Bond v. The Sheriff of Ottawa Cnty.

1

Austin P. Bond as Personal Representative of the Estate of Terral Ellis II, Plaintiff, v. The Sheriff of Ottawa County, in his Official Capacity, Defendant.

No. 4:17-cv-00325-CRK-CDL

United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma

February 29, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

Claire R. Kelly, Judge ^[*]

Three motions are before the Court made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 filed by Defendant Sheriff of Ottawa County, in his official capacity (“Defendant”): (i) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (“Mot. JMOL”), Oct. 5, 2023 ECF No. 410; (ii) Motion for New Trial, Oct. 5, 2023, ECF No 411 (“Mot. New Trial”); and (iii) Motion for Remittitur, Oct. 5, 2023, ECF No. 412 (“Mot Remit.”). For the following reasons all three of Defendant's motions are denied.

BACKGROUND

This matter involves the death of Terral Brooks Ellis II (“Mr. Ellis”). In response to an outstanding warrant, the 26-year-old Ellis surrendered himself to the Ottawa County Jail on October 10, 2015. Pretrial Order at 3 Aug. 4, 2023, ECF No. 352-1 (“Stip. Facts”). Mr. Ellis was detained at the jail between October 10 and October 22, 2015. Id. at 3-5.

On October 22, 2015, Mr. Ellis died of sepsis and pneumonia. Id. at 5. On June 9, 2017, Plaintiff Austin P. Bond (“Plaintiff”), as the personal representative of Mr. Ellis's estate, filed suit against the Sheriff of Ottawa County in his official capacity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Compl., June 9, 2017, ECF No. 2. Plaintiff alleged that the jail did not provide Ellis with adequate medical care as a pre-trial detainee and thus violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at ¶¶ 49-64. In August of 2023, the case was tried in the Northern District of Oklahoma. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Plaintiff's case. Tr. of Proc. Jury Trial at 1028:7-32:6, Aug. 1523, 2023, ECF Nos. 377, 379, 393-98, 403-07 (“Trial Tr.”). The Court denied Defendant's motion. Id. at 1035:9. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, awarding compensatory damages in the amount of $33 million as well as postjudgment interest at a rate of 5.39% per annum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. See Jury Verdict, August 8, 2023, ECF No. 392. Pursuant to the jury's decision, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff on September 8, 2023. See Judgment, Sept. 8, 2023, ECF No. 400. On October 5, 2023, Defendant filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, a motion for a new trial, and a motion for remittitur. See generally Mot. JMOL; Mot. New Trial; Mot. Remit.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, because it arises under the laws of the United States. Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), the district court has authority to grant judgment as a matter of law to the moving party at the close of the non-moving party's evidence. A party denied judgment as a matter of law may renew its motion within 28 days after judgment is entered. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). Judgment as a matter of law is only an appropriate remedy when “the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the nonmoving party's position.” Mountain Dudes v. Split Rock Holdings, Inc., 946 F.3d 1122, 1129 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing In re: Cox Enters., Inc., 871 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 2017)) (internal quotations omitted).

After a jury trial, the district court may, on motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1)(A), “grant a new trial on all or some of the issues . . . for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” The decision to grant a new trial is at the discretion of the district court. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984); Hinds v. Gen. Motors Corp., 988 F.2d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 1993). To successfully overturn a verdict rendered by the jury, it must be shown there were “trial errors which constitute prejudicial error or that the verdict is not based on substantial evidence.” White v. Conoco, Inc., 710 F.2d 1442, 1443 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing Rasmussen Drilling, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir. 1978)).

The district court will grant remittitur if the jury's verdict is unsupported by substantial evidence or the product of jury passion or prejudice. O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1448 (10th Cir. 1987). The jury possesses “wide latitude to choose an award based on the evidence.” Hill v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 815 F.3d 651, 668 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing Prager v. Campbell Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 731 F.3d 1046, 1063 (10th Cir. 2013)). If a “jury award is supported by sufficient evidence” it is appropriate for the district court to deny remittitur. See Therrien v. Target Corp., 617 F.3d 1242, 1258 (10th Cir. 2010). Remittitur is appropriate only when “the jury award is so excessive . . . as to shock the judicial conscience and to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or another improper cause invaded the trial.” Fresquez v. BNSF Railway Co., 52 F.4th 1280, 1315 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 1035 (10th Cir. 2019)) (internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Defendant argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff failed to present evidence at trial which supports the verdict. See generally Mot. JMOL. Specifically, Defendant argues that the evidence did not support that Mr. Ellis' constitutional right to receive adequate medical care as a pre-trial detainee was violated, or that a policy or custom of Defendant led to the violation of Mr. Ellis' constitutional right to receive medical care as a pre-trial detainee. Id. at 5.

A. Underlying Constitutional Violation

Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to medical care when in a custodial setting. Paugh v. Uintah Cnty., 47 F.4th 1139, 1153 (10th Cir. 2022) cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. Calder, 143 S.Ct. 2658 (2023). Deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical illness constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees are entitled to the same protections as inmates under the Eighth Amendment. Burke, 935 F.3d at 991. Deliberate indifference requires “proof that [an] actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). “Deliberate indifference involves both an objective and subjective component.” Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1315 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted). To satisfy the objective component of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show “the medical condition or harm claimed by the inmate was ‘sufficiently serious' to be cognizable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.” Prince v. Sheriff of Carter Cnty., 28 F.4th 1033, 1044 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009)). The subjective component of deliberate indifference is satisfied if it is shown that the government official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Burke, 935 F.3d at 992 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “An official's failure to alleviate a significant risk of which he was unaware, no matter how obvious the risk or how gross his negligence in failing to perceive it, is not an infliction of punishment and therefore not a constitutional violation.” Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008). However, “[b]ecause it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove another person's actual state of mind, whether an official had knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.” DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 975 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 809-10 (10th Cir. 1999)). Thus, “the existence of an obvious risk to health or safety may indicate awareness of the risk.” Rife v. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety, 854 F.3d 637, 647 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

During the trial, the jury was presented overwhelming evidence from which it could conclude that the jail staff not only knew about Mr. Ellis' condition but were also indifferent to it. As an example, on the evening of October 21, 2015, Mr Ellis asked D.O.^[1] Lawson “do you mind giving me some meds and my inhaler?” to which D.O. Lawson replied “no, that's a nurse thing. The nurse has to okay [inaudible] we'll call her tomorrow.” Pl. Exh. 68 at 20:20.^[2] Later that evening, Mr. Ellis told D.O. Lawson and D.O. Bray that he could not move his legs and asked them to call an ambulance, to which D.O. Bray responded, “you're paralyzed now?” and reiterated that he would call the nurse. Pl. Exh. 55 at 21:55:47. On the morning of October 22, 2015, after screaming to get the attention of Assistant Jail Administrator (“A.J.A.”) Charles Shoemaker, Mr. Ellis again expressed that there was something wrong with his legs; however, A.J.A. Shoemaker refused to call emergency services. Stip. Facts ¶ 3. In the middle of an exchange with D.O. Bray, Brenda Pierce, the jail's lunch lady, can be heard saying “that poor guy needs help” before ultimately mocking and dismissing him, by asking, “if you can't breathe how can you talk?” Pl. Exh. 58 at 8:36:53. At one point, Mr. Ellis...