Booker v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.

1

JOANN BOOKER, Plaintiff, v. DEPT OF SOCIAL SERVICES; LONGBEACH POLICE DEPT, Defendants.

No. 23-CV-04888 (NCM) (ARL)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

August 22, 2024

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NATASHA C. MERLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Before the Court is defendant Department of Social Services' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 31 (the “Motion”).^[1] Plaintiff Joann Booker brings this action against defendants Department of Social Services and the Longbeach Police Department^[2] for alleged violations of her constitutional rights. For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is GRANTED without prejudice. The Court grants plaintiff leave to amend her complaint as to defendant Department of Social Services within thirty (30) days of this Order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's operative complaint names, among others, defendant Department of Social Services for Nassau County, New York (“DSS”). ECF Nos. 6, 14 (together, the “amended complaint”).^[3] As to DSS, plaintiff alleges that “CPS,” which the Court construes to mean Nassau County's Child Protective Services, “was called apparently” before and after a child, presumably plaintiff's, was born. Am. Compl. 8-9, ECF No. 6 (“AC”). Plaintiff further alleges that the allegations made to CPS were “not proven,” the “case was unfounded,” and CPS “has provided no real evidence” as to plaintiff's competence to care for her children. AC at 9. Plaintiff also alleges that her children “are not being cared for properly as well as have been injured in care.” AC at 9.

On April 23, DSS moved to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint. After plaintiff failed to oppose the Motion, the Court sua sponte extended the deadline for plaintiff to file her opposition and warned plaintiff that if she did not file an opposition by that date, the motion would be deemed fully briefed. See ECF Orders dated April 4 and June 21, 2024. Despite filing other submissions unrelated to defendant DSS or its Motion, plaintiff did not file an opposition to the Motion. Accordingly, the Court deemed the Motion fully briefed on July 31. ECF Order dated July 31 2024.

LEGAL STANDARD

Although plaintiff has not opposed the Motion, “the lack of opposition does not, without more, justify dismissal.” James v. John Jay Coll. of Crim. Just., 776 Fed.Appx. 723, 724 (2d Cir. 2019).^[4] Instead, the Court must determine the adequacy of plaintiff's complaint “as a matter of law” based on “its own reading of the pleading and knowledge of the law.” Id. (citing Goldberg v. Danaher, 599 F.3d 181, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2010)); see also Plastic Surgery Group, P.C. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. of New York, Inc., 64 F.Supp.3d 459, 468-469 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (Rule 12 motions “probe the legal, not the factual, sufficiency of a complaint.”). When deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept[] all factual claims in the complaint as true, and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 2014).

In order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must state “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff pleads a plausible claim if she alleges facts that allow the Court to reasonably infer that the defendant is legally accountable for the actions described in the complaint. Matson v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of New York, 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011). Only where “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him or her to relief” should the Court dismiss a complaint. Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 2000). The Court will not accept conclusory statements, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, but it will hold a pro se plaintiff's pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that “[e]ven after Twombly,” courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”).

DISCUSSION

DSS contends that plaintiff has not alleged enough factual information to enable it to understand the type of claim plaintiff brings or relief she seeks. Because plaintiff did not submit an opposition to the Motion, the Court must assess whether the amended complaint, construed liberally as plaintiff is pro se, could support a claim for relief against DSS. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that it could not.

I. Threshold Requirements

Plaintiff named the Department of Social Services for Nassau County as a defendant in this action. However, “a department of a municipality” such as DSS “lacks its own legal identity” and cannot be sued separate from the municipality. Michael N. v. Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 185 N.Y.S.3d 493, 513 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022). Nonetheless, the Court will construe plaintiff's claim against DSS as a claim against Nassau County (the “County”) for purposes of this Order.

Section 1983 provides an avenue through which plaintiffs may seek relief for alleged violations of their constitutional rights by state and municipal governments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”); Morris-Hayes v. Bd. of Educ. of Chester Union Free Sch. Dist., 423 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (Section 1983 “authorizes actions to enforce the rights of individuals under federal statutes as well as under the Constitution.”). In New York, plaintiffs must bring a Section 1983 claim within three years of “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of” the injuries for which she seeks relief. Lynch v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep't, Inc., 348 Fed.Appx. 672, 674 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order). However, plaintiff's amended complaint provides no dates associated with her allegations against DSS. Nor does plaintiff provide any indication as to how long ago the alleged conduct occurred, for example by indicating the ages of her children now and at the time of the allegations. The Court therefore cannot determine whether plaintiff's claims are timely at this stage. However, the Court will assume that plaintiff's claims are timely for the purpose of this Order and proceed to a merits analysis.

When a plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, such as the County, she must allege three elements: “(1) a municipal policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Agosto v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 97 (2d Cir. 2020). This kind of claim-alleging that a local government's policy or custom inflicted constitutional harm on a plaintiff-is called a Monell claim. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Court construes plaintiff's claims against the County as Monell claims. However, for the reasons stated below, plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead those claims.

II. Monell: Policy or Custom

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to support the first element of a Monell claim: the County had a “policy or custom” that led to the deprivation of her constitutional rights. See Newton v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2015); Triano v. Town of Harrison, NY, 895 F.Supp.2d 526, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (at the pleading stage, plaintiffs “must allege facts tending to support, at least circumstantially, an inference that such a municipal policy or custom exists.”). In general, plaintiffs can demonstrate a municipal policy or custom through allegations regarding “decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” 20 Dogwood LLC v. Vill. of Roslyn Harbor, No. 22-cv-o4047, 2023 WL 3571239, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2023) (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)), aff'd, No. 23-cv-00930, 2024 WL 1597642 (2d Cir. Apr. 12, 2024); see also Deferio v. City of Syracuse, 770 Fed.Appx. 587, 590 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (noting a fourth avenue for establishing municipal liability: failure to train employees). In other words, to state a Monell claim here, plaintiff would need to allege facts suggesting a widespread practice by County employees, a failure to train County employees, or actions taken by County lawmakers or policymaking officials.

Here, plaintiff alleges that CPS engaged in an “unfounded” case with “no real evidence” against her regarding the custody of her children. See AC at 8-9. However, plaintiff's amended complaint includes no allegations as to any decision or action by County officials or employees. For example, plaintiff does not indicate that CPS has pursued other unsupported child custody cases. See Walston v. City of New York, No. 22-cv-10002, 2024 WL 1376905, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1374837 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2024) (finding description of hospital policy to detain children after any report of abuse or neglect, whether or not the report was supported, sufficient to state a policy or custom for a Section 1983 claim). Nor does plaintiff allege, for example, that CPS employees are inadequately trained such that they pursue unfounded cases against parents. See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 165-167 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's finding that child services agency had policy or custom, including based on failure to train employees, regarding neglect cases against victims of domestic violence). Without any facts to suggest that CPS has a repeated practice of pursuing groundless allegations, plaintiff's amended complaint does not support a Monell claim.

Plaintiff also alleges that her children “are...