Bogaski v. Cnty. of Allegheny

JUSTINA BOGASKI, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, PENNSYLVANIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15 - 487

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 26, 2018

Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

I. Summation

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 (ECF No. 218) will be denied.

II. Factual and Procedural History

The parties are familiar with the facts of the case, which need not be restated in detail here. This case was filed by Complaint on April 12, 2015 (ECF No. 1), and Amended on July 6, 2015 (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff, who resigned from Defendant's employment with the filing of her Complaint, alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"). More specifically, Plaintiff filed claims alleging a sexually hostile work environment, disparate impact, and constructive discharge. On the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, this Court found that there were questions of material fact as to Plaintiff's hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims. ECF No. 68. At the conclusion of trial, on November 20, 2017, the jury returned a verdict in Defendant's favor. ECF No. 215.

By her December 29, 2017 Motion for New Trial (ECF No. 218) and Brief in Support thereof (ECF No. 219), Plaintiff asserts that the jury verdict that she was not subject to sexual harassment at her place of employment was against the weight of the evidence and a miscarriage of justice, and that some evidence - specifically certain of Plaintiff's Facebook statements/postings - should not have been admitted at trial. ECF No. 219. Plaintiff also raises these contentions of error as to certain of the Facebook material: the prejudicial and improper admission of irrelevant Facebook material as character evidence, Defendant's closing argument references thereto, and the absence of a corrective jury instruction. ECF No. 219 at 6-16. Plaintiff raises three additional contended "errors of law": restricting Plaintiff's questioning of Defendant's employee Ms. Liebenguth, retaining a jury instruction on mitigation of damages, and admitting testimony of police detective Kelley. ECF No. 219 at 16-17.

III. Applicable Standard

As noted above, Defendant has moved for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Rule 59 states in relevant part as follows:

Rule 59. New Trial; Altering or Amending a Judgment

(a) In General.

(1) Grounds for New Trial.

The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues - and to any party - as follows:

(A) after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court[.]

Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a).

The ordering of a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 is within the sound discretion of the district court. Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1017 (3d Cir.1995). Reasons for granting a new trial include both grounds presently raised by Plaintiff, i.e., verdicts which are against the weight of the evidence or prejudicial errors of law. Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (3d Cir.1993). Taking the latter first, when the basis for the motion is an alleged error concerning the court's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions - that is, when it concerns a matter within the discretion of the trial court - a District Court must first determine whether an error was made during the course of the trial, and then determine "whether that error was so prejudicial that refusal to grant a new trial would be 'inconsistent with substantial justice.'" Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 709 F.Supp. 600, 601 (E.D.Pa.1989) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 61), aff'd, 922 F.2d 184 (3d Cir.1990). Whether any error committed by the court was harmless is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61.¹ Thus, "[u]nless a substantial right of the party is affected," a non-constitutional error in a civil case is harmless. Linkstrom v. Golden T. Farms, 883 F.2d 269, 269 (3d Cir.1989). "Absent a showing of substantial injustice or prejudicial error, a new trial is not warranted and it is the court's duty to respect a plausible jury verdict." Montgomery County v. MicroVote Corp., 152 F.Supp.2d 784, 795 (E.D.Pa.2001).²

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has further indicated that the District Court's discretion to grant a new trial is more limited when the alleged ground is that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir.1999). In this instance, new trials "'are proper only when the record shows that the jury's verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience.'" Greenleaf, 174 F.3d at 366 (quoting Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir.1991)); EEOC v. Delaware Dep't of Health and Soc. Servs., 865 F.2d 1408, 1413 (3d Cir.1989). "[T]his stringent standard is necessary to ensure that a district court does not substitute its judgment of the facts and credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury." Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1076 (3d Cir.1996) (citations omitted). The movant bears the burden of proof on a Motion for a New Trial. Whelan v. Teledyne Metal Working Prods., 2006 WL 39156, at *7 (W.D.Pa.2006). And the party seeking a new trial must meet a high threshold in order to obtain this "extraordinary relief." Ponzini v. PrimeCare Med., Inc., 2017 WL 3754787, at *87 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (quoting Marra v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 497 F.3d 286, 309 n.18).

IV. Analysis

A. Jury Verdict as Against the Weight of the Evidence

Plaintiff asserts that the "jury verdict in this matter is against the weight of the evidence, particularly due to prejudicial statements made by Defendant's counsel." Plaintiff's Brief in Support, ECF No. 219 at 2. As noted above, the jury entered a Defense verdict on the firstquestion: whether Plaintiff had "proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she was subject to harassment [in her employment] and that this harassment was motivated by [her] sex." ECF No. 215. This jury verdict does not meet the high "against the weight of the evidence" standard, as it neither resulted in a miscarriage of justice nor was conscience-shocking. To the contrary, notwithstanding Plaintiff's assertion that her testimony as to events during her employment was "proven by credible and unrebutted testimony", id. at 3, the jury in fact heard conflicting evidence as to many events, and duly made credibility assessments as to each witness, including Plaintiff. See Ponzini v. Primecare Medical, Inc., 2017 WL 3754787, at *65 (M.D. Pa. 2017) ("Where evidence is in conflict and subject to two interpretations, the trial judge should be reluctant to grant a new trial."); Rhoades, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 340 F.2d 481, 485-86 (3d Cir.1965) ("[T]he mere assertion of any witness does not of itself need to be believed, even though he is unimpeached in any manner; because to require such belief would be to give a quantitative and impersonal measure to testimony'.... [T]he trier of fact, whether the issue be one of an excessive or inadequate verdict, is at liberty within the bounds of reason to reject entirely the uncontradicted testimony of a witness which does not convince the trier of its merit."); id. (holding that where jury might have rationally weighed factors in evidence in reaching its decision, rejection of some uncontradicted testimony fell within bounds of reason).

Moreover, as Defendant correctly observes, to prevail on Question 1 of the verdict slip, Plaintiff had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was subjected to the alleged intentional and gender-motivated conduct, and that management level employees knew or should have known of the conduct. Plaintiff was also required to prove that the conduct was not welcomed, was so severe or pervasive that a reasonable person in Plaintiff's position would find her work environment to be hostile or abusive, and that Plaintiff herself believed her work environment to be hostile or abusive. Defendant's Response in Opposition, ECF No. 222 at 4-5. As well explicated inDefendant's Response in Opposition, the jury heard conflicting evidence and made credibility determinations as to each witness's testimony in determining whether and in what circumstances (e.g., intentionality, motivation) conduct occurred and management had knowledge thereof. ECF No. 222 at 5-12, 19-24. Plaintiff misplaces reliance on Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 438 (3d Cir.1994), in support of her assertion that the verdict was a miscarriage of justice because evidence that Defendant's employee Ms. Lord "heard rumors spread by Plaintiff's co-workers, accusing her of using her looks to get her way with her supervisor" was sufficient as a matter of law to constitute harassment. ECF No. 219 at 4. In Spain, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the trial court erred in failing to admit plaintiff's evidence regarding rumors of a sexual relationship purposefully created by her supervisor and perpetuated for several years to conceal private meetings regarding his illicit procurement of loans from plaintiff. The Court held that such evidence was probative and relevant, that Plaintiff had met the elements of her prima facie case, and material fact questions remained as to whether such rumors developed and persisted as a result of the supervisor's conduct, therefore those questions should have been presented to the jury, which could have reasonably found in plaintiff's favor. 26 F.3d at 447-551. Accordingly, this holding does not support Plaintiff's assertion. See also ECF No. 222 at 12-14.

Plaintiff also contends the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because the Defendant engaged in "overly prejudicial...