Bonta, LLC v. City of Marysville

BONTA, LLC, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MARYSVILLE, a municipal corporation, Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:18-cv-01544-BJR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

November 14, 2019

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter involves a dispute between Plaintiff Bonta, LLC ("Bonta") and the City of Marysville, Washington (the "City") over local zoning codes and their application to commercial property owned by Bonta. The case was removed to this Court because, in addition to its state law claims, Bonta alleges violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Before the Court are both the City's and Bonta's Motions for Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 22 and 25. Having reviewed the motions, oppositions thereto, the record of the case, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court will grant the City's motion as to the federal law claims and deny Bonta's motion as to those same claims. Having done so, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and dismisses them without prejudice. The reasoning for the Court's decision follows.

II. BACKGROUND

At issue is property located at 1217 1^st Street, Marysville, WA 98270 (the "Property"). Bonta owns the Property and leases it to Kodiak Industrial Solutions, LLC ("Kodiak"), which runs a spray-on coating business. Dkt. No. 22 at 3-4; Dkt. No. 25 at 4. Bonta has owned the Property since 2012 and, after running a business there for some time, sold the business and began leasing out the Property instead. Kodiak executed a lease with Bonta on September 11, 2017.

The Property is located in Marysville's Downtown Commercial zone. On November 27, 2017, Kodiak applied to the City for a business license, describing its business as "specialty coating applicator and industrial cleaning contractor." Dkt. No. 22 at 4. At the time, Kodiak described its use of the Property to the City as a "base for employees where material and equipment would be stored." Id. at 14 (quoting Dkt. No. 28-10 at 2). From there, Kodiak explained, "an employee arrives at the beginning of their shift to get whatever materials are needed for the specific jobs they have for that day, load the materials into the company vehicle, and depart." Id. Based on this description, the City determined that storage was the only thing the property would be used for and classified the business as "Contractor's Office and Storage Yard." Id. at 4, 14.

Pursuant to that classification, Kodiak was required to comply with local Marysville Municipal Code ("MMC") § 22C.020.070(30), which provides:

Outdoor storage of materials or vehicles must be accessory to the primary building area and located to the rear of buildings. Outdoor storage is subject to an approved landscape plan that provides for effective screening of storage, so that it is not visible from public right-of-way or neighboring properties.

MMC § 22C.020.070(30) ("Outdoor Storage Provision").

According to the City, both Kodiak and Bonta are currently in violation of the Outdoor Storage Provision because "[t]here is substantial outdoor storage (of several trucks and othersupplies). It is not in the rear of the building. There is no approved landscape plan. And this is visible from virtually every direction." Dkt. No. 22 at 2. Bonta, for its part, does not dispute that there is noncomplying storage at the Property. See Dkt. No. 25 at 4. Instead, it claims that the storage should be permitted as a "historical non-conforming use" of the Property) and further alleges that the City treats its property different from two nearby properties, which similarly store vehicles and storage outside without shielding them from the public right-of-way. Id. at 4-5.

The City first attempted to work with Kodiak to bring its business into compliance. Dkt. No. 22 at 5. The City issued Kodiak a temporary permit to allow it to operate through May 1, 2018, and later extended the permit to July 1, 2018 when Kodiak requested additional time to relocate its business. Id.

Bonta, however, in an effort to assist its tenant, filed an appeal of the Marysville Director of Community Development's April 4, 2018 administrative ruling that Kodiak could continue its business only if it complied with the Outdoor Storage Provision. Dkt. No. 22 at 5. On August 29, 2018, an administrative hearing was held before a Hearing Examiner, who issued a Decision against Bonta on September 20, 2018. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3; Dkt. No. 22 at 8. Bonta appealed this decision to the Superior Court for the State of Washington under Washington's Land Use Petition Action ("LUPA"), RCW Ch. 36.70C. Dkt. No. 22 at 8.

Additionally, around this time, Bonta submitted numerous record requests to the City for information related to the Property, with which it maintains the City has still not fully complied. Dkt. No. 25 at 5-6. Along with its Land Use Petition, Bonta filed a complaint alleging four causes of action: (1) Void For Vagueness under the United States Constitution and Washington State Constitution; (2) Violation of the Equal Protection Clause under the United States Constitutionand Washington State Constitution; (3) Violation of Washington Public Records Act, RCW 42.56, et seq.; and (4) Intentional Interference with Business Expectancy. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 9-12.

The matter was removed from Superior Court citing Bonta's invocation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 1-1. On October 4, 2019 both parties moved for Summary Judgment. Dkt. Nos. 22 and 25.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary Judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56. "A fact is 'material' if it might affect the outcome of the case." California Expanded Metal Prod. Co. v. Klein, 396 F. Supp. 3d 956, 967 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute is "'genuine' only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party." Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ("a material fact is 'genuine,' . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."). Finally, a movant is entitled to judgment "as a matter of law" where the nonmoving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

The movant bears the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to prevail as a matter of law. See Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. Walflor Indus., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). "[W]hen simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment on the same claim are before the court, the court must consider the appropriate evidentiary material identified and submitted insupport of both motions, and in opposition to both motions, before ruling on each of them." Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Massachusetts Bay Ins., 383 F. Supp. 3d at 1156. In such circumstances, the Court "rule[s] on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard." Tulalip Tribes of Washington v. Washington, 783 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 1998)); see also Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2011) ("the court must consider each party's evidence, regardless under which motion the evidence is offered").

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Bonta's Motion for Summary Judgment

1. Void for Vagueness

Bonta's complaint asserts a cause of action for "void for vagueness, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution" seeking a declaration that the Outdoor Storage Provision is unconstitutional. Dkt. No. 1-2 at ¶ 9-10. Bonta moves for summary judgment on this claim. See Dkt. No. 25 at 8-9. The City opposes and claims that the Outdoor Storage Provision is sufficiently clear, and that Bonta has failed to show otherwise. See Dkt. No. 22 at 9-12; Dkt. No. 31 at 3-5.

The complaint appears to challenges the regulation's use of the words "storage," "vehicles," and "parking," claiming they are "impermissibly vague and ambiguous." Dkt. No. 1-2 at 10. Bonta's motion for summary judgment, however, does little to elaborate on this cause. Instead, in its section entitled "Downtown Commercial Code is Unconstitutionally Vague," itstates that the City's zoning code "violates the Washington and Federal Constitutions" and then provides a number of conclusory statements that do not address any of the words which it challenged in its complaint. See Dkt. No. 25 at 8-9. Thus, broadly, Bonta's complaint appears to be that the code fails to provide a clear standard to apply.

"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see also Edge v. City of Everett, 929 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2019). But, "[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language," Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, and thus, "perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity." United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989)).

This doctrine incorporates two related requirements. See Edge, 929 F.3d at 664. First, "laws [must] give the person of ordinary...