Bonnie v. Dunbar

1

GREGORY ALLEN BONNIE, Plaintiff, v. R.S. DUNBAR, Warden, Defendant.

No. 4:23-cv-01215-DCN

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division

May 9, 2024

ORDER

DAVID C. NORTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the court on Magistrate Judge Thomas E Rogers, III's report and recommendation (“R&R”), ECF No. 50, that the court grant defendant R.S. Dunbar's (“Warden Dunbar”) motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment ECF No. 20. For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts the R&R in full and grants Warden Dunbar's motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Gregory Allen Bonnie (“Bonnie”) is an inmate designated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to serve his sentence at the Satellite Prison Camp adjacent to Federal Correctional Institution Williamsburg (“FCI Williamsburg”) in Salters, South Carolina.^[1]He filed this petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that the BOP is denying him time credits he earned under the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, for his participation in Evidence-Based Recidivism Reduction (“EBRR”) programming. ECF No. 1, Pet.

The FSA governs the calculation of federal prison sentences. Eligible federal inmates may earn additional good time credits under the FSA. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). One way those eligible inmates may earn good time credits is through completion of EBRR programming, which allows that inmate to earn time credits to be applied toward time in pre-release custody or supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). However, a prisoner is ineligible to receive time credits if the prisoner is serving a sentence for a disqualifying offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D). Relevant here, a “prisoner is ineligible to receive time credits under this paragraph if the prisoner is serving a sentence for a conviction” under § 924(c), “relating to unlawful possession or use of a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii). Bonnie is currently imprisoned after he pleaded guilty to two criminal sentences for separate offenses. He pleaded guilty to drug distribution offenses as well as possession of a firearm in violation of § 924(c) in his first offense.^[2] United States v. Bonnie (“USA v. Bonnie I”), No. 2:04-cr-00546-DCN-1 (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2005), ECF No. 106. For his second offense, Bonnie pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to possess and distribute illicit drugs as well as possession with intent to distribute heroin and methamphetamine on a specific date.3United States v. Bonnie, (“USA v. Bonnie II”), No. 2:19-cr-0060-DCN-3 (D.S.C. May 27, 2021), ECF No. 1128. Bonnie's conviction for violation of § 924(c) makes him ineligible for FSA time credit for EBRR programming. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D). The parties dispute whether that ineligibility only applies to his sentence for USA v. Bonnie I or to both that sentence and the sentence imposed for USA v. Bonnie II, which are set to run consecutively. As Bonnie's counsel succinctly phrased it: “Does the 24-month § 924(c) revocation sentence taint the separately imposed 120-month drug sentence such that Mr. Bonnie is ineligible to earn FSA time credits for the entire 144-month sentence?” ECF No. 39 at 8.^[3]

On March 27, 2023, Bonnie filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 1, Pet. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), all pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to Magistrate Judge Rogers. On May 31, 2023, Warden Dunbar filed the instant motion to dismiss or, alternatively, other, but consecutively to the term of imprisonment imposed in the second criminal case described hereinafter. USA v. Bonnie I, ECF No. 166. for summary judgment. ECF No. 20. On August 13, 2023, Bonnie responded in opposition, ECF No. 39, to which Warden Dunbar replied on August 28, 2023, ECF No. 43.^[4] On January 16, 2024, Magistrate Judge Rogers issued the R&R recommending the court grant Warden Dunbar's motion for summary judgment and dismiss the Petition. ECF No. 50, R&R. On February 14, 2024, Bonnie filed objections to the R&R. ECF No. 54, to which Warden Dunbar responded on March 12, 2024, ECF No. 58. As such, the motion is fully briefed and is ripe for review.

II. STANDARD

A. Order on R&R

The recommendation of the magistrate judge carries no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination rests with this court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge . . . or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which specific, written objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party's failure to object is accepted as agreement with the conclusions of the magistrate judge. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985).

In the absence of a timely filed, specific objection, the court reviews the report and recommendation only for clear error. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[a] party's general objections are not sufficient to challenge a magistrate judge's findings.” Greene v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Lab'ys, Inc., 455 F.Supp.2d 483, 488 (D.S.C. 2006) (citation omitted). When a party's objections are directed to strictly legal issues “and no factual issues are challenged, de novo review of the record may be dispensed with.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). Analogously, de novo review is unnecessary when a party makes general and conclusory objections without directing the court's attention to a specific error in a magistrate judge's proposed findings. Id.

B. Summary Judgment^[5]

Summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248. “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249. The court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all inferences in its favor. Id. at 255.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Administrative Exhaustion

Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not contain a statutory exhaustion requirement, courts have required prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking habeas review under § 2241. See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct., 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973) (requiring exhaustion in a § 2241 matter); Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 525, 531 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting courts require “exhaustion of alternative remedies before a prisoner can seek federal habeas relief” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Exhaustion allows prison officials to develop a factual record and provides “an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007).

The Attorney General, through the BOP, has responsibility for imprisoning federal offenders. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 331 (1992) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a)). This responsibility includes the calculation of an inmate's term of imprisonment, which is recognized as an “administrative purpose” well within the BOP's responsibilities as charged by Congress. See id. at 333-35. If the Attorney General, through the BOP, does not give Bonnie the sentencing credit he believes he deserves, he can seek an administrative remedy. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 (2014). If Bonnie remains unsatisfied with the result upon exhausting his administrative remedies, he may file a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Wilson, 503 U.S. at 336.

Neither party contends that Bonnie has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and the court likewise finds them exhausted. R&R at 3 n.2; ECF No. 54 at 4 (noting that the parties agree that Bonnie exhausted his administrative remedies with the BOP prior to filing this action). Thus, Bonnie's § 2241 petition is properly before the court.

B. Statutory Interpretation of the FSA

The court begins with the sections of the FSA that the parties agree are unambiguous before reviewing those provisions where the parties' interpretations diverge. Thereafter the court will “use ‘traditional tools of statutory construction' to determine ‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.'” Julmice v. Garland, 29 F.4th 206, 207 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472 480 (4th Cir. 2012)). “If-and only if-[the court's] interpretive toolkit leaves [it] with a...