTD comes forth with a sufficient reason, the burden shifts back to Bogan to show that MTD's given reason was really a pretext for discrimination. Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000)). Bogan must ultimately prove that her race or gender was a "motivating factor" in MTD's decision to terminate her. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2526, 186 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2013).

To meet her prima facie burden, Bogan must demonstrate that "(1) she belongs to a protected group, (2) she was qualified for her position, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action[,] and (4) she was replaced with a similarly qualified person who was not a member of her protected group, or in the case of disparate treatment, that similarly situated employees weretreated more favorably." Nasti, 492 F.3d at 593 (citing Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 512-13 (5th Cir. 2001)). MTD contests only the fourth element for summary judgment purposes.

Bogan contends inter alia that she was replaced by John Tramel, a white male employee in Tool and Die who assumed her duties. Citing unreported Fifth Circuit authority, MTD argues that an employee "has not been 'replaced' . . . when h[er] former duties are distributed among other co-workers." Griffin v. Kennard Indep. Sch. Dist., 567 F. App'x 293, 295 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal citation and quotation omitted). However, this principle from Griffin may be confined to cases involving "layoffs or employer-planned reductions in force" as opposed to the single-employee termination in this case. Howard v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 447 F. App'x 626, 629 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011).¹ Further, the language in Griffin and in the cases on which it relies presupposes that the plaintiff's duties are distributed among multiple coworkers. 567, F. App'x at 295; Rexses, 401 F. App'x 868; Dulin, 1998 WL 127729, at *3; see also Binger v. Anderson Enterprises, No. 1:13-CV-150-SA, 2015 WL 461753, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 4, 2015) (no prima facie case where duties distributed between two existing employees). Here, one individual wholly subsumed Bogan's job.

Additionally, Tramel may qualify as Bogan's replacement if he not only assumed Bogan's duties, but was actually transferred to her job. See Carbaugh v. Unisoft Int'l, Inc., No. H-10-CV-670-SL, 2011 WL 5553724, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2011) (phrasing inquiry as whether "the existing employees did not continue to perform their own jobs" in addition toplaintiff's duties); see also Pierson v. Quad/Graphics Printing Corp., 749 F.3d 530, 537 (6th Cir. 2014) ("An employer 'replaces' a discharged employee when it reassigns an existing employee to assume the discharged employee's duties in a way that 'fundamentally change[s] the nature of his employment.'").

The specifics surrounding Tramel's assignment are not firmly established. Cherry stated in his declaration that Bogan's "former job duties were added to those" of John Tramel. In response to Bogan's interrogatories, MTD stated that her duties "were assigned to John Tramel . . . ." Barry Ledbetter, the day shift lead man, acknowledged that Tramel was "put in the position after [Bogan] was terminated." In view of these varying accounts, there remains a factual question as to whether Tramel merely assumed Bogan's duties or was transferred to take over her job.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court...