Bolen v. N.M. Racing Comm'n

1

BRAD BOLEN a/k/a BRADLEY CARROL BOLEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEW MEXICO RACING COMMISSION; and FABIAN LOPEZ, Records Custodian for New Mexico Racing Commission, Defendants-Appellants.

No. A-1-CA-41120

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

April 16, 2024

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

Appeal from the District court of Bernalillo County Joshua a Allison, District Court Judge

Western Agriculture, Resource and Business Advocates, LLP A Blair Dunn Jared R. Vander Dussen Albuquerque, NM for Appellee

Jackson Loman Stanford Downey & Stevens-Block, P.C. Eric Loman Albuquerque, NM for Appellants

OPINION

BOGARDUS, JUDGE.

{¶1}This case requires us to interpret, for the first time, whether judicial immunity is a defense available to a "public body" under the New Mexico Civil Rights Act (CRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4A-1 to -13 (2021). Defendant, the New Mexico Racing Commission (NMRC)^[1] filed a motion for summary judgment in the district court, which argued, in relevant part, that NMRC has absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit for its decision to initiate and prosecute an administrative disciplinary proceeding against Plaintiff Brad Bolen. The district court denied NMRC's motion for summary judgment, concluding that because judicial immunity applies only to individuals, NMRC is not immune from suit under the CRA. On appeal, NMRC argues that the district court erred in denying its motion because judicial immunity is expressly preserved under Section 41-4A-10 of the CRA and, under the facts of this case, it is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.^[2] We agree with NMRC that the district court erred and therefore reverse and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of NMRC.

BACKGROUND

{¶2} This case arises from a dispute between Bolen, licensed by NMRC as a horse trainer, and a chief steward over the reinstatement of the license of an assistant trainer that Bolen wished to employ. After learning that his assistant trainer's license would not be reinstated after a lengthy period of suspension, Bolen contacted the chief steward to advocate for the reinstatement of the license. It is undisputed that Bolen was critical of the chief steward's performance during their dispute. Based on Bolen's behavior, NMRC initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against him for violating 16.47.1,8(L)(1)(i) NMAC.^[3]

{¶3} The board of stewards held a hearing on the matter and ruled that Bolen had violated 16.47.1.8(L)(1)(i) NMAC and issued a $500 fine, which was immediately waived and would be completely abated should Plaintiff have no violations for a period of one year. Bolen appealed to the board of stewards, seeking a review before an independent hearing officer. Contemporaneously, Bolen filed the underlying complaint in district court to establish NMRC's liability and recover damages and equitable relief under Section 41-4A-3 of the CRA alleging, in relevant part,^[4] that NMRC retaliated against him by initiating "a vindictive prosecution" against him, violating his rights under Article II, Sections 17 and 18 of the New Mexico Constitution. The administrative hearing was scheduled to take place but, before the hearing, Bolen withdrew his appeal choosing only to pursue litigation.

{¶4} subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. Bolen also filed a motion for partial summary judgment on his claims against NMRC. A hearing on the two motions took place. Following the hearing, the district court granted Bolen's motion for summary judgment, in part, and denied NMRC's motion. The district court concluded that NMRC is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity based on the distin ction between the types of claims for relief allowed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, versus those allowed under the CRA. Specifically, the district court reasoned that because "[t]he immunities available under [§] 1983 are based in public policy that protects an individual defendant from personal liability for damages" and this public policy is not at issue under the CRA-NMRC is not immune from suit.

{¶5} Following the district court's denial of its motion, NMRC promptly filed both an application for interlocutory appeal and petition for writ of error to this Court. We granted both and consolidated the appeals.

DISCUSSION

{¶6} We begin by determining whether judicial immunity, as well as its extension-quasi-judicial immunity, is a defense available to public bodies sued under the CRA.^[5] Because we conclude-based on our plain language interpretation of the relevant statutory section-that it is, we then determine whether NMRC is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for the claims brought against it by Bolen. We hold that NMRC is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity under the facts of this case.

I. Standard of Review

{¶7} We review the district court's denial of summary judgment de novo, see Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 5, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of a trial on the merits. Upton v. Clovis Mun. Sch. Dist., 2006-NMSC-040, ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 205, 141 P.3d 1259. "Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Roth v. Thompson, 1992-NMSC-Oll, ¶ 17, 113 N.M. 331,825 P.2dl241.

IL Quasi-Judicial Immunity is a Defense Available to Public Bodies Under Section 41-4A-10 of the CRA

{¶8} NMRC asserts that the district court erred in concluding that a public body cannot raise quasi-judicial immunity as a defense under the CRA-arguing that Section 41-4A-10 explicitly preserves this defense. Bolen does not dispute NMRC's argument that quasi-judicial immunity can apply to a public body under the CRA. We agree with NMRC that the district court erred.

{¶9} We review Section 41-4A-10 de novo. See Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004-NMSC-010, ¶ 10, 135 N.M. 397, 89 P.3d 69 ("Statutory interpretation is a question of law which we review de novo."). "When construing statutes our charge is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent." Wild Horse Observers Ass'n v. N.M. Livestock Bd., 2022-NMCA-061, ¶ 8, 519 P.3d 74 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "New Mexico courts have long honored this statutory command through application of the plain meaning rule, recognizing that when a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation." Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 37, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (text only) (citation omitted). "Statutes must also be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous, and we will not read into a statute language which is not there." Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. &Mun. Emps. v. City of Albuquerque, 2013-NMCA-063, ¶ 5, 304 P.3d 443 (omission, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). Moreover, "[w]e consider all parts of the statute together, reading the statute in its entirety and construing each part in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole." Dep I of Game &Fish v. Rawlings, 2019-NMCA-018, ¶ 6, 436 P.3d 741 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

{¶10} Pursuant to the CRA, a person can bring an action "to establish liability and recover actual damages and equitable or injunctive relief in any New Mexico district court" for the deprivation of their rights under the New Mexico Constitution "due to acts or omissions of a public body or person acting on behalf of, under color of or within the course and scope of the authority of a public body." Section 41-4A-3(B). Moreover, under the CRA, a claim may only be brought against a public body, not an individual. Section 41-4A-3(C). The CRA defines "public body" as "a state or local government, an advisory board, a commission, an agency or an entity created by the constitution of New Mexico or any branch of government that receives public funding." Section 41-4A-2. The parties do not dispute that NMRC qualifies as a "public body" within the meaning of Section 41-4A-2-NMRC is a state agency created by the Horse Racing Act to regulate the sport and industry of racing.

{¶11} The statutory section at issue in this case is Section 41-4A-10, which states,

The prohibition on the use of the defense of qualified immunity pursuant to Section 41-4A-10 ... of the New Mexico [CRA] and the waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 41-4A-9 ... of that act shall not abrogate judicial immunity, legislative immunity or any other constitutional, statutory or common law immunity.

NMRC contends that because Section 41-4A-10 expressly states that judicial immunity is not abrogated by the prohibition on the defense of qualified immunity and the waiver of sovereign immunity within Sections 41-4A-4 and -9 of the CRA- it is a defense available under the CRA. Moreover, according to NMRC, this language read together with Section 41-4A-3(C), which limits claims under the CRA to those "brought exclusively against a public body," signifies that a public body sued pursuant to the CRA may raise judicial immunity as a defense. Interpreting the statute otherwise, according to NMRC, would render Section 41-4A-10 "meaningless and unnecessary."

{¶12} Reading Sections 41-4A-10, -2, and -3(C) together-we hold that a public body that is sued under the CRA may raise judicial immunity, as well as quasi-judicial immunity, as a defense. See State v. Parish...