Boggs v. Bd. of Educ.

1

JOSEPH BOGGS, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF FAYETTE COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:24-136-DCR

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington

November 8, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DANNY C. REEVES, CHIEF JUDGE

Defendants Board of Education of Fayette County, Kentucky and Kentucky Department of Education have filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on assertions that Plaintiff Joseph Boggs' Complaint is untimely. [Record No. 9] Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the parties' arguments, the Court concludes that the Complaint was filed prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, the defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss will be denied.

I. Background

Plaintiff Joseph Boggs received services in Fayette County Public Schools (“FCPS”) as a child with a disability. [Record No. 1-1 at 1-2] After he purportedly graduated high school, he requested a Due Process Hearing with the Kentucky Department of Education pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and 707 KAR 1:340. Id. at 6. During the hearing, he argued that he was being denied an appropriate education because he did not have an appropriate transition plan, did not receive a manifestation determination hearing, was allowed to make-up failed classes to graduate, and was not permitted to attend graduation and its related activities. Id. at 2-3. Following the hearing, the final order issued required FCPS to provide Boggs with twenty-seven hours of Orientation and Mobility Training but denied all other relief. Id. at 30. Boggs filed an appeal with the Exceptional Children Appeals Board (“ECAB”) which affirmed the decision of the hearing officer on March 11, 2024, and emailed it to Boggs on March 12, 2024. Id. at 56 58.

Pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 13B.140 Boggs filed a civil action in Fayette Circuit Court seeking judicial review of the administrative determinations.^[1][Record No. 1-6 at 2] The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that it was filed beyond the thirty-day statutory period. [Record No 1-5] Two weeks later, the defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. [Record No. 1] Boggs objected to the removal and requested that the matter be remanded to state court. However, his motion was denied. [Record Nos. 3, 8] Thereafter, the defendants filed the instant Joint Motion to Dismiss. [Record Nos. 7-9]

IL Legal Standard

To “survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible upon its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While the Court need not accept legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences, the allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and all reasonable inferences must be construed in the plaintiff's favor. Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the Court will dismiss a complaint if the factual allegations are insufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Rule 12(b)(6) motions are generally not an appropriate vehicle for dismissing a claim based on a statute of limitations violation except when the complaint, on its face, reveals that it is time-barred. Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012). However, for dismissal to be proper in that context, the complaint must affirmatively show the plaintiff “can prove no set of facts to entitle him to relief.” Dimond Rigging Co., LLC v. BDP Int'l, Inc., 914 F.3d 435, 441 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations and emphasis omitted).

While courts are generally limited to considering the pleadings, they can consider certain items without converting the motion to one for summary judgment, including public records, exhibits attached to the complaint, and those attached to the motion to dismiss “so long as they are referred to in the complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett, 528 F.3d at 430.

III. Analysis

The parties agree that KRS 13B.140 applies and, therefore, Boggs appeal of the ECAB's final order needed to be filed within thirty days (i.e., by April 11, 2024). [Record Nos. 9 at 4, 10 at 1] Plaintiff first eFiled his Complaint in Fayette Circuit Court with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) along with the required affidavit on April 9, 2024.

[Record No. 10, 10-1] Boggs included the documents required by the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 5.05^[2], but the next morning, the clerk denied the submission explaining:

The In forma Pauperis needs to be attached with a separate proposed order to proceed in forma pauperis, so it can reach the judge's portal for them to rule on.

Please attach the order and re-submit. Thanks, JS

These item(s) must be resolved and resubmitted to the Circuit Clerk by April 12, 2024 at 11:59PM Eastern

No payment was collected for this efiling. EFiling transactions are preauthorized at the time of envelope submission but not finalized until clerk acceptance. (emphasis in original)

[Record No. 10-1] Boggs refiled his Complaint, IFP motion, affidavit, and requested proposed order on Friday, April 12, 2024, at 5:20 p.m. [Record No. 10-3] The clerk processed and accepted the filing the following Monday. [Record No. 10-3 at 6] The stamped notation identified the Complaint as “filed” and the IFP documents as “tendered” on April 12, 2024- one day after the statute of limitations expired. [Record No. 1] The date on the summons for the Board of Education bears that same date. [Record No. 9]

The defendants argue that because the Complaint, on its face, is marked by the clerk as filed on April 12-it is untimely and subject to dismissal. [Record No. 9 at 5] They further contend that the thirty-day period to appeal the ECAB's order is a jurisdictional deadline, requiring strict compliance. Id. (citing J.M. v. Oldham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 647 S.W.3d 279 (Ky. Ct. App. 2022)). First the defendants acknowledge the Supreme Court of Kentucky's eFiling Rules which allow a party to correct a filing error within two days and preserve the original filing date. [Record No. 9 at 5] Then, they point to Section 18(1) of those same rules which provides that “[s]ome deadlines are jurisdictional and cannot be extended.”^[3]Id. Finally, they cite CR 3.01 stating that a civil action is “commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court and the issuance of a summons or warning order thereon in good faith” and to KRS 413.250(1), explaining that an action “shall be deemed to commence on the date of the first summons or process issued in good faith from the court having jurisdiction.” Id.

In sumary, the defendants interpret the facts and relevant rules as follows: (1) plaintiff made a filing error when he failed to attach a proposed order to proceed IFP, meaning his Complaint was not “filed” on April 9, 2024; (2) the two-day grace period provided to plaintiff did not apply in his circumstance because the thirty-day period was jurisdictional; (3) because the defendants' summons bears the April 12, 2024 date, the civil action was not “commenced” before the statute of limitations lapsed; and (4) this Court lacks jurisdiction, and the plaintiff failed to state a claim because the Complaint is marked “filed” one day late.

Conversely, Boggs argues that his Complaint was not rejected by the clerk, there was no mistake in his filing, and it was filed on April 9, 2024. [Record No. 10] To show the Complaint was not rejected, he references the clerk's request sent to him on April 10, 2024, which included that eFiling transactions are “preauthorized at the time of submission.” Id. at 2. Regarding any allegation of mistake, Boggs insists that neither CR 73.02, now Rules of Appellate Practice (“RAP”) 3, nor Fayette County Local Rule 31 on in forma pauperis require a proposed order. Id. at 3 n.1. He contends that his Complaint was timely filed, despite the “filed” April 12, 2024, notation by the clerk. [See Record No. 10.] In support, he cites CR 73.02, now RAP 3(A)(3), which says “if the notice of appeal is timely tendered and accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis . . . the notice of appeal or cross-appeal shall be considered timely but shall not be filed until the motion is granted or, if denied, the filing fee is paid.” Id. While the plaintiff does not believe there are issues with the filing of the Complaint, he contends that it should not be dismissed because, at a minimum, it was issued in “good faith.” [Record No. 10] (quoting Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n v. Motion, 592 S.W.3d 739, 746 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019) (allowing an appeal to proceed despite lacking a timely summons because it was issued in good faith)); see also [Record 10-5 at 8] (citing Motion, 592 S.W.3d at 746 (citing CR 3.01; KRS 413.250) (outlining the role of good faith in summonses and process)).

According to the plaintiff: (1) his Complaint was tendered on April 9, 2024; (2) the clerk's request for a proposed order to proceed IFP did not mean there was an error in the filing; (3) the April 12, 2024 “filed” notation is not dispositive because the relevant statutes indicate that when accompanied by an IFP motion, the Complaint is considered filed on the date it is tendered; and (4) he should be allowed to proceed even though the summons was dated April 12, 2024, because it was issued in good faith.

The issues raised in the defendants' motion involve a host of moving parts. To resolve this motion, however, the Court need not address each one....